In this article, education policy is analysed from a welfare state perspective. The aim is to analyse the significance attributed to social‐inclusive aspects of education in contemporary education policies of the Nordic countries, and the extent to which education is regarded as an element in welfare policies. Four aspects are addressed: (1) access to education and measures to prevent social exclusion of young people, (2) comprehensiveness of education in terms of public/private, integration/segregation of e.g. minority children and children with special needs, (3) emphasis on democratic values and participation, (4) the importance of community and equality versus a focus on the individual. It is concluded that it is still justified to speak of the five Nordic countries as a rather distinct group. However, social‐inclusive policies have also clearly been reformulated and delimited, related to a strengthening of the economic‐utilitarian functions of education and a weakening of central education governance.

Still Social and Democratic? Inclusive Education Policies in the Nordic Welfare States

Examining reforms that have taken place in the  s, this article explores the hypothesis that the most distinctive characteristic of the Scandinavian model today is the "stickiness" of its reputation, rather than the institutions and policies that make up the model. Borrowing the concept of path-dependency from institutional analysis, the article argues that because there is a strong commitment to the idea of a Scandinavian model, there is a tendency to expand conceptions of the model so that policy changes appear to be consistent with it.

The Path‐dependency of an Idea: Why Scandinavian Welfare States Remain Distinct

Because of their more limited inequality and more comprehensive social welfare systems, many perceive average welfare to be higher in Scandinavian societies than in the United States. Why then does the United States not adopt Scandinavian-style institutions? More generally, in an interdependent world, would we expect all countries to adopt the same institutions? To provide theoretical answers to this question, we develop a simple model of economic growth in a world in which all countries benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. A greater gap of incomes between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs (thus greater inequality) increases entrepreneurial effort and hence a country’s contribution to the world technology frontier. We show that, under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric: some countries will opt for a type of “cutthroat” capitalism that generates greater inequality and more innovation and will become the technology leaders, while others will free-ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose a more cuddly form of capitalism. Paradoxically, those with cuddly reward structures, though poorer, may have higher welfare than cutthroat capitalists; but in the world equilibrium, it is not a best response for the cutthroat capitalists to switch to a more cuddly form of capitalism. We also show that domestic constraints from social democratic parties or unions may be beneficial for a country because they prevent cutthroat capitalism domestically, instead inducing other countries to play this role.

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Can't We All Be More Like Scandinavians? Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World

We present a model of technologically interconnected countries that benefit and potentially contribute to advances in the world technology frontier. Greater inequality between successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs increases entrepreneurial effort and a country’s contribution to that frontier. Under plausible assumptions, the world equilibrium is asymmetric, involving different economic institutions and technology levels for different countries. Some countries become technology leaders and opt for a type of “cutthroat” capitalism with greater inequality and innovations, while others free ride on the cutthroat incentives of the leaders and choose a more “cuddly” form of capitalism with greater social insurance for entrepreneurs.

/pdf/asymmetric-growth-and-institutions-in-an-interdependent-2h1hqczgfu.pdf

Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World

In this paper we empirically analyze how different forms of democracy affect redistributive spending programs, the size of government and political participation. Specifically, we compare a representative democracy with direct democracy, i.e., town-meeting, using a very large data set on Swedish local government for the period 1919-1950. Due to the Swedish Local Government Act, we can implement two different design-based strategies: a regression-discontinuity design and a nonparametric instrumental variables approach. Our results indicate that going from a direct democracy to a representative system dramatically increases political participation, redistributive spending, and the size of government. The estimated effects on public spending to the poor (poverty relief, child welfare and basic public education) are on the order of 35-70 percent while the effect on political participation is between 150-200 percent. We argue that these results most likely reflect that direct democracy is more prone to capture by (rich) local elites than representative democracy. We present further evidence that supports the theoretical framework developed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008) based on the persistence of de facto political power.

Democracy, Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence from Sweden 1919-1950

(2001). Social Rights and Social Security: The Swedish Welfare State, 1900-2000. Scandinavian Journal of History: Vol. 26, No. 3, pp. 157-176.

Urban Lundberg

Papers

Social rights and social security: the Swedish welfare state, 1900-2000.