ion: The grounding relations are relations of abstraction. The derivative entities, in order to be an ‘‘ontological free lunch’’ and count as no further addition, ought to be already latent within the substances. In other words, the grounding relations should just be ways of separating out aspects that are implicitly present from the start.37 Here is the sort of picture of substances that these diagnostics converge upon: Priority Monism: There is exactly one substance, the whole concrete cosmos. Insofar as there can be no difference in the world without a difference somewhere in the cosmos, priority monism delivers a complete roster of substances.38 This roster is trivially minimal, since the only proper subset of {the cosmos} is Ø, which obviously is not complete. Moreover, this roster is clearly metaphysically general—the ways the cosmos could be just are the ways the world could be.39 And this roster is empirically specifiable since advanced physics is field theoretic physics, and field theory has a natural monistic interpretation in terms of a spacetime bearing properties.40 These diagnostics also converge on: Thick Particularism: Substances are thick particulars (concrete things). 37 Scaltsas imputes a similar view to Aristotle: ‘‘for Aristotle a substance is complex, not because it is a conglomeration of distinct abstract components like matter, form, or properties; a substance is complex because such items can be separated out by abstraction, which is a kind of division of the unified substance’’ (1994: 109) 38 To see the bite of completeness, note that a pluralistic roster comprising point particles in spatiotemporal relations would fail completeness if the whole had emergent features, as are arguably present in entangled quantum systems (Schaffer forthcoming–a: §2.2). 39 In contrast, a pluralistic roster of mereological simples fails generality, since the world could be gunky. That would be a way the world that could be that is not a way that any roster of simples could be (Schaffer forthcoming–a: §2.4). 40 For instance, general relativistic models are <M, g, T> triples, where M is a four-dimensional continuously differentiable point manifold, g is a metric-field tensor, and t is a stress-energy tensor (with both g and t defined at every point of M). The obvious ontology here is that of a spacetime manifold bearing fields. Thus Norton notes: ‘‘a spacetime is a manifold of events with certain fields defined on the manifold. The literal reading is that this manifold is an independently existing structure that bears properties’’ (2004). Quantum field theory invites a similar monistic reading. As d’Espagnat explains: ‘‘Within [quantum field theory] particles are admittedly given the status of mere properties, ... But they are properties of something. This something is nothing other than space or space-time, ...’’ (1983: 84) See Schaffer (manuscript) for some further defense of the spacetime-bearing-fields view of what is fundamental. on what grounds what 379 That is, substances have both a that-aspect—the thin particular, the substratum—and a what-aspect—the thickening features, the modes (c.f. Armstrong 1997: 123–6). Plugging in priority monism, the that-aspect of the cosmos is spacetime, and the what-aspect of it is its fields. So among the derivative categories are those of substratum and mode: Substratum and Mode as Derivative: substratum and mode are abstractions from thick particulars. Another derivative category will be the partialia, abstracted via: Universal Decomposition: The cosmos may be arbitrarily decomposed into parts. From priority monism plus universal decomposition, the entirety of the actual concrete mereological hierarchy of thick particulars is generated (whether or not the world is gunky). Wholes are complete and concrete unities, and partialia their incomplete aspects, arising from a process of ‘‘one-sided abstraction’’ (Bradley 1978: 124). With the partialia thus grounded, it remains to ground abstracta (such as numbers and possibilia) in the actual concrete realm. Here matters are too complicated to discuss further within the scope of this paper. But perhaps I have said enough to illustrate how at least one of the many possible neo-Aristotelian programs might look. To conclude: metaphysics as I understand it is about what grounds what. It is about the structure of the world. It is about what is fundamental, and what derives from it.41

On What Grounds What

(2004). SNAP and SPAN: Towards Dynamic Spatial Ontology. Spatial Cognition & Computation: Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 69-104.

/pdf/snap-and-span-towards-dynamic-spatial-ontology-54nlj7p3k1.pdf

SNAP and SPAN: Towards Dynamic Spatial Ontology

Consider a circle and a pair of its semicircles. Which is prior, the whole or its parts? Are the semicircles dependent abstractions from their whole, or is the circle a derivative construction from its parts? Now in place of the circle consider the entire cosmos (the ultimate concrete whole), and in place of the pair of semicircles consider themyriad particles (the ultimate concrete parts).Which if either is ultimately prior, the one ultimate whole or its many ultimate parts? The monist holds that the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos as fundamental, with metaphysical explanation dangling downward from the One. The pluralist holds that the parts are prior to their whole, and thus tends to consider particles fundamental, with

http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/monism.pdf

Monism: The Priority of the Whole

We propose a modular formal ontology of the biomedical domain with two components, one for biological objects, corresponding broadly to anatomy, and one for biological processes, corresponding broadly to physiology. The result constitutes what might be described as a joint venture between two perspectives--of so-called three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism--which are normally regarded as incompatible. We outline an approach which allows them to be combined together, and provide examples of its application in biomedicine.

Biodynamic Ontology: Applying BFO in the Biomedical Domain

Can there be grounding without necessitation? Can a fact obtain wholly in virtue of metaphysically more fundamental facts, even though there are possible worlds at which the latter facts obtain but not the former? It is an orthodoxy in recent literature about the nature of grounding, and in first-order philosophical disputes about what grounds what, that the answer is no. I will argue that the correct answer is yes. I present two novel arguments against grounding necessitarianism, and show that grounding contingentism is fully compatible with the various explanatory roles that grounding is widely thought to play.

/pdf/against-grounding-necessitarianism-5229ai2uxy.pdf

Against Grounding Necessitarianism

Book Information Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. By Theodore Sider. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 2001. Pp. xxiv + 255. £30.

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Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time