Some scholars suggest that the Middle East's oil wealth helps explain its failure to democratize. This article examines three aspects of this “oil impedes democracy” claim. First, is it true? Does oil have a consistendy antidemocratic effect on states, once other factors are accounted for? Second, can this claim be generalized? Is it true only in the Middle East or elsewhere as well? Is it true for other types of mineral wealth and other types of commodity wealth or only for oil? Finally, if oil does have antidemocratic properties, what is the causal mechanism?The author uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not.The author also tests three explanations for this pattern: a “rentier effect,” which suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to dampen democratic pressures; a “repression effect,” which holds that resource wealth enables governments to strengthen their internal security forces and hence repress popular movements; and a “modernization effect,” which implies that growth that is based on the export of oil and minerals will fail to bring about die social and cultural changes that tend to produce democratic government. He finds at least limited support for all three effects.

Does Oil Hinder Democracy

How does a state's natural resource wealth influence its economic development? For the past fifty years, versions of this question have been explored by both economists and political scientists. New research suggests that resource wealth tends to harm economic growth, yet there is little agreement on why this occurs. This article reviews a wide range of recent attempts in both economics and political science to explain the “resource curse.” It suggests that much has been learned about the economic problems of resource exporters but less is known about their political problems. The disparity between strong findings on economic matters and weak findings on political ones partly reflects the failure of political scientists to carefully test their own theories.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0043887100008200

The Political Economy of the Resource Curse

This article examines the economic institution utilized during the eleventh century to facilitate complex trade characterized by asymmetric information and limited legal contract enforceability. The geniza documents are employed to present the "coalition," an economic institution based upon a reputation mechanism utilized by Mediterranean traders to confront the organizational problem associated with the exchange relations between merchants and their overseas agents. The theoretical framework explains many trade-related phenomena, especially why traders utilized specific forms of business association, and indicates the interrelations between social and economic institutions. M editerranean trade contributed much to the economic growth of southern Europe during the Middle Ages.' The spread of this trade depended, to a large extent, upon traders' ability to employ overseas agents or to let business associates function as overseas agents. The employment of overseas agents was vital during the Middle Ages, since goods were sold abroad only after being shipped to their destination.2 Since, absent contractual problems, a merchant can decrease cost by sending goods to an overseas agent rather than traveling with his goods, a large efficiency gain could potentially be achieved by employing overseas agents.3

Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders

A large body of scholarship finds that there is a relationship between reliance on natural resources and authoritarianism. Extant cross-country findings are derived, however, from panel regressions that assume random effects, where the dataset’s time dimension is relatively short. Because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable that is randomly assigned, this is not an effective strategy to uncover causal relationships. Indeed, numerous sources of bias may be driving the results, the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by the time-invariant differences between countries. We therefore develop unique historical datasets, employ time-series centric techniques, and operationalize explicitly specified counterfactuals. This allows us properly test for long-run relationships between resource reliance and regime type within countries over time, therefore allowing us to minimize the sources of bias that beset the extant literature. Our results indicate that increases in resource reliance are not associated with the undermining of democracy, or less complete transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. If anything, in many specifications we generate results that suggest a resource blessing.

Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse

Political economists point to the levels of economic development, poverty, and income inequality as the most important determinants of political regimes. The authors present empirical evidence suggesting a robust and negative correlation between the presence of a sizable natural resource sector and the level of democracy in Africa. They argue that resource abundance not only is an important determinant of democratic transition but also partially determines the success of democratic consolidation in Africa. The results illuminate the fact that post-Cold War democratic reforms have been successful only in resource-poor countries such as Benin, Mali, and Madagascar. The authors argue that resource-rich countries such as Nigeria and Gabon can become democratic only if they introduce strong mechanisms of vertical and horizontal accountability within the state.

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Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa

This is a paperback edition of a controversial study of the origins of Islamic civilisation, first published in 1977. By examining non-Muslim sources, the authors point out the intimate link between the Jewish religion and the earliest forms of Islam. As a serious, scholarly attempt to open up a new, exploratory path of Islamic history, the book has already engendered much debate. This paperback edition will make the authors' conclusions widely accessible to teachers and students of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies.

Hagarism. The Making of the Islamic World

What kind of duty do we have to try to stop other people doing wrong? The question is intelligible in just about any culture, but few of them seek to answer it in a rigourous fashion. The most striking exception is found in the Islamic tradition, where 'commanding right' and 'forbidding wrong' is a central moral tenet already mentioned in the Koran. As an historian of Islam whose research has ranged widely over space and time, Michael Cook is well placed to interpret this complex subject. His book represents the first sustained attempt to map the history of Islamic reflection on this obligation. It covers the origins of Muslim thinking about 'forbidding wrong', the relevant doctrinal developments over the centuries, and its significance in Sunni and Shi'ite thought today. In this way the book contributes to the understanding of Islamic thought, its relevance to contemporary Islamic politics and ideology, and raises fundamental questions for the comparative study of ethics.

/pdf/commanding-right-and-forbidding-wrong-in-islamic-thought-toysndsb0a.pdf

Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought

Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World

Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East

? 1 In the sixth century of the Muslim era the Hanbalite scholar Abui 'l-Farag ibn al-Gawzl (d. 597) wrote a book to encourage his lazy contemporaries to greater efforts in the memorisation of Tradition.' God, he argued, had singled out the Muslims to memorise Koran and Tradition, whereas those who had been before them had been dependent on written sources and were incapable of memorisation. The Jews, for example, had conferred on Ezra2 the title "son of God" merely because he knew the Torah by heart; among Muslims, by contrast, a seven-year-old child could recite the Koran from memory. The same contrast obtained in the field of Tradition. "Nobody among the nations transmits the words and deeds of their Prophet in a reliable fashion apart from us; for among us Tradition is transmitted from one generation to another, and the reliability of [each] transmitter is examined until the tradition has been traced back to the Prophet. Other nations have their traditions from written sources of which the writers and transmitters are unknown."3 ? 2 Ibn al-Oawzi's exhortation suggests two basic points about the "oral Tradition" of Islam. The first concerns the significance of its oral character. For Ibn al-(awzi, as for the Muslim traditionists in general, this oral character was more than an occasion for the display of

Michael Cook

Papers

Hagarism. The Making of the Islamic World

Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought

Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World

Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East

The Opponents of the Writing of Tradition in Early Islam