How to Do Things With Words

The author systematically examines one of the important issues of information — establishing the market price. He introduces the concept of «search» — where a buyer wanting to get a better price, is forced to question sellers. The article deals with various aspects of finding the necessary information.

Economics of Information

The cultural origins of human cognition

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Cognition In The Wild

Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I

Stuxnet, the computer worm which disrupted Iranian nuclear enrichment in 2010, is the first instance of a computer network attack known to cause physical damage across international boundaries. Some have described Stuxnet as the harbinger of a new form of warfare that threatens even the strongest military powers. The influential but largely untested Cyber Revolution thesis holds that the internet gives militarily weaker actors asymmetric advantages, that offense is becoming easier while defense is growing harder, and that the attacker's anonymity undermines deterrence. However, the empirical facts of Stuxnet support an opposite interpretation; cyber capabilities can marginally enhance the power of stronger over weaker actors, the complexity of weaponization makes cyber offense less easy and defense more feasible than generally appreciated, and cyber options are most attractive when deterrence is intact. Stuxnet suggests that considerable social and technical uncertainties associated with cyber operations ...

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Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

Cyber attackers rely on deception to exploit vulnerabilities and obfuscate their identity, which makes many pessimistic about cyber deterrence. The attribution problem appears to make retaliatory punishment, contrasted with defensive denial, particularly ineffective. Yet observable deterrence failures against targets of lower value tell us little about the ability to deter attacks against higher value targets, where defenders may be more willing and able to pay the costs of attribution and punishment. Counterintuitively, costs of attribution and response may decline with scale. Reliance on deception is a double-edged sword that provides some advantages to the attacker but undermines offensive coercion and creates risks for ambitious intruders. Many of the properties of cybersecurity assumed to be determined by technology, such as the advantage of offense over defense, the difficulty of attribution, and the inefficacy of deterrence, are in fact consequences of political factors like the value of the target and the scale-dependent costs of exploitation and retaliation. Assumptions about attribution can be incorporated into traditional international relations concepts of uncertainty and credibility, even as attribution involves uncertainty about the identity of the opponent, not just interests and capabilities. This article uses a formal model to explain why there are many low-value anonymous attacks but few high-value ones, showing how different assumptions about the scaling of exploitation and retaliation costs lead to different degrees of coverage and effectiveness for deterrence by denial and punishment. Deterrence works where it is needed most, yet it usually fails everywhere else.

Tipping the scales: the attribution problem and the feasibility of deterrence against cyberattack

It is widely believed that cyberspace is offense dominant because of technical characteristics that undermine deterrence and defense This argument mistakes the ease of deception on the Internet for a categorical ease of attack As intelligence agencies have long known, deception is a double-edged sword Covert attackers must exercise restraint against complex targets in order to avoid compromises resulting in mission failure or retaliation More importantly, defenders can also employ deceptive concealment and ruses to confuse or ensnare aggressors Indeed, deception can reinvigorate traditional strategies of deterrence and defense against cyber threats, as computer security practitioners have already discovered The strategy of deception has other important implications: as deterrence became foundational in the nuclear era, deception should rise in prominence in a world that increasingly depends on technology to mediate interaction

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Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace

Exaggerated fears about the paralysis of digital infrastructure and the loss of competitive advantage contribute to a spiral of mistrust in U.S.-China relations. In every category of putative Chinese cyber threat, there are also considerable Chinese vulnerabilities and Western advantages. China has inadvertently degraded the economic efficiency of its networks and exposed them to foreign infiltration by prioritizing political information control over technical cyber defense. Although China also actively infiltrates foreign targets, its ability to absorb stolen data is questionable, especially at the most competitive end of the value chain, where the United States dominates. Similarly, China’s military cyber capacity cannot live up to its aggressive doctrinal aspirations, even as its efforts to guide national information technology development create vulnerabilities that more experienced U.S. cyber operators can attack. Outmatched by the West, China is resorting to a strategy of international institutional reform, but it benefits too much from multistakeholder governance to pose a credible alternative. A cyber version of the stability-instability paradox constrains the intensity of cyber interaction in the U.S.-China relationship—and in international relations more broadly—even as lesser irritants continue to proliferate.

The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction

China's emergence as a great power in the twenty-first century is strongly enabled by cyberspace. Leveraged information technology integrates Chinese firms into the global economy, modernizes infrastructure, and increases internet penetration which helps boost export-led growth. China's pursuit of "informatization " reconstructs industrial sectors and solidifies the transformation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army into a formidable regional power. Even as the government censors content online, China has one of the fastest growing internet populations and most of the technology is created and used by civilians. Western political discourse on cybersecurity is dominated by news of Chinese military development of cyberwarfare capabilities and cyber exploitation against foreign governments, corporations, and non-governmental organizations. Western accounts, however, tell only one side of the story. Chinese leaders are also concerned with cyber insecurity, and Chinese authors frequently note that China is also a victim of foreign cyber---attacks---predominantly from the United States. China and Cybersecurity: Political, Economic, and Strategic Dimensions is a comprehensive analysis of China's cyberspace threats and policies. The contributors---Chinese specialists in cyber dynamics, experts on China, and experts on the use of information technology between China and the West---address cyberspace threats and policies, emphasizing the vantage points of China and the U.S. on cyber exploitation and the possibilities for more positive coordination with the West. The volume's multi-disciplinary, cross-cultural approach does not pretend to offer wholesale resolutions. Contributors take different stances on how problems may be analyzed and reduced, and aim to inform the international audience of how China's political, economic, and security systems shape cyber activities. The compilation provides empirical and evaluative depth on the deepening dependence on shared global information infrastructure and the growing willingness to exploit it for political or economic gain. Available in OSO: Contributors to this volume - Fred H. Cate Duan Haixin Nigel Inkster Gu Lion Li Yuxiao Sarah McKune Joe McReynolds Kevin Pollpeter Taylor Roberts Robert Sheldon Mark Stokes Xu Jinghong Xu Lu Ye Zheng Zhuge Jianwei

Jon R. Lindsay

Papers

Stuxnet and the Limits of Cyber Warfare

Tipping the scales: the attribution problem and the feasibility of deterrence against cyberattack

Weaving Tangled Webs: Offense, Defense, and Deception in Cyberspace

The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction

China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy, and Politics in the Digital Domain