https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.2307%2F3343168.pdf

Development as Freedom

Background: The American Heart Association, in conjunction with the National Institutes of Health, annually reports on the most up-to-date statistics related to heart disease, stroke, and cardiovas...

Heart Disease and Stroke Statistics—2020 Update: A Report From the American Heart Association

I offer an institutional theory of corporate social responsibility consisting of a series of propositions specifying the conditions under which corporations are likely to behave in socially responsible ways. I argue that the relationship between basic economic conditions and corporate behavior is mediated by several institutional conditions: public and private regulation, the presence of nongovernmental and other independent organizations that monitor corporate behavior, institutionalized norms regarding appropriate corporate behavior, associative behavior among corporations themselves, and organized dialogues among corporations and their stakeholders. Concerns about corporate social responsibility have grown significantly during the last two decades. Not only has the issue become commonplace in the business press and among business and political leaders (Buhr & Graf

http://laisumedu.org/DESIN_Ibarra/desin/imagenescampbell/tres-c.pdf

Why would corporations behave in socially responsible ways? an institutional theory of corporate social responsibility

Today, as in the past, within a country at a given time those with higher incomes are, on average, happier. However, raising the incomes of all does not increase the happiness of all. This is because the material norms on which judgments of well-being are based increase in the same proportion as the actual income of the society. These conclusions are suggested by data on reported happiness, material norms, and income collected in surveys in a number of countries over the past half century.

/pdf/will-raising-the-incomes-of-all-increase-the-happiness-of-4uvil5jobh.pdf

Will raising the incomes of all increase the happiness of all

Hydrogel delivery systems can leverage therapeutically beneficial outcomes of drug delivery and have found clinical use. Hydrogels can provide spatial and temporal control over the release of various therapeutic agents, including small-molecule drugs, macromolecular drugs and cells. Owing to their tunable physical properties, controllable degradability and capability to protect labile drugs from degradation, hydrogels serve as a platform in which various physiochemical interactions with the encapsulated drugs control their release. In this Review, we cover multiscale mechanisms underlying the design of hydrogel drug delivery systems, focusing on physical and chemical properties of the hydrogel network and the hydrogel-drug interactions across the network, mesh, and molecular (or atomistic) scales. We discuss how different mechanisms interact and can be integrated to exert fine control in time and space over the drug presentation. We also collect experimental release data from the literature, review clinical translation to date of these systems, and present quantitative comparisons between different systems to provide guidelines for the rational design of hydrogel delivery systems.

/pdf/designing-hydrogels-for-controlled-drug-delivery-3k03j5j2j9.pdf

Designing hydrogels for controlled drug delivery.

In this essay I explore the ideal of a ‘deliberative democracy’.1 By a deliberative
democracy I shall mean, roughly, an association whose affairs are governed by the
public deliberation of its members. I propose an account of the value of such an association that treats democracy itself as a fundamental political ideal and not simply as
a derivative ideal that can be explained in terms of the values of fairness or equality
of respect.

Deliberation and democratic legitimacy

This essay by Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel promotes visions of democracy, constitutionalism and institutional innovations which may help to open up new dimensions in the search for legitimate European governance structures and their constitutionalisation. Faced with Europe's legitimacy problems, proponents of the European project often react by pointing to the many institutional failings in the (national) constitutional state. These reactions, however, seem simplistic, offering no normatively convincing alternatives to the once undisputed legitimacy of a now eroding nation state. The essay by Cohen and Sabel forecloses such strategies. Summarising and endorsing critiques of both the unfettered market system and the manner of its regulatory and political correction, it concludes that the many efforts to establish new equilibria between well‐functioning markets and well‐ordered political institutions are doomed to fail, and opts instead for fundamental change: conservative in their strict defence of fundamental democratic ideals, such ideas are radical in their search for new institutional arrangements which bring democratic values directly to bear. How is the concept of directly‐deliberative polyarchy complementary to and reconcilable with our notions of democratic constiutionalism? To this question the readers of the essay will find many fascinating answers. Equally, however, how might the debate on the normative and practical dilemmas of the European system of governance profit from these deliberations? Which European problem might be resolved with the aid of the emerging and new direct forms of democracy identified in this essay? How might direct democracy interact with the intergovernmentalist and the functionalist elements of the EU system? Although this essay contains no certain answers to these European questions, its challenging messages will be understood in European debates.

Directly‐Deliberative Polyarchy

For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism

Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance

Following common practice, Riker's Liberalism against Populism distinguishes populist from liberal conceptions of democracy.1 Intuitively, populist conceptions emphasize that political participation and public deliberation can serve to articulate and advance a "general will," while liberal conceptions emphasize the role of regular electoral tests in limiting the power of public officials. Riker assesses these two conceptions in light of social choice theory and draws two main conclusions from that assessment: (1) populism is incoherent and (2) liberalism survives intact. My remarks here begin (in the first section) by discussing three objections to Riker's argument.2 With those objections as background, I then consider (in the second section) what Jules Coleman and John Ferejohn call "the epistemic interpretation of voting" (p. 15) and the role of that interpretation in a populist conception of democracy. The aim of the second section is exploratory. My intention there is not to defend populism but to consider in more detail the structure of epistemic populism and to suggest that it represents a coherent and more plausible interpretation of populism than the version that Riker rejects.

Joshua Cohen

Papers

Deliberation and democratic legitimacy

Directly‐Deliberative Polyarchy

For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism

Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance

An Epistemic Conception of Democracy