The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.

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The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice

Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk-adjusted returns Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) "hot hands" result is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum strategy in stocks The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers PERSISTENCE IN MUTUAL FUND performance does not reflect superior stock-picking skill Rather, common factors in stock returns and persistent differences in mutual fund expenses and transaction costs explain almost all of the predictability in mutual fund returns Only the strong, persistent underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds remains anomalous Mutual fund persistence is well documented in the finance literature, but not well explained Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and Wermers (1996) find evidence of persistence in mutual fund performance over short-term horizons of one to three years, and attribute the persistence to "hot hands" or common investment strategies Grinblatt and Titman (1992), Elton, Gruber, Das, and Hlavka (1993), and Elton, Gruber, Das, and Blake (1996) document mutual fund return predictability over longer horizons of five to ten years, and attribute this to manager differential information or stock-picking talent Contrary evidence comes from Jensen (1969), who does not find that good subsequent performance follows good past performance Carhart (1992) shows that persistence in expense ratios drives much of the long-term persistence in mutual fund performance My analysis indicates that Jegadeesh and Titman's (1993) one-year momentum in stock returns accounts for Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser's (1993) hot hands effect in mutual fund performance However, funds that earn higher

/pdf/on-persistence-in-mutual-fund-performance-hff1y6xdm1.pdf

On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance

Agency theory is an important, yet controversial, theory. This paper reviews agency theory, its contributions to organization theory, and the extant empirical work and develops testable propositions. The conclusions are that agency theory (a) offers unique insight into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives, and risk and (b) is an empirically valid perspective, particularly when coupled with complementary perspectives. The principal recommendation is to incorporate an agency perspective in studies of the many problems having a cooperative structure.

http://strategy.sjsu.edu/www.stable/pdf/Eisenhardt,%20K.%20M.,%201989,%20The%20Academy%20of%20Management%20Review%2014(1)%2057-74.pdf

Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review

世界経済・社会統計 = World development indicators

This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur--management and risk bearing--are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devides for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm.

/pdf/agency-problems-and-the-theory-of-the-firm-42slaadz42.pdf

Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

Most real decisions, unlike those of economics texts, have a status quo alternative—that is, doing nothing or maintaining one's current or previous decision. A series of decision-making experiments shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo. Data on the selections of health plans and retirement programs by faculty members reveal that the status quo bias is substantial in important real decisions. Economics, psychology, and decision theory provide possible explanations for this bias. Applications are discussed ranging from marketing techniques, to industrial organization, to the advance of science.

/pdf/status-quo-bias-in-decision-making-wyksfp8n54.pdf

Status quo bias in decision making

Systems T he Internet offers vast new opportunities to interact with total strangers. These interactions can be fun, informative, even profitable. But they also involve risk. Is the advice of a self-proclaimed expert at expertcentral.com reliable? Will an unknown dotcom site or eBay seller ship items promptly with appropriate packaging? Will the product be the same one described online? Prior to the Internet, such questions were answered, in part, through personal and corporate reputations. Vendors provided references, Better Business Bureaus tallied complaints, and past personal experience and person-to-person gossip told you on whom you could rely and on whom you could not. Participants’ standing in their communities, including their roles in church and civic organizations, served as a valuable hostage. Internet services operate on a vastly larger scale

Reputation systems

Earnings provide important information for investment decisions. Thus executives--who are monitored by investors, directors, customers, and suppliers--acting in self-interest and at times for shareholders, have strong incentives to manage earnings. We introduce behavioral thresholds for earnings management. A model shows how thresholds induce specific types of earnings management. Empirical explorations identify earnings management to exceed each of three thresholds: report of positive profits, sustain recent performance, and meet analysts' expectations. The positive profits threshold proves predominant. The future performance of firms that have possibly boosted earnings just across a threshold appears poorer than that of less suspect control groups.

Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds

Earnings provide important information for investment decisions. Thus, executives--who are monitored by investors, directors, customers, and suppliers--acting in self-interest and at times for shareholders, have strong incentives to manage earnings. The authors introduce behavioral thresholds for earnings management. A model shows how thresholds induce specific types of earnings management. Empirical explorations identify earnings management to exceed each of three thresholds: report positive profits, sustain recent performance, and meet analysts' expectations. The positive profits threshold proves predominant. The future performance of firms suspect for boosting earnings just across a threshold is poorer than that of control group firms. Copyright 1999 by University of Chicago Press.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/209601

One of the earliest and best known Internet reputation systems is run by eBay, which gathers comments from buyers and sellers about each other after each transaction. Examination of a large data set from 1999 reveals several interesting features. First, despite incentives to free ride, feedback was provided more than half the time. Second, well beyond reasonable expectation, it was almost always positive. Third, reputation profiles were predictive of future performance, though eBay's net feedback statistic is far from the best predictor available. Fourth, there was a high correlation between buyer and seller feedback, suggesting that the players reciprocate and retaliate.

Richard J. Zeckhauser

Papers

Status quo bias in decision making

Reputation systems

Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds

Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds

Trust among strangers in internet transactions: Empirical analysis of eBay' s reputation system