A detailed review of the education sector in Australia as in the data provided by the 2006 edition of the OECD's annual publication, 'Education at a Glance' is presented. While the data has shown that in almost all OECD countries educational attainment levels are on the rise, with countries showing impressive gains in university qualifications, it also reveals that a large of share of young people still do not complete secondary school, which remains a baseline for successful entry into the labour market.

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Education at a Glance

A recent “revisionist” literature characterizes the pronounced rise in U.S. wage inequality since 1980 as an “episodic” event of the first half of the 1980s driven by nonmarket factors (particularly a falling real minimum wage) and concludes that continued increases in wage inequality since the late 1980s substantially reflect the mechanical confounding effects of changes in labor force composition. Analyzing data from the Current Population Survey for 1963 to 2005, we find limited support for these claims. The slowing of the growth of overall wage inequality in the 1990s hides a divergence in the paths of upper-tail (90/50) inequality—which has increased steadily since 1980, even adjusting for changes in labor force composition—and lower-tail (50/10) inequality, which rose sharply in the first half of the 1980s and plateaued or contracted thereafter. Fluctuations in the real minimum wage are not a plausible explanation for these trends since the bulk of inequality growth occurs above the median ...

Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists

This article starts from the assumption that the current process of globalization or denationalization leads to the formation of a new structural conflict in Western European countries, opposing those who benefit from this process against those who tend to lose in the course of the events. The structural opposition between globalization 'winners' and 'losers' is expected to constitute potentials for political mobilization within national political contexts, the mobilization of which is expected to give rise to two intimately related dynamics: the transformation of the basic structure of the national political space and the strategic repositioning of the political parties within the transforming space. The article presents several hypotheses with regard to these two dynamics and tests them empirically on the basis of new data concerning the supply side of electoral politics from six Western European countries (Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland). The results indicate that in all the countries, the new cleavage has become embedded into existing two-dimensional national political spaces, that the meaning of the original dimensions has been transformed, and that the configuration of the main parties has become triangular even in a country like France.

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/28264/1/497813890.PDF

Globalization and the transformation of the national political space: Six European countries compared

The structure of employment is always changing, and economists are always trying to understand those changes. In the 1990s the idea of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) was used to understand the shift in employment toward more educated workers (see David H. Autor and Lawrence F. Katz 1999, for a survey). However, in recent years, it has become appar ent that a more nuanced approach is needed. The idea of SBTC might lead one to predict a uni form shift in employment away from low-skilled and toward high-skilled occupations, but studies for the United States (Autor, Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney 2006) and the United Kingdom (Goos and Manning 2007) have shown that there is growth in employment in both the high est-skilled (professional and managerial) and lowest-skilled (personal services) occupations, with declining employment in the middle of the distribution (manufacturing and routine office jobs). This is what Goos and Manning (2007) term job polarization (although see the introduc tion to Goos and Manning 2007 for antecedents of these ideas). There are several hypotheses about the rea sons for job polarization. First, the "routiniza tion" hypothesis (first put forward by Autor, Frank Levy, and Richard Murnane 2003) sug gests that the effect of technological progress is to replace "routine" labor which tends to be clerical and craft jobs in the middle of the wage distribution. Second, there is the view that globalization in general, and offshoring in par ticular, is an important source of change in the job structure in the richest countries (see, for example, Alan S. Blinder 2007). Third, there may be a link between job polarization and

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Job Polarization in Europe

The social scientific analysis of social class is attracting renewed interest given the accentuation of economic and social inequalities throughout the world. The most widely validated measure of social class, the Nuffield class schema, developed in the 1970s, was codified in the UK’s National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) and places people in one of seven main classes according to their occupation and employment status. This principally distinguishes between people working in routine or semi-routine occupations employed on a ‘labour contract’ on the one hand, and those working in professional or managerial occupations employed on a ‘service contract’ on the other. However, this occupationally based class schema does not effectively capture the role of social and cultural processes in generating class divisions. We analyse the largest survey of social class ever conducted in the UK, the BBC’s 2011 Great British Class Survey, with 161,400 web respondents, as well as a nationally representative sample survey, which includes unusually detailed questions asked on social, cultural and economic capital. Using latent class analysis on these variables, we derive seven classes. We demonstrate the existence of an ‘elite’, whose wealth separates them from an established middle class, as well as a class of technical experts and a class of ‘new affluent’ workers. We also show that at the lower levels of the class structure, alongside an ageing traditional working class, there is a ‘precariat’ characterised by very low levels of capital, and a group of emergent service workers. We think that this new seven class model recognises both social polarisation in British society and class fragmentation in its middle layers, and will attract enormous interest from a wide social scientific community in offering an up-to-date multi-dimensional model of social class.

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A new model of social class : findings from the BBC's Great British Class Survey Experiment.

During the 1990s, the working class has become the core clientele of right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. This article empirically examines the motives of workers for supporting a right- wing populist party. Based on data from the European Social Survey for Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland, three different sets of explanations are tested: (1) hypotheses stressing economic determinants, that is, the fear of wage pressure and competition over welfare benefi ts; (2) hypotheses emphasizing cultural determinants, that is, the perception of immigration as a threat to national identity; and (3) hypotheses focusing on social alienation, that is, dissatisfaction with the way the country's democracy works and the nonintegration into inter- mediary networks (trade unions). We fiquestions of community and identity to be clearly more important than economic grievances. Hence, in Austria and Switzerland, the electoral success of right-wing populist parties among workers seems primarily due to cultural protectionism: the defense of national identity against outsiders. In Belgium, France, and Norway, cultural protectionism is complemented by deep-seated discontent with the way the countries' democracies work.

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Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland:

Introduction PART I: LABOUR MARKET TRENDS AND THE THEORY OF A NEW CLASS SCHEMA Class Theorists and the Debate About the End of Class Three Labour Market Trends and their Impact on the Employment Structure Women, the Manual/Non-Manual Divide and the Working Class Horizontal Divisions Within the Middle Class The Construction Logic of a New Class Schema PART II: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT STRATIFICATION Operationalization of the New Class Schema The Class Structure of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland The Distribution of Advantage Within the Class Schema Structural Divisions Within the Schema: Public Employment and Party Support Collapsed Versions of the Detailed Class Schema PART III: CLASS AND THE CONCEPT OF INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS Introducing Institutions: The Concept of Institutional Embeddedness Class Differences in Pension System Integration Class Differences in Trade Union Membership Class Differences in Political Citizenship and Electoral Participation Cumulative Differences in Institutional Embeddedness Concluding Summary Statistical Annexe

https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_DFEE89B9C53A.P001/REF.pdf

Redrawing the Class Map: Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland

Over the last 30 years, trends such as service sector growth, welfare state expansion and rising female participation rates have promoted increasing heterogeneity within the occupational system. Accordingly, this article argues that the class map has to be redrawn in order to grasp these changes in the employment structure. For that purpose, it develops the bases of a new class schema that partly shifts its focus from hierarchical divisions to horizontal cleavages. The middle class is not conceptualized as a unitary grouping and the manual/non-manual divide is not used as a decisive class boundary. Instead, emphasis is put on differences in marketable skills and the work logic. The schema is expected to more accurately reflect the class location of unskilled service employees and to make visible the political divide within the salaried middle class. This expectation is empirically examined with survey data from Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland. Findings for earnings and promotion prospects indicate that the schema successfully captures the hierarchical dimension in the class structure. Moreover, results for party support and union membership suggest that the schema grasps a salient horizontal cleavage between managers and sociocultural professionals.

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Coming to Grips with a Changing Class Structure: An Analysis of Employment Stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland

The rise of the radical right fundamentally changes the face of electoral competition in Western Europe. Bipolar competition is becoming tripolar, as the two dominant party poles of the twentieth century – the left and the centre‐right – are challenged by a third pole of the radical right. Between 2000 and 2015, the radical right has secured more than 12 per cent of the vote in over ten Western European countries. This article shows how electoral competition between the three party poles plays out at the micro level of social classes. It presents a model of class voting that distinguishes between classes that are a party's preserve, classes that are contested strongholds of two parties and classes over which there is an open competition. Using seven rounds of the European Social Survey, it shows that sociocultural professionals form the party preserve of the left, and large employers and managers the preserve of the centre‐right. However, the radical right competes with the centre‐right for the votes of small business owners, and it challenges the left over its working‐class stronghold. These two contested strongholds attest to the co‐existence of old and new patterns of class voting. Old patterns are structured by an economic conflict: Production workers vote for the left and small business owners for the centre‐right based on their economic attitudes. In contrast, new patterns are linked to the rise of the radical right and structured by a cultural conflict.

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Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right

This paper analyzes the pattern of occupational change in four Western European countries over the last two decades: what kind of jobs have been expanding -- high-paid jobs, low-paid jobs or both? By addressing this issue, we also examine what theoretical account is consistent with the observed pattern of change: skill-biased technical change, skill supply evolution or wage-setting institutions? Our empirical findings show a picture of massive occupational upgrading that closely matches educational expansion. In all four countries, by far the strongest employment growth occurred at the top of the occupational hierarchy, among managers and professionals. Yet in parallel, in Britain and Switzerland, as well as in Germany and Spain after 1996 and 2002 respectively, relative employment declined more strongly in the middling occupations (among clerks and production workers) than at the bottom (among interpersonal service workers). This slightly polarized pattern of occupational upgrading is consistent with the "routinization" hypothesis that technology is a better substitute for average-paid jobs in production and the office that for low-paid jobs in interpersonal services. However, we find large cross-country differences in the employment evolution at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy, among low-paid services workers: sizeable growth in Britain and Spain, but stagnation in Germany and Switzerland. This results points towards the possibility that wage-setting institutions filter the pattern of occupational change.

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Daniel Oesch

Papers

Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland:

Redrawing the Class Map: Stratification and Institutions in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland

Coming to Grips with a Changing Class Structure: An Analysis of Employment Stratification in Britain, Germany, Sweden and Switzerland

Electoral competition in Europe's new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right

Upgrading or polarization? Occupational change in Britain, Germany, Spain and Switzerland, 1990-2008