Many problems of recent interest in statistics and machine learning can be posed in the framework of convex optimization. Due to the explosion in size and complexity of modern datasets, it is increasingly important to be able to solve problems with a very large number of features or training examples. As a result, both the decentralized collection or storage of these datasets as well as accompanying distributed solution methods are either necessary or at least highly desirable. In this review, we argue that the alternating direction method of multipliers is well suited to distributed convex optimization, and in particular to large-scale problems arising in statistics, machine learning, and related areas. The method was developed in the 1970s, with roots in the 1950s, and is equivalent or closely related to many other algorithms, such as dual decomposition, the method of multipliers, Douglas–Rachford splitting, Spingarn's method of partial inverses, Dykstra's alternating projections, Bregman iterative algorithms for l1 problems, proximal methods, and others. After briefly surveying the theory and history of the algorithm, we discuss applications to a wide variety of statistical and machine learning problems of recent interest, including the lasso, sparse logistic regression, basis pursuit, covariance selection, support vector machines, and many others. We also discuss general distributed optimization, extensions to the nonconvex setting, and efficient implementation, including some details on distributed MPI and Hadoop MapReduce implementations.

/pdf/distributed-optimization-and-statistical-learning-via-the-8s9gtddw0d.pdf

Distributed Optimization and Statistical Learning Via the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers

/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

This paper introduces a novel algorithm to approximate the matrix with minimum nuclear norm among all matrices obeying a set of convex constraints. This problem may be understood as the convex relaxation of a rank minimization problem and arises in many important applications as in the task of recovering a large matrix from a small subset of its entries (the famous Netflix problem). Off-the-shelf algorithms such as interior point methods are not directly amenable to large problems of this kind with over a million unknown entries. This paper develops a simple first-order and easy-to-implement algorithm that is extremely efficient at addressing problems in which the optimal solution has low rank. The algorithm is iterative, produces a sequence of matrices $\{\boldsymbol{X}^k,\boldsymbol{Y}^k\}$, and at each step mainly performs a soft-thresholding operation on the singular values of the matrix $\boldsymbol{Y}^k$. There are two remarkable features making this attractive for low-rank matrix completion problems. The first is that the soft-thresholding operation is applied to a sparse matrix; the second is that the rank of the iterates $\{\boldsymbol{X}^k\}$ is empirically nondecreasing. Both these facts allow the algorithm to make use of very minimal storage space and keep the computational cost of each iteration low. On the theoretical side, we provide a convergence analysis showing that the sequence of iterates converges. On the practical side, we provide numerical examples in which $1,000\times1,000$ matrices are recovered in less than a minute on a modest desktop computer. We also demonstrate that our approach is amenable to very large scale problems by recovering matrices of rank about 10 with nearly a billion unknowns from just about 0.4% of their sampled entries. Our methods are connected with the recent literature on linearized Bregman iterations for $\ell_1$ minimization, and we develop a framework in which one can understand these algorithms in terms of well-known Lagrange multiplier algorithms.

/pdf/a-singular-value-thresholding-algorithm-for-matrix-3rmbvujnls.pdf

A Singular Value Thresholding Algorithm for Matrix Completion

This monograph is about a class of optimization algorithms called proximal algorithms. Much like Newton's method is a standard tool for solving unconstrained smooth optimization problems of modest size, proximal algorithms can be viewed as an analogous tool for nonsmooth, constrained, large-scale, or distributed versions of these problems. They are very generally applicable, but are especially well-suited to problems of substantial recent interest involving large or high-dimensional datasets. Proximal methods sit at a higher level of abstraction than classical algorithms like Newton's method: the base operation is evaluating the proximal operator of a function, which itself involves solving a small convex optimization problem. These subproblems, which generalize the problem of projecting a point onto a convex set, often admit closed-form solutions or can be solved very quickly with standard or simple specialized methods. Here, we discuss the many different interpretations of proximal operators and algorithms, describe their connections to many other topics in optimization and applied mathematics, survey some popular algorithms, and provide a large number of examples of proximal operators that commonly arise in practice.

Proximal Algorithms

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Whether or not the general asymmetric variational inequality problem can be formulated as a differentiable optimization problem has been an open question. This paper gives an affirmative answer to this question. We provide a new optimization problem formulation of the variational inequality problem, and show that its objective function is continuously differentiable whenever the mapping involved in the latter problem is continuously differentiable. We also show that under appropriate assumptions on the latter mapping, any stationary point of the optimization problem is a global optimal solution, and hence solves the variational inequality problem. We discuss descent methods for solving the equivalent optimization problem and comment on systems of nonlinear equations and nonlinear complementarity problems.

/pdf/equivalent-differentiable-optimization-problems-and-descent-1uug3h8u0p.pdf

Equivalent differentiable optimization problems and descent methods for asymmetric variational inequality problems

This paper considers the worst-case Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) in the situation where only partial information on the underlying probability distribution is available. The minimization of the worst-case CVaR under mixture distribution uncertainty, box uncertainty, and ellipsoidal uncertainty are investigated. The application of the worst-case CVaR to robust portfolio optimization is proposed, and the corresponding problems are cast as linear programs and second-order cone programs that can be solved efficiently. Market data simulation and Monte Carlo simulation examples are presented to illustrate the proposed approach.

Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management

In Pang and Fukushima (Comput Manage Sci 2:21–56, 2005), a sequential penalty approach was presented for a quasi-variational inequality (QVI) with particular application to the generalized Nash game. To test the computational performance of the penalty method, numerical results were reported with an example from a multi-leader-follower game in an electric power market. However, due to an inverted sign in the penalty term in the example and some missing terms in the derivatives of the firms’ Lagrangian functions, the reported numerical results in Pang and Fukushima (Comput Manage Sci 2:21–56, 2005) are incorrect. Since the numerical examples of this kind are scarce in the literature and this particular example may be useful in the future research, we report the corrected results.

/pdf/quasi-variational-inequalities-generalized-nash-equilibria-xbbkozu2at.pdf

Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games

A modified BFGS method and its global convergence in nonconvex minimization

We consider a rate of convergence of the Levenberg-Marquardt method (LMM) for solving a system of nonlinear equations F(x) = 0, where F is a mapping from Rn into Rm. It is well-known that LMM has a quadratic rate of convergence when m = n, the Jacobian matrix of F is nonsingular at a solution x and an initial point is chosen sufficiently close to x. In this paper, we show that if

Masao Fukushima

Papers

Equivalent differentiable optimization problems and descent methods for asymmetric variational inequality problems

Worst-Case Conditional Value-at-Risk with Application to Robust Portfolio Management

Quasi-variational inequalities, generalized Nash equilibria, and multi-leader-follower games

A modified BFGS method and its global convergence in nonconvex minimization

On the Rate of Convergence of the Levenberg-Marquardt Method