We offer the first large scale, multiple source analysis of the outcome of what may be the most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented. To do this, we have devised a system to locate, download, and analyze the content of millions of social media posts originating from nearly 1,400 different social media services all over China before the Chinese government is able to find, evaluate, and censor (i.e., remove from the Internet) the large subset they deem objectionable. Using modern computer-assisted text analytic methods that we adapt and validate in the Chinese language, we compare the substantive content of posts censored to those not censored over time in each of 95 issue areas. Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored. Instead, we show that the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collection action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is oriented toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or may occur in the future --- and, as such, seem to clearly expose government intent, such as examples we offer where sharp increases in censorship presage government action outside the Internet.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2122937_code1697187.pdf?abstractid=2104894&mirid=5&type=2

How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism But Silences Collective Expression

We offer the first large scale, multiple source analysis of the outcome of what may be the most extensive effort to selectively censor human expression ever implemented. To do this, we have devised a system to locate, download, and analyze the content of millions of social media posts originating from nearly 1,400 different social media services all over China before the Chinese government is able to find, evaluate, and censor (i.e., remove from the Internet) the subset they deem objectionable. Using modern computer-assisted text analytic methods that we adapt to and validate in the Chinese language, we compare the substantive content of posts censored to those not censored over time in each of 85 topic areas. Contrary to previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic, criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely to be censored. Instead, we show that the censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content. Censorship is oriented toward attempting to forestall collective activities that are occurring now or may occur in the future—and, as such, seem to clearly expose government intent.

/pdf/how-censorship-in-china-allows-government-criticism-but-3mw377zu9z.pdf

How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression

1. Rightful resistance 2. Opportunities and perceptions 3. Boundary-spanning claims 4. Tactical escalation 5. Outcomes 6. Implications for China.

/pdf/rightful-resistance-in-rural-china-2ehrk42gmw.pdf

Rightful Resistance in Rural China

The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom by Evgeny Morozov New York: Public Affairs, 2011 409 pages $16.99 [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In January 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton gave a highly touted speech on Internet freedom in which she stated, "The freedom to connect is like the freedom of assembly, only in cyberspace. It allows individuals to get online, come together, and hopefully cooperate. Once you're on the Internet, you don't need to be a tycoon or a rock star to have a huge impact on society." Evgeny Morozov, in his book The Net Delusion, takes great issue with the implication, however, that the so-called "Arab Spring" and "Twitter Revolution" were caused by unfettered access to the Internet. Instead, Morozov, a research academic, provides a cautionary tale about what he argues is any attempt to establish a monocausal relationship to meaningful political change (especially when that single focus is information technology). The book opens with a discussion of cyber-utopianism and Internet-centrism--mind-sets that focus on the positive "emancipatory" aspects of Internet communication while ignoring the downsides. The argument throughout centers on nation-state policy, or lack thereof, that attacks the "wicked" problem of authoritarianism by, as a colleague of mine has dubbed it, "wiring the world." Morozov, expectantly, but importantly, cites the hedonistic world portrayed by Huxley and the "Big Brother" world of Orwell to consider both the proactive and reactive approaches to Internet freedom by authoritarian regimes. Interestingly, he notes that there is often a mix of both. Such regimes certainly use the anonymity and openness of the Internet to spy on their people and shutdown undesirable sites. But there is also a subtle approach that belies the jackboot on the keyboard methodology. While China may be known more for suppressing the Internet and for employing the masses to counter antiregime rhetoric, Russia imposes no formal Internet censorship. It relies on entertainment (porn is specifically cited) to soothe the masses, assuming that given options for political discourse and anything else, most opt for "anything else." Hitler would understand. And in nations where freedom is not widely understood from a western perspective, any bit of additional mindless diversion may be viewed as liberty by the populace. Perhaps most importantly, Morozov rails against social media determinism as driving the end of authoritarianism, labeling it "an intellectually impoverished, lazy way to study the past, understand the present, and predict the future." He does not dismiss the value of Facebook and Twitter to quickly mobilize like-minded individuals. He notes as well that the development of that very like-mindedness is complex and potentially can be manipulated by authoritarian governments using the same Internet freedom. …

The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom

Traditional analyses of political liberalization in China focus on elections or other facets of democratization. But they cannot account for the fact that although China remains authoritarian, it is nevertheless responsive to the increasingly diverse demands of Chinese society. I argue that the rules of the policy-making process are still captured by the fragmented authoritarianism framework, but that the process has become increasingly pluralized: barriers to entry have been lowered, at least for certain actors (hitherto peripheral officials, non-governmental organizations and the media) identified here as “policy entrepreneurs.” With policy change as the variable of interest, I compare three cases of hydropower policy outcomes. I argue that policy entrepreneurs' ability to frame the issue effectively explains variation in hydropower policy outcomes. I then extend these findings to an unlikely policy area, international trade, specifically, the 2001–06 Sino-EU trade talks over child-resistant lighter safety regulations.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0305741009990592

“Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0”: Political Pluralization in the Chinese Policy Process*

Ching Kwan Lee, (2007), x + 325 (University of California Press, Berkeley, $55.00, paperback $21.95). This book is a solid study of laboUr politics in contemporary China. Largely based on years of ...

Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt

Authoritarian governments may face serious uncertainties when dealing with popular resistance because of the unpredictable consequences of making concessions or repressing opposition. However, a political system with multiple levels of authority can help reduce the uncertainties by granting conditional autonomy to lower-level authorities. Such a power structure prevents excessive repression and unconditional concessions when the priorities of different levels of authority do not match. Under this political arrangement, the central authority can avoid blame when local authorities use repression. The divided power also helps reduce the uncertainties faced by the central authority because it will then have to deal with only a very limited number of instances of resistance. Using the case of China, this article shows that divided state power has allowed the party-state to maintain social stability amid numerous instances of social unrest during the reform era.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/B18088327A764C51C0C51E3DA4D05995/S0007123408000215a.pdf/div-class-title-power-structure-and-regime-resilience-contentious-politics-in-china-div.pdf

Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China

Although academics have paid much attention to contentious politics in China and elsewhere, research on the outcomes of social protests, both direct and indirect, in non-democracies is still limited. In this new work, Yongshun Cai combines original fieldwork with secondary sources to examine how social protest has become a viable method of resistance in China and, more importantly, why some collective actions succeed while others fail. Cai looks at the collective resistance of a range of social groups--peasants to workers to homeowners--and explores the outcomes of social protests in China by adopting an analytical framework that operationalizes the forcefulness of protestor action and the cost-benefit calculations of the government. He shows that a protesting group's ability to create and exploit the divide within the state, mobilize participants, or gain extra support directly affects the outcome of its collective action. Moreover, by exploring the government's response to social protests, the book addresses the resilience of the Chinese political system and its implications for social and political developments in China.

Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail

In China during the reform period, the multitude of conflicts between the state or its agents and peasants has become a serious concern for the Chinese government. A fundamental reason for these conflicts is the fact that peasants' basic economic or political interests have been threatened or ignored. Using the case of non-agricultural use of farmland, this study seeks to explain why the peasants' lack of resistive power appears institutionalized in China. The use of rural land often gives rise to conflicts because peasants are usually under-compensated for their land. Facing the encroachment of their interests, peasants may take ex ante preventive action and ex post measures. While ex ante action is more effective, it is not always feasible because it needs the organizing of village cadres. Hence, peasants are weak because usually action can only be taken ex post, which, more often than not, is ineffective because of the political arrangements through which the state, peasants and cadres interact.

Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? The Non-agricultural Use of Farmland in China

Since the 1990s, the Chinese government has carried out the reform of state-owned enterprises involving the retrenchment of millions of workers. One outcome of this reform has been labour unrest across the country. This article addresses the following questions about laid-off workers' collective resistance to the reform: why has collective action repeatedly occurred in a still authoritarian regime; and when are the workers more likely to take action? It argues that the workers' action is a result of two types of interaction, one between the workers and the government, and the other among workers themselves. Collective action is likely to occur when the workers expect to succeed. In addition, workers should be able to co-ordinate their actions, which is likely when there are mechanisms that make mobilization among them possible. The article concludes that worker resistance in the 1990s was not enough to stop the reform because several constraints made it difficult for them to take forceful action.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4618739.pdf

Yong Shun Cai

Papers

Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt

Power Structure and Regime Resilience: Contentious Politics in China

Collective Resistance in China: Why Popular Protests Succeed or Fail

Collective Ownership or Cadres' Ownership? The Non-agricultural Use of Farmland in China

The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers in the Reform Period