Some natural properties have causal roles; call these ‘causal properties’. Dispositional essentialists think that some causal properties have their causal roles essentially. For the purposes of this paper, I treat dispositional essentialism (hereafter ‘DE’) as a claim about the properties of (ideal, completed, fundamental) science. If the basic ontology of completed science (hereafter ‘Physics’) includes charge, and attributes to it the causal role of repelling like charges, then repelling like charges is essential to charge. Dispositional essentialists often go further. The causal role R of charge isn’t just essential to charge, R is the individual essence of charge—in addition to having R essentially, having R as opposed to some other causal role is what makes charge the property it is, rather than some other property. By contrast, categoricalists hold that Physical properties have no essential (non-trivial) modal character. A canonical explanation of why such properties have their inessential causal roles appeals to laws of nature. That charge has R is determined by a second-order relation of ‘contingent necessitation’—such relations (so to speak) tell categorical properties what to

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The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism

Recent Work on Dispositions

Dispositionalism is the view that causal powers are among the irreducible properties of nature. It has long been among the core competing positions in the metaphysics of laws, but its potential implications for other key debates within metaphysics and the philosophy of science have remained under-explored. Travis Dumsday fills this major gap in the literature by establishing new connections between dispositionalism and such topics as substance ontology, ontic structural realism, material composition, emergentism, natural-kind essentialism, perdurantism, time travel, and spacetime substantivalism. He also puts forward a novel view concerning the precise relationship between causal powers and the fundamental laws of nature. His rich and accessible study will appeal to readers interested in contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of science.

Dispositionalism and the Metaphysics of Science

Dispositional essentialism maintains that all sparse properties are essentially powerful. Two conceptions of sparse properties appear compatible with dispositional essentialism: sparse properties as pure powers or as powerful qualities. This paper compares the two views, criticizes the powerful qualities view, and then develops a new theory of pure powers, termed Point Theory. This theory neutralizes the main advantage powerful qualities appear to possess over pure powers—explaining the existence of powers during latency periods. The paper discusses the relation between powers and space-time points, whether pure powers need to occupy space, and how to account for the movement of pure powers through space-time. Given Point Theory, dispositional essentialists should maintain that sparse properties are pure powers.

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Dispositional Essentialism and the Nature of Powerful Properties

Marc Lange and Ann Whittle have independently developed an important challenge to dispositionalism, arguing that dispositions are reducible to primitive subjunctive facts. I argue in reply that by pairing dispositionalism with a certain version of natural-kind essentialism, their objection can be overcome. Moreover, such a marriage carries further advantages for the dispositionalist. My aim is therefore two-fold: to defend dispositionalism, and to give the dispositionalist some new motivation to adopt natural-kind essentialism.

Using Natural-Kind Essentialism to Defend Dispositionalism

Pan-Dispositionalism – the view that all properties (and relations) are irreducibly dispositional – currently appears to have no takers amongst major analytic metaphysicians. There are those, such as Mumford, who are open to the idea but remain uncommitted. And there are those, such as Ellis and Molnar, who accept that some properties are irreducibly dispositional but argue that not all are. In this paper, I defend Pan-Dispositionalism against this ‘Moderate’ Dispositionalism.

Simon Bostock

Papers

In Defence of Pan-Dispositionalism

The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science - by E.J. Lowe