In his Preface the author' says that he started out to review all the more important theories upon the topics ordinarily discussed under human motivation but soon found himself more and more limited to the presentation of his own point of view. This very well characterizes the book. It is a very personal product. It is an outline with some defense of the author's own thinking about instincts and appetites and sentiments and how they function in human behavior. And as the author draws so heavily upon James and McDougall, especially the latter, the book may well be looked upon as a sort of sequel to their efforts. There is a thought-provoking distinction presented between instinct and appetite. An instinct is said to be aroused always by something in the external situation; and, correspondingly, an appetite is said to be aroused by sensations from within the body itself. This places, of course, a heavy emphasis upon the cognitive factor in all instinctive behaviors; and the author prefers to use the cognitive factor, especially the knowledge of that end-experience which will satisfy, as a means of differentiating one instinct from another. In this there is a recognized difference from McDougall who placed more emphasis for differentiation upon the emotional accompaniment. The list of instincts arrived at by this procedure is much like that of McDougall, although the author is forced by his criteria to present the possibility of food-seeking and sex and sleep operating both in the manner of an appetite and also as an instinct. The Shand-McDougall concept of sentiment is taken over and used in the explanation of moral motivation. There is the development within each personality of a sentiment for some moral principle. But this sentiment is not a very powerful motivating factor. It is reinforced by social pressures and by religion, which is treated as an effort of finite man to live in harmony with the infinite reality. Those whose psychological thinking is largely in terms of McDougall will doubtless find this volume a very satisfying expansion; but those who are at all inclined to support their psychological thinking by reference to experimental studies will not be so well pleased. The James-Lange theory, for example, is discussed without mention of the many experimental studies which it has provoked. Theoretical sources appear in general to be preferred to experimental investigations.

Human MotivationThe Mind in Action: A Study of Motives and Values. A. Campbell Garnett

Investigators who use phenomenological approaches to understand experiences of human healing, caring, and wholeness need to consider the differences that exist between descriptive and hermeneutic phenomenology. In this article, these two approaches are compared and contrasted with respect to roots, similarities, and differences. Guidelines are offered to assist prospective investigators in selecting the approach most suitable to personal cognitive style and beliefs about the ways humans experience and find meanings during transitions through wellness and illness to advance nursing knowledge in a holistic view.

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Phenomenology: an exploration.

Mind in a Physical World

The methodological foundations of comparative-historical sociology have been transformed dramatically in recent years. Arguments against general theoretical models have proliferated, while the complexity and uniqueness of historical events and the virtues of inductive methods have been emphasized. The growing convergence of sociology and history has led to a decline in the use of general theories. This article begins with a description and analysis of the recent transformation of the methodology of comparative-historical sociology. An overreliance on inductive methods has resulted in inadequate specifications of causal relations and causal mechanisms in recent comparative-historical sociology. The concluding section discusses a nascent rational choice research program in political sociology to illustrate an alternative methodology.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2781636.pdf

The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology

This paper explores the fundamental ideas that have motivated the idea of emergence and the movement of emergentism. The concept of reduction, which lies at the heart of the emergence idea is explicated, and it is shown how the thesis that emergent properties are irreducible gives a unified account of emergence. The paper goes on to discuss two fundamental unresolved issues for emergentism. The first is that of giving a "positive" characterization of emergence; the second is to give a coherent explanation of how "downward" causation, a central component of emergentism, is able to avoid the problem of overdetermination.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/20118828

Emergence: Core ideas and issues

The development of a defensible and fecund notion of emergence has been dogged by a number of threshold issues neatly highlighted in a recent paper by Jaegwon Kim. We argue that physicalist assumptions confuse and vitiate the whole project. In particular, his contention that emergence entails supervenience is contradicted by his own argument that the ‘microstructure’ of an object belongs to the whole object, not to its constituents. And his argument against the possibility of downward causation is question-begging and makes false assumptions about causal sufficiency. We argue, on the contrary, for a rejection of the deeply entrenched assumption, shared by physicalists and Cartesians alike, that what basically exists are things (entities, substances). Our best physics tells us that there are no basic particulars, only fields in process. We need an ontology which gives priority to organization, which is inherently relational. Reflection upon the fact that all biological creatures are far-from-equilibrium systems, whose very persistence depend upon their interactions with their environment, reveals incoherence in the notion of an ‘emergence base’.

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Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation

1: Introduction 2: Doing Philosophy Historically 3: Truth as Divine Norm 4: Timeless Truth 5: Truth and the Divine Intellect 6: Doing the Truth 7: Truth and Judgements 8: The Forms Fracture 9: Truth as the Positive Reality of Ideas 10: Truth and the New Way of Ideas 11: Truth in a Contingent World 12: The Emergence of Historicity 13: The True as a Historical Result 14: Individual Existence and the Appropriation of Truth 15: Truth as a Social Construct 16: Truth and the Analysis of Logical Form 17: The Historicity of Truth 18: Truth in Action Select Bibliography Index.

Truth and Historicity

The paper proposes a process-based model for an ontology that encompasses the emergence of process systems generated by increasingly complex levels of organization. Starting with a division of processes into those that are persistent and those that are fleeting, the model builds through a series of exclusive and exhaustive disjunctions. The crucial distinction is between those persistent and cohesive systems that are energy wells, and those that are far-from-equilibrium. The latter are necessarily open; they can persist only by interaction with their environments. Further distinctions, developed by means of the notions of self-maintenance and error detection, lead to the identification of complex biological organisms that are flexible learners, some of which are self-conscious and form themselves into social institutions. This model provides a non-reductive model for understanding human beings as both embodied and yet emergent. In particular, it provides a way of characterizing action as ‘metaphysically deep’, not an ontological embarrassment within an otherwise physicalist world.

A process-based model for an interactive ontology

PART I: PROCESSES AND ENTITIES 1.1 Change and Stability 1.2 The Need for a New Metaphysics 1.3 An Overview of the Project 1.4 A Terminological Difficulty PART II: THE METAPHYSICS OF PARTICULAR ENTITIES 2.1 The Reification of Being and the Unreality of Change 2.2 The Invention of the Timeless 2.3 Entity as the Primary Category 2.4 Entities as Countable Particulars 2.5 The Invention of Material 2.6 Explaining Change 2.7 The Disintegration of the Aristotelian Explanatory Model 2.8 Descartes' Metaphysical Dichotomy 2.9 Locke, Newton and the 'Corpuscular Philosophy' 2.10 The Rise of Physicalist Metaphysics PART III: CONCEPTUAL SHIFTS IN PHYSICS 3.1 The Invention of Physical Science 3.2 The Fate of 'Matter' 3.3 The Superseding of Newtonian Physics 3.4 Reconceptualizing 'Particles' 3.5 'Particles' and Quantum Fields 3.6 Conceptualizing Quantum Phenomena 3.7 Realist Interpretations of QFT 3.8 Metaphysical Implications PART IV: THE CATEGORY OF GENERIC PROCESSES 4.1 Processes, Stuffs, and Particulars 4.2 Generic and Specific Processes 4.3 Identifying Categories 4.4 The Logic of Process-descriptions 4.5 Processes, Entities, and their Parts 4.6 Re-categorizing Countables 4.7 The 'Part-of' Relation 4.8 Processes and Series of Events 4.9 Whitehead's Process Metaphysics PART V: IDENTITY THROUGH CHANGE 5.1 Identity and Discernible Difference 5.2 Identity as Continuity of Temporal Parts 5.3 Change in Four-dimensional Entities 5.4 Common Assumptions 5.5 Heraclitus' Insight 5.6 Change in Enduring Entities 5.7 Sameness across Different Times 5.8 The Types of Generic Process PART VI: A METAPHYSICAL TAXONOMY OF EMERGENT ENTITIES 6.1 Processes and their Organizations 6.2 Persistence and Stability 6.3 Entities as Cohesive Organizations of Processes 6.4 Energy-wells 6.5 Far-from-Equilibrium Stability 6.6 Self-maintenant Systems 6.7 Recursively Self-maintenant Systems 6.8 The Status of the Concept of Recursive Self-maintenance PART VII: AN EVOLUTIONARY TAXONOMY OF TYPES OF ACTION AND LIFE 7.1 Agency and Causation 7.2 Goal-Directedness 7.3 Serving a Function 7.4 Liability to Error 7.5 Minimal Action 7.6 Selective Action 7.7 Error Detection 7.8 Flexible Learners 7.9 Self-reflective Persons interacting with Externalized Knowledge 7.10 Social Institutions and Groups 7.11 Conclusion PART VIII: THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCE 8.1 Clarifying the Issues 8.2 'Emergence Bases' and Open Systems 8.3 A Definition of Emergence 8.4 Emergence and Non-linearity 8.5 Self-organization 8.6 Emergence and Reduction 8.7 Emergence and the Causal Exclusion Argument 8.8 Downward Causation and Physical Laws PART IX: THE WORLD ACCORDING TO PHYSICALISM 9.1 Defining Physicalism in terms of 'Physical Objects' 9.2 Defining Physicalism in terms of Physical Theory 9.3 Mereological Supervenience 9.4 The Irreducibility of Actions 9.5 Non-reductive Supervenience 9.6 Humean Supervenience 9.7 Global Supervenience 9.8 Basic Particulars 9.9 Physicalism without Particulars? PART X: THE MENTAL ACTIVITY OF HUMAN BEINGS 10.1 Intentionality and Mental Content 10.2 Correspondence Accounts of Representations 10.3 The Interactive Model of Representations 10.4 The Emergence of Awareness 10.5 The 'Hard Problem' of Consciousness 10.6 Sensory Experience 10.7 The Emergence of Reflective Consciousness 10.8 Rationality 10.9 Being Conscious of Oneself PART XI: FURTHER REFLECTIONS 11.1 Time 11.2 The Puzzle about Entropy 11.3 The Emergence of Values 11.4 Freedom and Causation 11.5 Concluding Reflections

The Metaphysics of Emergence

Martin Heidegger accordingly suggests that it is no accident that the Greeks expressed the essence of truth by a privative expression, aletheia. Being-in-untruth makes up an essential characteristic of Being-in-the world, and it takes resolution to adhere to the way of truth. Fundamental to Heidegger's 'definition' of truth as Being-uncovering is his tracing back the question of the truth of an assertion to a direct confrontation with the entity pointed out in the assertion. In a sense, Heidegger's phenomenology of truth-seeking does bring out vividly the realism of the truth-seeker. Heidegger therefore characterizes the being-true of a logos as meaning that, in speaking, the entities one is talking about have to be taken out of their concealment; one must let them be seen as something unconcealed – literally, one discovers them. Yet it emerges that Heidegger is not simply trying to shift the locus of truth from assertions or judgements back to the entities themselves which are 'uncovered'.

Richard Campbell

Papers

Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation

Truth and Historicity

A process-based model for an interactive ontology

The Metaphysics of Emergence

Heidegger: Truth as Aletheia