Social dominance orientation (SDO), one's degree of preference for inequality among social groups, is introduced. On the basis of social dominance theory, it is shown that (a) men are more social dominance-oriented than women, (b) high-SDO people seek hierarchy-enhancing professional roles and low-SDO people seek hierarchy-attenuating roles, (c) SDO was related to beliefs in a lag number of social and political ideologies that support group-based hierarchy (e.g., meritocracy and racism) and to support for policies that have implications for intergroup relations (e.g., war, civil rights, and social programs), including new policies. SDO was distinguished from interpersonal dominance, conservatism, and authoritarianism

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/3207711/Sidanius_SocialDominanceOrientation.pdf

Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes.

Allport (1954) recognized that attachment to one's ingroups does not necessarily require hostility toward outgroups. Yet the prevailing approach to the study of ethnocentrism, ingroup bias, and prejudice presumes that ingroup love and outgroup hate are reciprocally related. Findings from both cross-cultural research and laboratory experiments support the alternative view that ingroup identification is independent of negative attitudes toward outgroups and that much ingroup bias and intergroup discrimination is motivated by preferential treatment of ingroup members rather than direct hostility toward outgroup members. Thus to understand the roots of prejudice and discrimination requires first of all a better understanding of the functions that ingroup formation and identification serve for human beings. This article reviews research and theory on the motivations for maintenance of ingroup boundaries and the implications of ingroup boundary protection for intergroup relations, conflict, and conflict prevention.

/pdf/the-psychology-of-prejudice-ingroup-love-and-outgroup-hate-4rnxayadwm.pdf

The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love and Outgroup Hate?

Conventional wisdom has regarded low self-esteem as an important cause of violence, but the opposite view is theoretically viable. An interdisciplinary review of evidence about aggression, crime, and violence contradicted the view that low self-esteem is an important cause. Instead, violence appears to be most commonly a result of threatened egotismwthat is, highly favorable views of self that are disputed by some person or circumstance. Inflated, unstable, or tentative beliefs in the self's superiority may be most prone to encountering threats and hence to causing violence. The mediating process may involve directing anger outward as a way of avoiding a downward revision of the selfconcept. Only a minority of human violence can be understood as rational, instrumental behavior aimed at securing or protecting material rewards. The pragmatic futility of most violence has been widely recognized: Wars harm both sides, most crimes yield little financial gain, terrorism and assassination almost never bring about the desired political changes, most rapes fail to bring sexual pleasure, torture rarely elicits accurate or useful information, and most murderers soon regret their actions as pointless and selfdefeating (Ford, 1985; Gottfiedson & Hirschi, 1990; Groth, 1979; Keegan, 1993; Sampson & Laub, 1993; .Scm'ry, 1985). What drives people to commit violent and oppressive actions that so often are tangential or even contrary to the rational pursuit of material self-interest? This article reviews literature relevant to the hypothesis that one main source of such violence is threatened egotism, particularly when it consists of favorable self-appraisals that may be inflated or ill-founded and that are confronted with an external evaluation that disputes them. The focus on egotism (i.e., favorable self-appraisals) as one cause of violent aggression runs contrary to an entrenched body of wisdom that has long pointed to low self-esteem as the root of violence and other antisocial behavior. We shall examine the arguments for the low self-esteem view and treat it as a rival hypothesis to our emphasis on high self-esteem. Clearly, there

https://www.emotionalcompetency.com/papers/baumeistersmartboden1996[1].pdf

Relation of threatened egotism to violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem.

This article presents a critical review of Social Identity Theory. Its major contributions to the study of intergroup relations are discussed, focusing on its powerful explanations of such phenomena as ingroup bias, responses of subordinate groups to their unequal status position, and intragroup homogeneity and stereotyping. In addition, its stimulative role for theoretical elaborations of the Contact Hypothesis as a strategy for improving intergroup attitudes is noted. Then five issues which have proved problematic for Social Identity Theory are identified: the relationship between group identification and ingroup bias; the self-esteem hypothesis; positive – negative asymmetry in intergroup discrimination; the effects of intergroup similarity; and the choice of identity strategies by low-status groups. In a third section a future research agenda for the theory is sketched out, with five lines of enquiry noted as being particularly promising: expanding the concept of social identity; predicting comparison choice in intergroup settings; incorporating affect into the theory; managing social identities in multicultural settings; and integrating implicit and explicit processes. The article concludes with some remarks on the potential applications of social identity principles. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/1099-0992%28200011/12%2930%3A6%3C745%3A%3AAID-EJSP24%3E3.0.CO%3B2-O

Social identity theory: past achievements, current problems and future challenges

The multidimensionality of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes and their relationship to nuclear policy opinions were investigated One hundred and ninety-four college students, 24 high school students, and 21 building contractors were administered the 120-item Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire One hundred and sixty-six of the college students were concurrently administered the 18-item Nuclear Policy Questionnaire An iterated principal factor analysis was performed on the Patriotism/Nationalism Questionnaire and six factors were extracted for Varimax rotation The results indicated that the factors were interpretable and distinct Further analyses indicated the predictive validity of the subscales derived from the six factors for the Nuclear Policy Questionnaire, and exploratory analyses of variance examined the effects of selected demographic variables The findings support the contention that patriotic/nationalistic attitudes entail multiple dimensions, and that they are differentially related to nuclear policy opinions We conclude that researchers need to be more attentive to this multidimensionality, especially the distinction between patriotism and nationalism

Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes.

the predictive validity of the subscales derived from the six factors for the Nuclear Policy Questionnaire, and exploratory analyses of variance examined the effects of selected demographic variables. The findings support the contention that patriotic/nationalistic attitudes entail multiple dimensions, and that they are differentially related to nuclear policy opinions. We conclude that researchers need to be more attentive to this multidimensionality, especially the distinction between patriotism and nationalism.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3791647.pdf

Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic

Three studies are reported which examine the influence of individual differences among US citizens on support for nuclear disarmament and moratorium policies. Results from the first study showed several significant differences between supporters and non-supporters of a nuclear moratorium, with non-sup porters evidencing considerably more hostility toward the Soviet Union and willingness to defer to ex perts. A second study indicated that persons who valued children highly were considerably more likely to have pro-nuclear disarmament attitudes. The third study, conducted in 'Middletown USA' (Muncie, Indiana), showed that supporters and non-supporters of a nuclear freeze differed on two basic factors: (1) fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and (2) willingness to characterize supporters of the freeze as stupid and unpatriotic. Non-supporters were also more likely to view a freeze as useless due to their per ception of Soviet propensity to cheat on an agreement. When considered from the perspective of peace activists, these results have several implications. Most importantly, those attempting to mobilize public support for nuclear control should focus their messages to the public on how national security can be en hanced through arms control agreements, on the patriotism of supporting such a plan, and how an indi vidual citizen -- by supporting an effective plan -- can have an impact on reducing shared anxiety con cerning nuclear war. It is argued that efforts to emphasize the horrific aspects of nuclear war will be lar gely ineffective in increasing support for nuclear disarmament.

Individual Differences in Attitudes Towards Nuclear Arms Policies: Some Psychological and Social Policy Considerations

Public support for a mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze was examined among 251 adult residents of a midwestern city. During a telephone interview respondents answered questions regarding their attitudes toward the Soviet Union, national defense, and nuclear disarmament. Marginal percentages were similar to those found in national surveys and suggest that supporters and nonsupporters of nuclear freeze proposals differ on several variables. We argue that the conflict between anxieties concerning nuclear warfare and desires for an effective national defense posed a significant dilemma for respondents, resulting in considerable overlap in positions held by the two groups.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3791300.pdf

Who in Middletown Supports a Nuclear Freeze

Three studies are reported which examine the influence of individual differences among US citizens on support for nuclear disarmament and moratorium policies. Results from the first study showed several significant differences between supporters and non-supporters of a nuclear moratorium, with non-supporters evidencing considerably more hostility toward the Soviet Union and willingness to defer to experts. A second study indicated that persons who valued children highly were considerably more likely to have pro-nuclear disarmament attitudes. The third study, conducted in 'Middletown USA' (Muncie, Indiana), showed that supporters and non-supporters of a nuclear freeze differed on two basic factors: (1) fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and (2) willingness to characterize supporters of the freeze as stupid and unpatriotic. Non-supporters were also more likely to view a freeze as useless due to their perception of Soviet propensity to cheat on an agreement. When considered from the perspective of peace activists, these results have several implications. Most importantly, those attempting to mobilize public support for nuclear control should focus their messages to the public on how national security can be enhanced through arms control agreements, on the patriotism of supporting such a plan, and how an individual citizen - by supporting an effective plan - can have an impact on reducing shared anxiety concerning nuclear war. It is argued that efforts to emphasize the horrific aspects of nuclear war will be largely ineffective in increasing support for nuclear disarmament.

Seymour Feshbach

Papers

Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes.

Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic

Individual Differences in Attitudes Towards Nuclear Arms Policies: Some Psychological and Social Policy Considerations

Who in Middletown Supports a Nuclear Freeze

Individual Differences in Attitudes Towards Nuclear Arms Policies: Some Psychological and Social Policy