W
Werner Güth
Researcher at Max Planck Society
Publications - 596
Citations - 15138
Werner Güth is an academic researcher from Max Planck Society. The author has contributed to research in topics: Ultimatum game & Game theory. The author has an hindex of 48, co-authored 589 publications receiving 14386 citations. Previous affiliations of Werner Güth include Libera! & Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
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An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
TL;DR: In this paper, the ultimatum bargaining games with two players and two stages were investigated. But the authors focused on situations with two agents and two stage bargaining games and only one agent has to decide and the set of outcomes is restricted to two results.
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Ultimatum bargaining behavior : a survey and comparison of experimental results
Werner Güth,Reinhard Tietz +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the ultimatum bargaining games with more than just one round where, except for the final round, nonacceptance does not cause conflict but another round of ultrmatum bargainmg for a smaller cake.
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On ultimatum bargaining experiments — A personal review
TL;DR: In this article, a behavioral theory of ultimatum bargaining based on a dynamic reasoning process is presented, where the stages specify either an intention generator and its corresponding intention filter or, as the final step, an ex post-evaluation of the actual behaviour.
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Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the effects of leading by example in voluntary contribution experiments and find that only a minority of groups succeed in endogenously installing a leader, even though groups with leaders are much more efficient than groups without a leader.
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Information, strategic behavior, and fairness in ultimatum bargaining: an experimental study
Werner Güth,Eric van Damme +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, an experimental study of ultimatum bargaining situations in which an inactive third player is present is presented. But the results are limited to three messages m =( x, y, z ), m = y, and m = z ).