The New Comparative Economics
TLDR
The authors argue that to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship, one needs to understand how institutions exert profound influence on economic development and apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.About:
This article is published in Journal of Comparative Economics.The article was published on 2003-12-01 and is currently open access. It has received 798 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Comparative economic systems & Institutional economics.read more
Citations
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Do Institutions Cause Growth
TL;DR: This article found that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose and also found that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed.
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The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins
TL;DR: The authors argued that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes, and they summarized this evidence and attempted a unified interpretation.
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Private credit in 129 countries
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries, and find that both creditor protection through the legal system and information sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of the private credit to GDP.
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Eight Questions about Corruption
TL;DR: The authors discuss eight frequently asked questions about public corruption: What is corruption, which countries are the most corrupt, what are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption, what is the magnitude of corruption, do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption, can competition reduce corruption and why have there been so few successful attempts to fight corruption?
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The Regulation of Labor
Juan Carlos Botero,Simeon Djankov,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,Andrei Shleifer +4 more
TL;DR: Botero et al. as discussed by the authors investigated the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries and found that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries.
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Posted Content
Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance
Douglass C. North,John Alt +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time.
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The Nature of the Firm
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that a definition of a firm may be obtained which is not only realistic in that it corresponds to what is meant by a firm in the real world, but is tractable by two of the most powerful instruments of economic analysis developed by Marshall, the idea of the margin and that of substitution.
Posted Content
Law and Finance
Rafael La Porta,Rafael La Porta,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Florencio Lopez de Silanes,Andrei Shleifer,Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny,Robert W. Vishny +7 more
TL;DR: This paper examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common law countries generally have the best, and French civil law countries the worst, legal protections of investors.
Journal ArticleDOI
Law and Finance
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries and found that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil law countries located in the middle.