计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison

This paper discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation, drawing on U.S. and international evidence. Given the policy relevance of research on regulation, we highlight the challenges with (1) quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, (2) measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and (3) drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies. Next, we discuss empirical studies that link disclosure and reporting activities to firm-specific and market-wide economic outcomes. Understanding these links is important when evaluating regulation. We then synthesize the empirical evidence on the economic effects of disclosure regulation and reporting standards, including the evidence on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. Several important conclusions emerge. We generally lack evidence on market-wide effects and externalities from regulation, yet such evidence is central to the economic justification of regulation. Moreover, evidence on causal effects of disclosure and reporting regulation is still relatively rare. We also lack evidence on the real effects of such regulation. These limitations provide many research opportunities. We conclude with several specific suggestions for future research.

The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research

International Momentum Strategies

Business cycles are both less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. We develop two alternative explanations based on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that use new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. Since new technologies are difficult to imitate, the industries of rich countries enjoy more market power and face more inelastic product demands than those of poor countries. Since skilled workers are less likely to exit employment as a result of changes in economic conditions, industries in rich countries face more inelastic labour supplies than those of poor countries. We show that either asymmetry in industry characteristics can generate cross-country differences in business cycles that resemble those we observe in the data. We are grateful to Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Perri for useful comments. The views expressed here are the authors' and do not necessarily reflect those of The World Bank. Business cycles are not the same in rich and poor countries. A first difference is that fluctuations in per capita income growth are smaller in rich countries than in poor ones, in the top panel of Figure 1 , we plot the standard deviation of per capita income growth against the level of (log) per capita income for a large sample of countries. We refer to this relationship as the volatility graph and note that it slopes downwards. A second difference is that fluctuations in per capita income growth are more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones. In the bottom panel of Figure 1 , we plot the correlation of per capita income growth rates with world average per capita income growth, excluding the country in question, against the level of (log) per capita income for the same set of countries. We refer to this relationship as the comovement graph and note that it slopes upwards. Table 1 , which is self-explanatory, shows that these facts apply within different sub-samples of countries and years. 1 Why are business cycles less volatile and more synchronized with the world cycle in rich countries than in poor ones? Part of the answer must be that poor countries exhibit more political and policy instability, they are less open or more distant from the geographical center, and they also have a higher share of their economy devoted to the production of agricultural products and the extraction of minerals. Table 1 shows that, in a statistical sense, these factors explain a substantial fraction of the variation in the volatility of income growth, although they do not explain much of the variation in the comovement of income growth. More important for our purposes, the strong relationship between income and the properties of business cycles reported in Table 1 is still present after we control for these variables. In short, there must be other factors behind the strong patterns depicted in Figure 1 beyond differences in political instability, remoteness and the importance of natural resources. With the exception that the comovement graph seems to be driven by differences between rich and poor countries and not within each group. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) also present the volatility graph. They provide an explanation for it based on the observation that rich countries have more diversified production structures. We are unaware of any previous reference to the comovement graph. In this paper, we develop two alternative but non-competing explanations for why business cycles are less volatile and more synchronized with the world in rich countries than in poor ones. Both explanations rely on the idea that comparative advantage causes rich countries to specialize in industries that require new technologies operated by skilled workers, while poor countries specialize in industries that require traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers. This pattern of specialization opens up the possibility that cross-country differences in business cycles are the result of asymmetries between these types of industries. In particular, both of the explanations advanced here predict that industries that use traditional technologies operated by unskilled workers will be more sensitive to country-specific shocks. Ceteris paribus, these industries will not only be more volatile but also less synchronized with the world cycle since the relative importance of global shocks is lower. To the extent that the business cycles of countries reflect those of their industries, differences in industrial structure could potentially explain the patterns in Figure 1 . One explanation of why industries react differently to shocks is based on the idea that firms using new technologies face more inelastic product demands than those using traditional technologies. New technologies are difficult to imitate quickly for technical reasons and also because of legal patents. This difficulty confers a cost advantage on technological leaders that shelters them from potential entrants and gives them monopoly power in world markets. Traditional technologies are easier to imitate because enough time has passed since their adoption and also because patents have expired or have been circumvented. This implies that incumbent firms face tough competition from potential entrants and enjoy little or no monopoly power in world markets. The price-elasticity of product demand affects how industries react to shocks. Consider, for instance, the effects of country-specific shocks that encourage production in all industries. In industries that use new technologies, firms have monopoly power and face inelastic demands for their products. As a result, fluctuations in supply lead to opposing changes in prices that tend to stabilize industry income. In industries that use traditional technologies, firms face stiff competition from abroad and therefore face elastic demands for their products. As a result, fluctuations in supply have little or no effect on their prices and industry income is more volatile. To the extent that this asymmetry in the degree of product-market competition is important, incomes of industries that use new technologies are likely to be less sensitive to country-specific shocks than those of industries that use traditional technologies. Another explanation for why industries react differently to shocks is based on the idea that the supply of unskilled workers is more elastic than the supply of skilled workers. A first reason for this asymmetry is that non-market activities are relatively more attractive to unskilled workers whose market wage is lower than that of skilled ones. Changes in labour demand might induce some unskilled workers to enter or abandon the labour force, but are not likely to affect the participation of skilled workers. A second reason for the asymmetry in labour supply across skill categories is the imposition of a minimum wage. Changes in labour demand might force some unskilled workers in and out of unemployment, but are not likely to affect the employment of skilled workers. The wage-elasticity of the labour supply also has implications for how industries react to shocks. Consider again the effects of country-specific shocks that encourage production in all industries and therefore raise the labour demand. Since the supply of unskilled workers is elastic, these shocks lead to large fluctuations in employment of unskilled workers. In industries that use them, fluctuations in supply are therefore magnified by increases in employment that make industry income more volatile. Since the supply of skilled workers is inelastic, the same shocks have little or no effects on the employment of skilled workers. In industries that use them, fluctuations in supply are not magnified and industry income is less volatile. To the extent that this asymmetry in the elasticity of labour supply is important, incomes of industries that use unskilled workers are likely to be more sensitive to country-specific shocks than those of industries that use skilled workers To study these hypotheses we construct a stylized world equilibrium model of the cross-section of business cycles. Inspired by the work of Davis (1995), we consider in section one a world in which differences in both factor endowments a la Heckscher-Ohlin and industry technologies a la Ricardo combine to determine a country's comparative advantage and, therefore, the patterns of specialization and trade. To generate business cycles, we subject this world economy to the sort of productivity fluctuations that have been emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1982). 2 In section two, we characterize the cross-section of business cycles and show how asymmetries in the elasticity of product demand and/or labour supply can be used to explain the evidence in Figure 1 . Using available microeconomic estimates of the key parameters, we calibrate the model and find that: (i) The model exhibits slightly less than two-thirds and one-third of the observed cross-country variation in volatility and comovement, respectively; and (ii) The asymmetry in the elasticity of product demand seems to have a quantitatively stronger effect on the slopes of the volatility and comovement graphs, than the elasticity in the labour supply. We explore these results further in sections three and four. In section three, we extend the model to allow for monetary shocks that have real effects since firms face cash-in-advance constraints. We use the model to study how cross-country variation in monetary policy and financial development affect the cross-section of business cycles. Once these factors are considered, the calibrated version of the model exhibits roughly the same cross-country variation in volatility and about 40 percent of the variation in comovement as the data. In section four, we show th

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01322868.pdf

Business cycles: A methodological approach

In 2002, the European Union (EU) Parliament passed a regulation that requires consolidated and simple accounts for all companies listed in the EU to use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for fiscal years starting after 1 January 2005. This change in accounting systems will have a large impact on the information environment for EU companies. This paper provides a review of the literature on adoption of different Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). We thus provide background and guidance for researchers studying the change in accounting quality following widespread IFRS adoption in the EU. We argue that cross-country differences in accounting quality are likely to remain following IFRS adoption because accounting quality is a function of the firm's overall institutional setting, including the legal and political system of the country in which the firm resides.

IFRS Adoption and Accounting Quality: A Review

In 2002, the European Union (EU) Parliament passed a regulation that requires consolidated and simple accounts for all companies listed in the EU to use International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for fiscal years starting after January 1, 2005. This change in accounting systems will have a large impact on the information environment for EU companies. This paper provides a review of the literature on adoption of different GAAPs. We thus provide background and guidance for researchers studying the change in accounting quality following widespread IFRS adoption in the EU. We argue that cross-country differences in accounting quality are likely to remain following IFRS adoption because accounting quality is a function of the firm's overall institutional setting, including the legal and political system of the country in which the firm resides.

Researchers argue that analysts’ information acquisition efforts increase firm value by facilitating monitoring of firms' activities and, thereby, reducing agency costs (e.g., Jensen and Meckling [1976]; Healy and Palepu [2001]). However, prior research provides limited and inconclusive empirical evidence to support this argument. This paper extends the literature by: examining the relation between analyst following and the value of firms' equity securities; and given a positive relation, whether that relation reflects effectively enhanced monitoring of firms' activities as a result of analysts' information acquisition efforts. We document a positive relation between analyst following and firms' asset values, and we find support for two hypotheses regarding the source of the increased asset values. First, the cash component drives the positive relation between analyst following and asset values. We interpret this evidence to imply a stronger monitoring effect for assets that are subject to higher agency costs or information asymmetry. Second, consistent with analyst following constraining asset mismanagement or motivating more efficient asset use, operating performance and total cash payout increase with analyst following. Overall, our results suggest that financial analysts facilitate more effective monitoring of firms' activities and, thereby, reduce agency costs and increase shareholder value.

Do Financial Analysts Add Value by Facilitating More Effective Monitoring of Firms' Activities?

Researchers argue that analysts’ information acquisition efforts increase firm value by facilitating monitoring of firms’ activities and, thereby, reducing agency costs. However, prior research pro...

Do Financial Analysts Add Value by Facilitating More Effective Monitoring of Firms’ Activities?:

Purpose – This study examines the relationship between Big Four audit firm country-level market shares and audit fees across a sample of nine emerging economies: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, and Taiwan.

Design/methodology/approach – First, auditor market share is calculated as a percentage of client sales based on all publicly traded companies in each of the sample countries during the period 2002–2005. Next, Audit Analytics is used to obtain audit fee data for a set of foreign companies listed on a primary U.S. exchange. A final sample of 483 client-year observations is included in the audit fee regression analysis.

Findings – After controlling for other factors related to audit pricing, Big Four auditors with dominant country-level market shares earn a fee premium of approximately 27% over competitor firms.

Originality/value – These results suggest that individual Big Four firm reputations, as measured by fee premiums, are not homogeneous across countries. Rather, it appears the largest audit firms are associated with quality-differentiated services and thus earn higher fees. Although accounting research tends to classify large international accounting firms into a pool of the “Big Four,” these findings indicate that it is important to consider each firm's market share in specific geographic locations when examining questions related to auditor reputation and pricing.

Kevin Jialin Sun

Papers

IFRS Adoption and Accounting Quality: A Review

IFRS Adoption and Accounting Quality: A Review

Do Financial Analysts Add Value by Facilitating More Effective Monitoring of Firms' Activities?

Do Financial Analysts Add Value by Facilitating More Effective Monitoring of Firms’ Activities?:

The relationship between auditor size and audit fees: further evidence from big four market shares in emerging economies