Deposits of clastic carbonate-dominated (calciclastic) sedimentary slope systems in the rock record have been identified mostly as linearly-consistent carbonate apron deposits, even though most ancient clastic carbonate slope deposits fit the submarine fan systems better. Calciclastic submarine fans are consequently rarely described and are poorly understood. Subsequently, very little is known especially in mud-dominated calciclastic submarine fan systems. Presented in this study are a sedimentological core and petrographic characterisation of samples from eleven boreholes from the Lower Carboniferous of Bowland Basin (Northwest England) that reveals a >250 m thick calciturbidite complex deposited in a calciclastic submarine fan setting. Seven facies are recognised from core and thin section characterisation and are grouped into three carbonate turbidite sequences. They include: 1) Calciturbidites, comprising mostly of highto low-density, wavy-laminated bioclast-rich facies; 2) low-density densite mudstones which are characterised by planar laminated and unlaminated muddominated facies; and 3) Calcidebrites which are muddy or hyper-concentrated debrisflow deposits occurring as poorly-sorted, chaotic, mud-supported floatstones. These

Phd by thesis

Social Network Analysis

Emotion and Adaptation

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Trust and reputation systems represent a significant trend in decision support for Internet mediated service provision. The basic idea is to let parties rate each other, for example after the completion of a transaction, and use the aggregated ratings about a given party to derive a trust or reputation score, which can assist other parties in deciding whether or not to transact with that party in the future. A natural side effect is that it also provides an incentive for good behaviour, and therefore tends to have a positive effect on market quality. Reputation systems can be called collaborative sanctioning systems to reflect their collaborative nature, and are related to collaborative filtering systems. Reputation systems are already being used in successful commercial online applications. There is also a rapidly growing literature around trust and reputation systems, but unfortunately this activity is not very coherent. The purpose of this article is to give an overview of existing and proposed systems that can be used to derive measures of trust and reputation for Internet transactions, to analyse the current trends and developments in this area, and to propose a research agenda for trust and reputation systems.

/pdf/a-survey-of-trust-and-reputation-systems-for-online-service-2vd0g0048y.pdf

A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service provision

In this paper we argue that open agent organisations can be effectively designed and implemented as institutionalised electronic organizations (electronic institutions) composed of a vast amount of heterogeneous (human and software) agents playing different roles and interacting by means of illocutions. Here we present the principal components that define an electronic institution. Source URL: https://www.iiia.csic.es/en/node/54896 Links [1] https://www.iiia.csic.es/en/staff/marc-esteva [2] https://www.iiia.csic.es/en/staff/juan-rodr%C3%ADguez-aguilar [3] https://www.iiia.csic.es/en/staff/josep-lluis-arcos [4] https://www.iiia.csic.es/en/staff/carles-sierra [5] https://www.iiia.csic.es/en/staff/pere-garc%C3%ADa

Institutionalising Open Multi-Agent Systems. A Formal Approach

Artiﬁcial Intelligence Research Institute (IIIA),Barcelona, Catalonia, Spainsierra@iiia.csic.esAbstractIn this paper we propose the use of Virtual Worldsas a 3D social interface for Electronic Institutions.It is shown how the two metaphors, Virtual Worldsand Electronic Institutions are combined into a singlemetaphor, 3D Electronic Institutions, while retainingthe features and advantages of both. Its essence isto open Electronic Institutions to human users. Thestrong methodology and powerful tools provided withElectronic Institutions create the possibility of semi-automatic generation of 3D social interfaces. UsingE-Commerce as the application domain for the newmetaphor, important cues such as social interactions,establishment of long term contacts, enhanced prod-uct observation and other real world attributes thatare missing from current on-line Web-based businessenvironments can be introduced.Keywords: Virtual Worlds, Electronic Institutions,social user interfaces, multi-agent systems, E-Commerce.1 IntroductionIndividuals today are the product of a particularlymobile and entrepreneurial society. As a result, in ev-eryday business activities, including e-commerce, theindividual is socially constituted and socially situated(Solomon 2004). However, researchers point out thatsocial needs of customers play a crucial role and are ofgreat importance in E-Commerce applications Preece& Maloney-Krichmar (2003), this needs are mostlyneglected in nowadays systems. At present, most e-commerce environments and their interfaces are de-signed with the assumption that customers buyingstyle (or behaviour) is rational, without much con-sideration of the needs of customers showing an emo-tional style of buying. Some conventional e-commercesolutions already try to meet social needs of theirusers. The popular web site Friendster.com, for in-stance, assists people in ﬁnding new contacts withthe help of other people they know and trust. Theanswer to the question “Whom do you know?” ap-pears to be a key characteristic of a businessman’ssuccess.Jung & Lee (2000) propose an environment whichincorporates a spatially-organized and interactive sitemap. This site map visualizes the location of peopleand oﬀers facilities for social interactions. Thougha good starting point, this approach does not go farenough in terms of consistency. For example, the sitemap is a separate part of the web site and not anintegral aspect of the user interface.In contrast, 3D Virtual Worlds provide a consis-tent and immersive user interface which implicitly in-corporates location awareness of other users and of-fers mechanisms for social interaction. Virtual Worldssupport to a certain extent the way humans operateand interact in the real world. Such immersive en-vironments incorporate social context, allowing cus-tomers to meet and interact with other people, andhave the potential to address the needs of both ratio-nal and emotional customers.Virtual Worlds go beyond the document and formbased interface of the World Wide Web, representingusers in a graphical form (an “avatar”, cf. (Damer1998)) and permitting them to operate, interact andcommunicate in a shared visual space, i.e. puttingthe human “in” the World Wide Web rather than“on” the World Wide Web. The underlying tech-nology supporting these worlds have been createdand hosted by variety of companies, ranging fromcomputing technology giants like Microsoft and Intel,and ending with relatively small start-ups like Ac-tive Worlds and Worlds Inc. Overall, the design anddevelopment of Virtual Worlds has emerged as a phe-nomenon shaped by the home computer user, ratherthan by the research and development in universitiesor companies. As a result, Virtual Worlds are some-what unregulated environments, which do not havethe means to enforce technological norms and ruleson their inhabitants. Hence, Virtual Worlds do notaddress the central issue of security in E-Commerce.In order to address this issue and make use of thebeneﬁts of Virtual Worlds interface we need to in-troduce methodologies on which reliable and secureE-Commerce systems build upon. Electronic Insti-tutions, for instance, focus exactly on taking controlover security aspects. In particular, Electronic In-stitutions guarantee that participants adhere to in-stitution rules and fulﬁll their obligations. In gen-eral, actors in Electronic Institutions are softwareagents and practical applications of this methodol-ogy so far aimed at building societies of completelyautonomous software agents – humans did not partici-pate at all! Nevertheless the MASFIT project pointedout that humans participating in complex decisionmaking tasks quite reluctantly delegate this activityto a completely autonomous entity, (Cun´i, Esteva,Garcia, Puertas, Sierra & Solchaga 2004). This high-lights that a better understanding and modelling ofthe relationship between humans and the agents thatmake decisions on their behalf is needed.Our major objective is to bridge the gap betweenthe two metaphors, Electronic Institutions and Vir-tual Worlds, and combine them in the metaphor of 3DElectronic Institutions. Electronic Institutions enablethe speciﬁcation of highly regulated and well struc-tured environments which contrast the mostly unreg-ulated nature of Virtual Worlds, cf. Figure 1.A 3D Electronic Institution is an environment thatenables human activities and participation in Elec-tronic Institutions. In order to achieve this goal weapply a three-layered framework and present a 3D so-cial user interface that allows humans to interact ef-

3D electronic institutions : social interfaces for e-commerce

This paper presents an initial study of the relevant issues on the development of an automated mediation agent. The work is conducted within the `curious negotiator' framework [1] . The paper demonstrates that mediation is a knowledge intensive process that integrates information revelation and analogical reasoning. The introduced formalism is used to demonstrate how via revealing the appropriate information and reshaping the set of issues of the disputing parties mediation can succeed. The paper presents MediaThor - a mediating agent that utilises past experiences and information from negotiating parties to mediate disputes and change the positions of negotiating parties.

/pdf/mediation-information-revelation-analogical-reasoning-xi5pqhex0k.pdf

Mediation = Information Revelation + Analogical Reasoning

Two key issues in building multi-agent systems concern their scalability and engineering open systems. We offer solutions to these potential problems by introducing a lifecycle for models of large multi-agent systems. Our proposal connects a model for the collective analysis of agent systems with an individual-based model. This approach leads on to a virtuous cycle in which individual behaviours can be mapped on to global models and vice-versa. We illustrate our approach with a formal example but relatively easy for engineers to follow and adapt.

/pdf/agent-oriented-software-engineering-ii-second-international-1my3nr1dbf.pdf

Agent-Oriented Software Engineering II: Second International Workshop, AOSE 2001, Montreal, Canada, May 29, 2001. Revised Papers and Invited Contributions

We propose a Case-Based Reasoning approach for action selection in the robot soccer domain presented in the 8th European Conference on Case-Based Reasoning (2006). Based on the current state of a game, the robots retrieve the most similar past situation and then the team reproduces the sequence of actions performed in that occasion. In this domain we have to deal with all the difficulties that a real environment involves.

/pdf/beyond-individualism-modeling-team-playing-behavior-in-robot-3jddi9h4gg.pdf

Carles Sierra

Papers

Institutionalising Open Multi-Agent Systems. A Formal Approach

3D electronic institutions : social interfaces for e-commerce

Mediation = Information Revelation + Analogical Reasoning

Agent-Oriented Software Engineering II: Second International Workshop, AOSE 2001, Montreal, Canada, May 29, 2001. Revised Papers and Invited Contributions

Beyond individualism: modeling team playing behavior in robot soccer through case-based reasoning