This is the second edition of Randall's concise introductory text for general marketing courses, combining academic rigour with an accessible writing style. While providing a comprehensive overview of 'classical' marketing, the book also covers 'new' marketing, including the shift from transactions to relationships, one-to-one marketing and mass customisation, changes in the role and organization of the marketing function, marketing accountability and marketing metrics. With new chapters on e-commerce and branding, there is also additional material on marketing ethics/social responsibility, knowledge management and technical developments, environmental marketing, and a focus on financial marketing in the services marketing chapter.

Principles of Marketing

A review is presented of the book “Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment,” edited by Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment

Much research in the last two decades has demon- strated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision mak- ing and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be inter- preted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experi- menter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implica- tions of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance er- rors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations un- derlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Un- expected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X00003435

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

A theory of norms and normality is presented and applied to some phenomena of emotional responses, social judgment, and conversations about causes. Norms are assumed to be constructed ad hoc by recruiting specific representations. Category norms are derived by recruiting exemplars. Specific objects or events generate their own norms by retrieval of similar experiences stored in memory or by construction of counterfactual alternatives. The normality of a stimulus is evaluated by comparing it to the norms that it evokes after the fact, rather than to precomputed expectations. Norm theory is applied in analyses of the enhanced emotional response to events that have abnormal causes, of the generation of predictions and inferences from observations of behavior, and of the role of norms in causal questions and answers. This article is concerned with category norms that represent knowledge of concepts and with stimulus norms that govern comparative judgments and designate experiences as surprising. In the tradition of adaptation level theory (Appley, 1971; Helson, 1964), the concept of norm is applied to events that range in complexity from single visual displays to social interactions. We first propose a model of an activation process that produces norms, then explore the role of norms in social cognition. The central idea of the present treatment is that norms are computed after the event rather than in advance. We sketch a supplement to the generally accepted idea that events in the stream of experience are interpreted and evaluated by consulting precomputed schemas and frames of reference. The view developed here is that each stimulus selectively recruits its own alternatives (Garner, 1962, 1970) and is interpreted in a rich context of remembered and constructed representations of what it could have been, might have been, or should have been. Thus, each event brings its own frame of reference into being. We also explore the idea that knowledge of categories (e.g., "encounters with Jim") can be derived on-line by selectively evoking stored representations of discrete episodes and exemplars. The present model assumes that a number of representations can be recruited in parallel, by either a stimulus event or an

https://www3.canyons.edu/faculty/rafterm/0%200LLI%20LOVEandLOSS/Day%206%20Files/1986%20-%20Norm%20Theory%20-%20Comparing%20Reality%20to%20Its%20Alternatives.pdf

Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives

Verification and validation of numerical models of natural systems is impossible. This is because natural systems are never closed and because model results are always nonunique. Models can be confirmed by the demonstration of agreement between observation and prediction, but confirmation is inherently partial. Complete confirmation is logically precluded by the fallacy of affirming the consequent and by incomplete access to natural phenomena. Models can only be evaluated in relative terms, and their predictive value is always open to question. The primary value of models is heuristic.

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/263/5147/641.full.pdf

Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences

Aspects of scientific explanation

Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory

Mathematics as a Science of Patterns is the definitive exposition of a system of ideas about the nature of mathematics which Michael Resnik has been elaborating for a number of years. In calling mathematics a science he implies that it has a factual subject-matter and that mathematical knowledge is on a par with other scientific knowledge; in calling it a science of patterns he expresses his commitment to a structuralist philosophy of mathematics. He links this to a defence of realism about the metaphysics of mathematics-the view that mathematics is about things that really exist. Resnik's distinctive philosophy of mathematics is here presented in an accessible and systematic form: it will be of value not only to specialists in this area, but to philosophers, mathematicians, and logicians interested in the relationship between these three disciplines, or in truth, realism, and epistemology.

Mathematics as a science of patterns

The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge.

entities, that is, immaterial and nonmental things which do not exist in space and time. So I am a platonist.1 Many philosophers of mathematics who would like to be platonists are bothered by two rather deep problems. The first is that since platonic mathematical objects do not exist in space or time the very possibility of our acquiring knowledge and beliefs about them comes into question. The second arises from the fact that no mathematical theory can do more than determine its objects up to isomorphism. Thus the platonist seems to be in the paradoxical position of claiming that a given mathematical theory is about certain things and yet be unable to make any definitive statement of what these things are.2 I think that these problems arise in part because of a fundamental misconception of what mathematics is about. If we conceive of the numbers, say, as objects each one of which can be given to us in isolation from the others as we think of, say, chairs or automobiles, then it is difficult to. avoid conceiving of knowledge of a number as dependent upon some sort of interaction between us and that number. The same line of thought leads us to think that the identity of a number vis a vis any other object should be completely determined. For some time mathematicians have emphasized that mathematics is concerned with structures involving mathematical objects and not with the "internal" nature of the objects themselves. They have recognized that we are not given mathematical objects in isolation but rather in structures. That 13 is a prime number is not determined by some internal property of 13 but rather by its place in the structure of the natural numbers. Some

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2214851.pdf

Michael D. Resnik

Papers

Aspects of scientific explanation

Choices: An Introduction to Decision Theory

Mathematics as a science of patterns

The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge.

Mathematics as a science of patterns: Ontology and reference