Roberto A. Weber

TL;DR: The authors conducted an experiment using a binary version of the dictator game and found that many subjects behave fairly in the baseline case mainly because they intrinsically dislike appearing unfair, either to themselves or others.

TL;DR: The authors explore the influence of social norms on behavior and find that social norms reflect social consensus regarding the appropriateness of different possible behaviors, and demonstrate that the norms they elicit, along with a simple model combining concern for norm-compliance with utility for money, predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game in which behavior changes substantially following the introduction of minor contextual variations.

TL;DR: A laboratory paradigm for studying organizational culture is introduced that captures several key elements of the phenomenon and subjects overestimate the performance of the merged firm and attribute the decrease in performance to members of the other firm rather than to situational difficulties created by conflicting culture.

TL;DR: The authors used simple coordination games to identify social norms and found that concern for the norms elicited and for money predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game, including data from a novel experiment.

TL;DR: This paper showed that when individuals are constrained to play a dictator game, 74% of the subjects share, but when the same subjects are allowed to avoid the situation altogether, less than one third share.