Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 lays down the main instruments for placing effective plant protection products (using pesticide substances) on the market that are safe for humans, animals and the environment, while at the same time ensuring effective functioning of the internal market and improved agricultural production. This European Implementation Assessment found that the above objectives, while largely relevant to real needs, are not being achieved in practice. In particular, the day to day implementation of the main instruments of the regulation – substance approval, plant protection product authorisation and enforcement of the regulatory decisions taken in the frame of the approvals and authorisations – is problematic, which also affects other related EU policies. Nevertheless, despite the implementation challenges observed, stakeholders including national competent authorities, health/environment NGOs, manufacturers of substances and plant protection products and their users (farmers), agree that the EU is the appropriate level at which regulatory action in the field of pesticides (used in plant protection products) should continue to take place. European Implementation Assessment AUTHORS (INTRODUCTION) European Implementation Assessment written by Alina DINU and Ekaterina KARAMFILOVA from the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit, Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, European Parliamentary Research Service. To contact the Unit, please email: EPRS-ExPostEvaluation@ep.europa.eu The authorship of the annexed studies, commissioned by EPRS, is set out in the following pages, and in each annex. RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATORS Alina DINU and Ekaterina KARAMFILOVA, Ex-Post Evaluation Unit. To contact the Unit, please e-mail EPRS-ExPostEvaluation@ep.europa.eu

The placing of plant protection products on the market

This article addresses problems of accountability in the system of multilevel governance, organised around networks, as it exists in the EU. An ‘accountability deficit’ arises when gaps are left by the accountability machinery of the several levels of government, supranational and national. This article suggests a new evaluative framework based on the concept of ‘accountability network’, questioning the hierarchical and pyramidal assumptions that presently underpin accountability theory in the EU context. Using case studies of the Community courts and European Ombudsman, the article suggests that ‘accountability networks’ may be emerging, composed of agencies specialising in a specific mode of accountability, which come together or coalesce in a relationship of support, fortified by shared professional expertise and ethos. At present fragmentary and imperfect, these might ultimately be capable of providing effective machinery for accountability in network governance systems.

http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2461/pdf/egp_connex_C_06_02.pdf

Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network Approach

One of the most common arguments about ‘new governance’ is that it is characterised by heterarchy rather than by hierarchy, creating horizontal modes of governance among a multitude of actors – public and private – involving all relevant stakeholders. Often implicitly and sometimes explicitly, this argument is linked with a normative democratic claim that praises the particular participatory features of ‘new governance’ as compared to ‘old governance’. Using as a case study European occupational health and safety policy, characterised by a shift from ‘old’ to ‘new governance’ since the 1990s, this article warns us that one should be very reluctant in making normative claims on new governance. The analysis of new governance modes such as comitology, agency networking, and social dialogue in this field shows that more horizontal and heterarchical governance does not mean automatically more participatory governance in terms of involving civil society actors and all stakeholders.

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New modes of governance and the participatory myth

I SYSTEMS OF LIABILITY 1. Introduction 2. Europe 3. France 4. Germany 5. England 6. Ius Commune II REQUIREMENTS OF LIABILITY 7. Protected Interests 8. Intention and Negligence 9. Violation of a Statutory Rule 10. Strict Liability 11. Causation 12. Damage and Damages III CATEGORIES OF LIABILITY 13. Introduction 14. Liability for Movable Objects 15. Liability for Immovable Objects 16. Liability for Other Persons 17. Liability in Emergency Cases 18. Liability of Public Authorities

European Tort Law

One of the most striking features of contemporary EU governance is the ubiquity of Commission and member-state committees known under the rubric of "comitology." The significance of these committees, however, remains a matter of dispute, with two distinct theoretical images of comitology being put forward in the literature. The first of these approaches, drawn from sociological institutionalism and constructivism, suggests that EU committees provide a forum in which national and supranational experts meet and deliberate in a search for the most efficient solutions to common policy problems. A second view, derived from rational choice theory, depicts comitology committees as control mechanisms designed by EU member governments to supervise the Commission in its executive duties. This article engages in a direct competitive test of these two approaches, examining the empirical record of institutional choice of comitology committees and demonstrating that the weight of both quantitative and qualitative evide...

Control Mechanism Or Deliberative Democracy? Two Images of Comitology

Even if an external observer who takes an interest in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities may not have such an impression at first sight, comparative law plays a central role in the activities of these courts. It means much more than simply looking at solutions given to certain problems in the legal orders of the Member States. As a former president of the Court of Justice rightly observed, recourse to comparative law is for the Court of Justice essentially a method of interpretation of Community law itself.1 For the Court of Justice and the CFI (below often referred to as ‘Community judge’ or ‘Community courts’), it is one method amongst other methods of interpretation of the law (such as literal, exegetic, historical, systematic interpretation) and it constitutes a tool for establishing the law.2

Interlocking legal orders in the European Union and comparative law

Scope of application of Charter – What does ‘implementing Union law’ mean? – Application of v. derogation from EU law – Asylum cases, N.S. – Familiapress, Schmidberger, Viking – Implementing to include derogation – Annibaldi and Dereci – Interpretation of the Charter – ‘Provided for by law’ – The ‘essence’ of a right or freedom – Legitimate objectives and proportionality – Rights both in EU Treaties and in Charter: citizenship – Charter and ECHR – Constitutional Traditions, level of protection and deference – Article 53 not according to Solange, but like Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein – Principles and Rights

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Koenraad Lenaerts

Papers

Interlocking legal orders in the European Union and comparative law

Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice

The Rule of Law and the Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union

New models of constitution-making in Europe: The quest for legitimacy