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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

Europe’s ‘Democratic Deficit’: The Question of Standards

Giandomenico Majone
- 01 Mar 1998 - 
- Vol. 4, Iss: 1, pp 5-28
TLDR
In this article, the authors argue that Europe's democratic deficit is democratically justified by the fact that the majority of voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic integration, and they cannot expect parliamentary democracy to flourish in the Union.
Abstract
Arguments about Europe’s democratic deficit are really arguments about the nature and ultimate goals of the integration process. Those who assume that economic integration must lead to political integration tend to apply to European institutions standards of legitimacy derived from the theory and practice of parliamentary democracies. We argue that such standards are largely irrelevant at present. As long as the majority of voters and their elected representatives oppose the idea of a European federation, while supporting far-reaching economic integration, we cannot expect parliamentary democracy to flourish in the Union. Economic integration without political integration is possible only if politics and economics are kept as separate as possible. The depoliticisation of European policy-making is the price we pay in order to preserve national sovereignty largely intact. These being the preferences of the voters, we conclude that Europe’s ‘democratic deficit’ is democratically justified. The expression ‘democratic deficit,’ however, is also used to refer to the legitimacy problems of non-majoritarian institutions, and this second meaning is much more relevant to a system of limited competences such as the EC. Now the key issues for democratic theory are about the tasks which may be legitimately delegated to institutions insulated from the political process, and how to design such institutions so as to make independence and accountability complementary and mutually supporting, rather than antithetical. If one accepts the ‘regulatory model’ of the EC, then, as long as the tasks delegated to the European level are precisely and narrowly defined, non-majoritarian standards of legitimacy should be sufficient to justify the delegation of the necessary powers.

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Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI

Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

TL;DR: In this article, the authors draw on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance: dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions, and task-specific, intersecting and flexible jurisdictions.
Book

The political system of European Union

Simon Hix
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explained the EU political system and the decision-making procedures of the European Union, focusing on the role of the Single Market and the single market's role in the political system.
Journal ArticleDOI

Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik

TL;DR: The authors argue that a democratic polity requires contestation for political leadership and over policy, which is an essential element of even the 'thinnest' theories of democracy, yet is conspicuously absent in the EU.
Journal ArticleDOI

Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and ‘Throughput’

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the EU's legitimacy is mainly defined by output effectiveness for the people and input participation by the people, and they define and discuss this third normative criterion as well as the interaction effects of all three normative criteria.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy.

TL;DR: The authors examine output time series from seven different public bureaucracies for responsiveness to political tools applied in the late Carter and early Reagan administrations and find responsiveness in all seven cases, indicating that political appointments are the most important instrument of political control; changing budgets, legislation, congressional signals, and administrative reorganizations are less important.
Journal ArticleDOI

Democracy's Time Constraints:

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore a series of time issues that have been largely ignored in democratic theory and discuss a defining feature of democratic rule: its temporal delimitation, which they call the "temporal delimitation".