The reallocation of authority upward, downward, and sideways from central states has drawn attention from a growing number of scholars in political science. Yet beyond agreement that governance has become (and should be) multi-level, there is no consensus about how it should be organized. This article draws on several literatures to distinguish two types of multi-level governance. One type conceives of dispersion of authority to general-purpose, nonintersecting, and durable jurisdictions. A second type of governance conceives of task-specific, intersecting, and flexible jurisdictions. We conclude by specifying the virtues of each type of governance.For comments and advice we are grateful to Christopher Ansell, Ian Bache, Richard Balme, Arthur Benz, Tanja Borzel, Renaud Dehousse, Burkard Eberlein, Peter Hall, Edgar Grande, Richard Haesly, Bob Jessop, Beate Kohler-Koch, David Lake, Patrick Le Gales, Christiane Lemke, David Lowery, Michael McGinnis, Andrew Moravcsik, Elinor Ostrom, Franz U. Pappi, Thomas Risse, James Rosenau, Alberta Sbragia, Philippe Schmitter, Ulf Sverdrup, Christian Tusschoff, Bernhard Wessels, the political science discussion group at the University of North Carolina, and the editor and three anonymous reviewers of APSR. We received institutional support from the Center for European Studies at the University of North Carolina, the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, and the Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung in Berlin. Earlier versions were presented at the European Union Studies Association meeting, the ECPR pan-European Conference in Bordeaux, and Hannover Universitat, Harvard University, Humboldt Universitat, Indiana University at Bloomington, Mannheim Universitat, Sheffield University, Sciences Po (Paris), Technische Universitat Munchen, and the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The authors' names appear in alphabetical order.

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Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance

Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

政治自由主义 = Political liberalism

Introduction: Explaining the EU Political System PART I: GOVERNMENT Executive Politics Legislative Politics Judicial Politics PART II: POLITICS Public Opinion Democracy, Parties and Elections Interest Representation PART III: POLICY-MAKING Regulation of the Single Market Expenditure Policies Economic and Monetary Union Citizen Freedom and Security Policies Foreign Policies Conclusions: Rethinking the European Union Appendix: Decision-making Procedures of the European Union Bibliography

The political system of European Union

Giandomenico Majone and Andrew Moravcsik have argued that the EU does not suffer a ‘democratic deficit’. We disagree about one key element: whether a democratic polity requires contestation for political leadership and over policy. This aspect is an essential element of even the ‘thinnest’ theories of democracy, yet is conspicuously absent in the EU.

/pdf/why-there-is-a-democratic-deficit-in-the-eu-a-response-to-5akfaz0s2w.pdf

Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik

This article argues that the irresistible rise of Comitology is an institutional response to the deep‐seated tensions between the dual supranational and intergovernmentalist structure of the Community on the one hand, and its problem‐solving tasks on the other. Comitology has accordingly provided a forum in which problems are addressed through evolving and novel processes of interest formation and decision‐making. However, neither legal nor political science have been able properly to evaluate the workings of the committee system, both disciplines remaining trapped within normative structures and traditional methodologies ill‐suited to the analysis of these institutional innovations. As a consequence, this article advocates the trans‐disciplinary study of Comitology, and furthermore argues that the two disciplines might be drawn together by the concept of ‘deliberative supranationalism’: being on the one hand a normative approach which seeks both to preserve the legitimacy of national democracies and to set limits upon the traditional Nation State within a supranational community; and on the other, a theoretical tool which is nonetheless responsive to and accomodating of ‘real‐world’ phenomena.

From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology

The central argument of this contribution is that core institutional features of the European Community (EC) should be read as supranational versions of deliberationist ideals. After outlining a normative perspective for institutional innovations, we argue that deliberative supranationalism is already more than Utopia. We substantiate this claim by briefly outlining a deliberative supranationalist analysis of comitology in the foodstuffs sector. It is argued that comitology is indicative of the emergence of a deliberative style of European regulatory policy-making which aims at building up co-ordination capacities, establishing a culture of inter-administrative partnership, and creating conditions in which the organizations responsible for managing particular policies are able to meet emerging challenges. Emphasis therefore is placed on identifying areas of interdependence and common interest with the aim of ensuring the coherence and reliability of the European management network in the foodstuffs sector...

Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuffs sector

One of the striking features of the European Community's regulatory regimes is the role assigned to committees at all stages of the preparation of new measures and the implementation of its policies Despite their obvious importance in the European polity, the 'comitology' of the EC has been understudied and poorly understood This book fills a number of gaps in the literature by bringing together legal, political and policy analysts to examine the emergence of the committee role For the European Parliament comitology represents obstacles to its own participation in policy making For lawyers comitology is indicative of a strengthening of the administrative branch of government which seems to be evading parliamentary control and susceptibility to judicial review These are the issues discussed and analysed in this book of original essays

https://www.uni-bamberg.de/fileadmin/uni/fakultaeten/sowi_professuren/politikwissenschaft_insb_int/Dateien/Mitarbeiter/Publikationen_Texterkennung/ArguinBargaining_text.pdf

EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics

The judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) of December 2008 in Viking and Laval on the compatibility of national collective labour law with European prerogatives have caused quite a heated critical debate This article seeks to put this debate in constitutional perspectives In its first part, it reconstructs in legal categories what Fritz W Scharpf has characterised as a decoupling of economic integration from the various welfare traditions of the Member States European constitutionalism, it is submitted, is bound to respond to this problematique The second part develops a perspective within which such a response can be found That perspective is a supranational European conflict of laws which seeks to realise what the draft Constitutional Treaty had called the ‘motto of the union’: unitas in pluralitate Within that framework, the third part analyses two seemingly contradictory trends, namely, first, albeit very briefly, the turn to ‘soft’ modes of governance in the realm of social policy and then, in much greater detail, the ECJ's ‘hard’ interpretations of the supremacy of European freedoms and its strict interpretation of pertinent secondary legislation The conflict‐of‐laws approach would suggest a greater respect for national autonomy, in particular, in view of the limited EU competences in the field of labour law

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/eulj_448.pdf?abstractid=1321912&mirid=5

Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ inVikingandLaval

Contributions by: Giuliano Amato, Klaus von Beyme, Tanja Borzel Renaud Dehousse, Christian Joerges, Charles Leben, M. Rainer Lepsius, Agustin Jose Menendez, Yves Meny, Iulia Motoc, Dietmar Nickel, Johan P. Olsen, Thomas Risse, Helen Wallace, J. H. H. Weiler, Jan Zielonka

Christian Joerges

Papers

From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology

Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuffs sector

EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics

Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the ‘Social Deficit’ of European Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ inVikingandLaval

What Kind of Constitution for What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer