Journal ArticleDOI
Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence
TLDR
The authors used information on a sample of sixteen OECD countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance, and found little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth, unemployment, or ex ante real interest rate.Abstract:Â
This note uses information on a sample of sixteen OECD countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance. As previous work suggests, politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation. However, the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth, unemployment, or the ex ante real interest rate. Copyright 1993 by Ohio State University Press.read more
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Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work
TL;DR: In this paper, Veto players analysis of European Union Institutions is presented, focusing on the role of individual veto players and collective players in the analysis of the institutions of the European Union.
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Monetary Theory and Policy
TL;DR: In this article, empirical evidence on money and output is presented, including the Tobin effect and the MIU approximation problems, and a general equilibrium framework for monetary analysis is presented.
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Inflation and Economic Growth
Robert J. Barro,Robert J. Barro +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects of inflation on economic performance were analyzed for around 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 and it was shown that the long-term effects on standards of living are substantial.
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Central Banking in Theory and Practice
TL;DR: Based on the 1996 Lionel Robbins lectures, the author as mentioned in this paper deals with a variety of issues in monetary policy including the goals of monetary policy, the choice of monetary instrument, the rule-versus-discretion debate, suggested remedies for the alleged problem of inflationary bias, central bank credability, arguments for and against central bank independence and the interplay between the central bank and financial markets.
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The political system of European Union
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explained the EU political system and the decision-making procedures of the European Union, focusing on the role of the Single Market and the single market's role in the political system.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that discretionary policy does not result in the social objective function being maximized, and that there is no way control theory can be made applicable to economic planning when expectations are rational.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that the ideal central bank should place a large, but finite, weight on inflation, and a new framework for choosing among alternative intermediate monetary targets is proposed.
Posted Content
Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
TL;DR: In this article, the authors develop an example of a reputational equilibrium where the out-comes turn out to be weighted averages of those from discretion and those from the ideal rule.
Journal ArticleDOI
Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles
Kenneth Rogoff,Anne Sibert +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that electoral cycles in taxes, government spending and money growth can be modeled as an equilibrium signaling process, driven by temporary information asymmetries which can arise if, for example, the government has more current information on its performance in providing for national defence.