The green book : appraisal and evaluation in central government

This paper takes stock of megaproject management, an emerging and hugely costly field of study. First, it answers the question of how large megaprojects are by measuring them in the units mega, giga, and tera, concluding we are presently entering a new "tera era" of trillion-dollar projects. Second, total global megaproject spending is assessed, at USD 6-9 trillion annually, or 8 percent of total global GDP, which denotes the biggest investment boom in human history. Third, four "sublimes" - political, technological, economic, and aesthetic - are identified to explain the increased size and frequency of megaprojects. Fourth, the "iron law of megaprojects" is laid out and documented: Over budget, over time, over and over again. Moreover, the "break-fix model" of megaproject management is introduced as an explanation of the iron law. Fifth, Albert O. Hirschman's theory of the Hiding Hand is revisited and critiqued as unfounded and corrupting for megaproject thinking in both the academy and policy. Sixth, it is shown how megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. Finally, it is argued that the conventional way of managing megaprojects has reached a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging.

What You Should Know About Megaprojects, and Why: An Overview

1 Introduction 2 Travel Demand 3 Costs 4 Pricing 5 Investment 6 Industrial Organization of Transportation Providers 7 Conclusion

/pdf/the-economics-of-urban-transportation-cl6ichbdfs.pdf

The economics of urban transportation

This paper takes stock of megaproject management, an emerging and hugely costly field of study. First, it answers the question of how large megaprojects are by measuring them in the units mega, giga, and tera, concluding we are presently entering a new "tera era" of trillion-dollar projects. Second, total global megaproject spending is assessed, at USD 6-9 trillion annually, or 8 percent of total global GDP, which denotes the biggest investment boom in human history. Third, four "sublimes" – political, technological, economic, and aesthetic – are identified to explain the increased size and frequency of megaprojects. Fourth, the "iron law of megaprojects" is laid out and documented: Over budget, over time, over and over again. Moreover, the "break-fix model" of megaproject management is introduced as an explanation of the iron law. Fifth, Albert O. Hirschman's theory of the Hiding Hand is revisited and critiqued as unfounded and corrupting for megaproject thinking in both the academy and policy. Sixth, it is shown how megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. Finally, it is argued that the conventional way of managing megaprojects has reached a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging.

What You Should Know About Megaprojects and Why: An Overview

Directions for future research in project management: The main findings of a UK government-funded research network

Es gibt nur wenige vergleichende Studien uber reale und geschatzte Kosten derEntwicklung von Verkehrsinfrastruktur. Wo solche Studien vorliegen, beziehen siesich auf Einzelfalle, oder die Stichprobe ist zu klein, um systematische statistische Analysen zuzulassen (Bruzelius et al. 1998, Fouracre et al. 1990, Hall 1980, Nijkamp/Ubbels 1999, Pickrell 1990, Skamris/Flyvbjerg 1997, Szyliowicz/Goetz 1995, Walmsley/Pickett 1992). Nach unserem Kenntnisstand ist bislang nur eine Studie veroffentlicht, die auf der Basis von 66 Transportprojekten einen breit angelegtenZugang wahlt und erste Schritte auf dem Weg zu einer stichhaltigen statistischen Analyse unternimmt (Merewitz 1973a, 1973b).Existing comparative studies of actual and estimated costs in transportation infrastructure development are few. Where such studies exist, they are typically single-case studies or they cover a sample of projects too small to allow systematic, statistical analyses (Bruzelius et al., 1998; Fouracre et al., 1990; Hall, 1980; Nijkamp & Ubbels, 1999; Pickrell, 1990; Skamris & Flyvbjerg, 1997; Szyliowicz & Goetz, 1995; Walmsley & Pickett, 1992). To our knowledge, only one study exists that, with a sample of 66 transportation projects, approaches a large-sample study and takes a first step toward valid statistical analysis (Merewitz, 1973a, 1973b).The English version of this article can be found at: http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2278415Den Svenska versionen av denna artikel finns pa: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2278382La versione italiana di questo documento e disponibile al seguente link: http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2278294

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2278383_code1935014.pdf?abstractid=2278383

Kostenunterschätzung bei öffentlichen bauprojekten: fehler oder lüge? (Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?)

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of cost escalation in transportation infrastructure projects. Based on a sample of 258 transportation infrastructure projects worth US$90 billion and representing different project types, geographical regions, and historical periods, it is found with overwhelming statistical significance that the cost estimates used to decide whether such projects should be built are highly and systematically misleading. Underestimation cannot be explained by error and is best explained by strategic misrepresentation, that is, lying. The policy implications are clear: legislators, administrators, investors, media representatives, and members of the public who value honest numbers should not trust cost estimates and cost-benefit analyses produced by project promoters and their analysts.

/pdf/underestimating-costs-in-public-works-projects-error-or-lie-1ebe1nafmv.pdf

Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?

How common and how large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects

This article presents results from the first statistically significant study of traffic forecasts in transportation infrastructure projects. The sample used is the largest of its kind, covering 210 projects in 14 nations worth US$59 billion. The study shows with very high statistical significance that forecasters generally do a poor job of estimating the demand for transportation infrastructure projects. For 9 out of 10 rail projects, passenger forecasts are overestimated; the average overestimation is 106%. For half of all road projects, the difference between actual and forecasted traffic is more than ±20%. The result is substantial financial risks, which are typically ignored or downplayed by planners and decision makers to the detriment of social and economic welfare. The data also show that forecasts have not become more accurate over the 30-year period studied, despite claims to the contrary by forecasters. The causes of inaccuracy in forecasts are different for rail and road projects, with deliberately slanted forecasts playing a larger role for rail than for road. The cure is transparency, accountability, and new forecasting methods. The challenge is to change the governance structures for forecasting and project development. The article shows how planners may help achieve this.Listed as "Most Cited" article on the journal's home page.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2238050_code1935014.pdf?abstractid=2238050&mirid=1&type=2

How (In)Accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works Projects? The Case of Transportation

Results from the first statistically significant study of the causes of cost escalation in transport infrastructure projects are presented. The study is based on a sample of 258 rail, bridge, tunnel and road projects worth US$90 billion. The focus is on the dependence of cost escalation on: (1) the length of the project‐implementation phase, (2) the size of the project and (3) the type of project ownership. First, it was found, with very high statistical significance, that cost escalation was strongly dependent on the length of the implementation phase. The policy implications are clear: decision‐makers and planners should be highly concerned about delays and long implementation phases because they translate into risks of substantial cost escalations. Second, projects have grown larger over time, and for bridges and tunnels larger projects have larger percentage cost escalations. Finally, by comparing the cost escalation for three types of project ownership - private, state‐owned enterprise and other public ownership - it was shown that the oft‐seen claim that public ownership is problematic and private ownership effective in curbing cost escalation is an oversimplification. The type of accountability appears to matter more to cost escalation than type of ownership.

Mette K. Skamris Holm

Papers

Kostenunterschätzung bei öffentlichen bauprojekten: fehler oder lüge? (Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?)

Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?

How common and how large are cost overruns in transport infrastructure projects

How (In)Accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works Projects? The Case of Transportation

What Causes Cost Overrun in Transport Infrastructure Projects