https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.2307%2F3343168.pdf

Development as Freedom

Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace

政治自由主义 = Political liberalism

Introduction: Explaining the EU Political System PART I: GOVERNMENT Executive Politics Legislative Politics Judicial Politics PART II: POLITICS Public Opinion Democracy, Parties and Elections Interest Representation PART III: POLICY-MAKING Regulation of the Single Market Expenditure Policies Economic and Monetary Union Citizen Freedom and Security Policies Foreign Policies Conclusions: Rethinking the European Union Appendix: Decision-making Procedures of the European Union Bibliography

The political system of European Union

Why do agents comply with the norms embedded in regimes and international institutions? Scholars have proposed two competing answers to this compliance puzzle, one rationalist, the other constructivist. Rationalists emphasize coercion, cost/benefit calculations, and material incentives; constructivists stress social learning, socialization, and social norms. Both schools, however, explain important aspects of compliance. To build a bridge between them, I examine the role of argumentative persuasion and social learning. This makes explicit the theory of social choice and interaction implicit in many constructivist compliance studies, and it broadens rationalist arguments about the instrumental and noninstrumental processes through which actors comply. I argue that domestic politics—in particular, institutional and historical contexts—delimit the causal role of persuasion/social learning, thus helping both rationalists and constructivists to refine the scope of their compliance claims. To assess the plausibility of these arguments, I examine why states comply with new citizenship/membership norms promoted by European regional organizations.

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Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change

This article argues that the irresistible rise of Comitology is an institutional response to the deep‐seated tensions between the dual supranational and intergovernmentalist structure of the Community on the one hand, and its problem‐solving tasks on the other. Comitology has accordingly provided a forum in which problems are addressed through evolving and novel processes of interest formation and decision‐making. However, neither legal nor political science have been able properly to evaluate the workings of the committee system, both disciplines remaining trapped within normative structures and traditional methodologies ill‐suited to the analysis of these institutional innovations. As a consequence, this article advocates the trans‐disciplinary study of Comitology, and furthermore argues that the two disciplines might be drawn together by the concept of ‘deliberative supranationalism’: being on the one hand a normative approach which seeks both to preserve the legitimacy of national democracies and to set limits upon the traditional Nation State within a supranational community; and on the other, a theoretical tool which is nonetheless responsive to and accomodating of ‘real‐world’ phenomena.

From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology

The central argument of this contribution is that core institutional features of the European Community (EC) should be read as supranational versions of deliberationist ideals. After outlining a normative perspective for institutional innovations, we argue that deliberative supranationalism is already more than Utopia. We substantiate this claim by briefly outlining a deliberative supranationalist analysis of comitology in the foodstuffs sector. It is argued that comitology is indicative of the emergence of a deliberative style of European regulatory policy-making which aims at building up co-ordination capacities, establishing a culture of inter-administrative partnership, and creating conditions in which the organizations responsible for managing particular policies are able to meet emerging challenges. Emphasis therefore is placed on identifying areas of interdependence and common interest with the aim of ensuring the coherence and reliability of the European management network in the foodstuffs sector...

Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuffs sector

The article argues for an understanding of the EU as a discourse-based multilevel governance structure. It conceptualises the EU as a heterarchical polity that includes the domestic, governmental and supranational levels. Heterarchical structures, however, can only be expected to perform efficiently, effectively and lead to high quality output if their mode of interaction is based on deliberation. Important institutional features of the EU can be interpreted as the means to create the necessary institutional preconditions for deliberation. Heisenberg Fellow of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Centre for Transatlantic Foreign and Security Politics Free University Berlin Ihnestr. 22 14195 Berlin Tel.: 0049 (0)30 838 55527 Fax.: 0049 (0)30 838 54160 Mail: neyer@zedat.fu-berlin.de

Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Governance

Deliberative approaches build on a large body of normative and positive political theory, which highlights the contribution of argumentative interaction for the coherence of a polity, its social acceptance and its normative acceptability. The purpose of this overview is to show the richness of deliberative approaches in integration studies and to stimulate researchers to apply them to empirical work. Deliberative approaches are a promising alternative to more established theoretical approaches. Their comparative strength is that they provide normative guidance to integration studies, open up a new research agenda for the analysis of interaction in European politics, and offer innovative interpretations for understanding the institutional design and the political process of the EU.

The deliberative turn in integration theory

The legal output of the EU can easily be compared to an average nation-state and surely surpasses that of any other international organization. Although the EU has neither become a state-like entity nor possesses any powers to coerce member states into compliance, its rules are almost always respected. The EU's comparatively good record in terms of efficiency and effectiveness can be understood as the product of an institutional structure that transforms strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving. Understood as such, the EU resembles a new type of political order which gives evidence that centralized coercion is anything but necessary for a good policy performance.

Jürgen Neyer

Papers

From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of Comitology

Transforming strategic interaction into deliberative problem-solving: European comitology in the foodstuffs sector

Discourse and Order in the EU. A Deliberative Approach to Multi-Level Governance

The deliberative turn in integration theory

Explaining the unexpected: efficiency and effectiveness in European decision-making