/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Technology, market characteristics, and spillovers

Greenhouse gas emissions are fundamental both to the world’s energy system and to its food production. The production of CO2, the predominant gas implicated in climate change, is intrinsic to fossil fuel combustion; specifically, thermal energy is generated by breaking the chemical bonds in the carbohydrates oil, coal, and natural gas and oxidizing the components to CO2 and H2O. One cannot have cheap energy without carbon dioxide emissions. Similarly, methane (CH4) emissions, an important greenhouse gas in its own right, are necessary to prevent the build-up of hydrogen in anaerobic digestion and decomposition. One cannot have beef, mutton, dairy, or rice without methane emissions. Climate change is the mother of all externalities: larger, more complex, and more uncertain than any other environmental problem. The sources of greenhouse gas emissions are more diffuse than any other environmental problem. Every company, every farm, every household emits some greenhouse gases. The effects are similarly pervasive. Weather affects agriculture, energy use, health, and many aspects of nature—which in turn affects everything and everyone. The causes and consequences of climate change are very diverse, and those in low-income countries who contribute least to climate change are most vulnerable to its effects. Climate change is also a long-term problem. Some greenhouse gases have an atmospheric life-time measured in tens of thousands of years. The quantities of emissions involved are enormous. In 2000, carbon dioxide emissions alone (and excluding land use change) were 24 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (tCO2).

/pdf/the-economic-effects-of-climate-change-554ikwofp2.pdf

The Economic Effects of Climate Change

https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/S_Sonmez_Influence_1998.pdf

Influence of terrorism risk on foreign tourism decisions.

The Political Economy of Terrorism presents a widely accessible political economy approach to the study of terrorism. It applies economic methodology – theoretical and empirical – combined with political analysis and realities to the study of domestic and transnational terrorism. In so doing, the book provides both a qualitative and quantitative investigation of terrorism in a balanced up-to-date presentation that informs students, policy makers, researchers and the general reader of the current state of knowledge. Included are historical aspects, a discussion of watershed events, the rise of modern-day terrorism, examination of current trends, the dilemma of liberal democracies, evaluation of counterterrorism, analysis of hostage incidents and much more. The new edition expands coverage of every chapter, adds a new chapter on terrorist network structures and organization, accounts for changes in the Department of Homeland Security and the USA Patriot Act and insurance against terrorism. Rational-actor models of terrorist and government behavior and game-theoretic analysis are presented for readers with no prior theoretical training. Where relevant, the authors display graphs using data from International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events (ITERATE), the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), and other public-access data sets.

/pdf/the-political-economy-of-terrorism-3fasro8h94.pdf

The Political Economy of Terrorism

This article applies formal modeling to study a terrorist group's choice of whether to attack or not, and, in the case of an attack, which of two potential targets to strike. Each potential target individually takes protective measures that influence the terrorists' perceived success and failure, and, hence, the likelihood of attack. For domestic terrorism, a tendency for potential targets to overdeter is indicated. For transnational terrorism, cases of overdeterrence and underdeterrence are identified. We demonstrate that increased information about terrorists' preferences, acquired by the targets, may exacerbate inefficiency when deterrence efforts are not coordinated. In some cases, perfect information may eliminate the existence of a noncooperative solution.

The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists' choice of targets

We use economic analysis in a simple game-theory framework to ascertain under what circumstances a government would want to precommit itself to a no-negotiation strategy. From the government viewpoint, we examine both the choice of deterrence expenditure (i.e., expense meant to reduce terrorist logistical success during incidents) and whether to negotiate or not.

https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1154&context=econ_las_pubs

To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That Is The Question

The profound changes that have affected agriculture in modern times are perhaps best illustrated by the evolution of production techniques due to mechanization, new chemical inputs such as herbicides, pesticides and fertilizers, genetic selection of crops and animals, new crop varieties, and countless other technical and organizational improvements. These innovations have allowed a generalized increase in physical output while, at the same time, agriculture has suffered a massive exodus of labor forces towards the non-farm sectors. Indeed, a stylized fact of developed countries’ post-war growth is that productivity in agriculture has grown faster than in other sectors (Jorgenson and Gollop, 1992). This remarkable record naturally begs the question of what is at its root, and a view that commands considerable consensus is that agricultural productivity growth is due to (past) investments in scientific research and development (R&D).

https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=econ_las_staffpapers

Intellectual Property Rights and the Welfare Effects of Agricultural R&D

A three-region world model for the soybean complex is developed to evaluate the welfare effects of Roundup Ready (RR) soybean adoption. The structural modeling of the innovation accounts for farmers’ adoption incentives and for the observed pricing of RR soybean seeds as a proprietary technology. The calibrated model is solved for various scenarios to evaluate the production, price, and welfare impacts of RR soybean adoption. The United States gains substantially from the innovation, with the innovator capturing the larger share of the welfare gains. US farmers benefit in the base scenario, but would be adversely affected if the RR innovation were to increase yields. Spillover of the new technology to foreign competitors erodes the competitive position of domestic soybean producers, and export of the technology per se may not improve the welfare position of the innovating country. Consumers in every region gain from the adoption of RR soybeans. [ JEL Classification: F14, O33, Q16]. © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1325&context=econ_las_staffpapers

Harvey E. Lapan

Papers

The calculus of dissent: An analysis of terrorists' choice of targets

To Bargain or Not To Bargain: That Is The Question

Intellectual Property Rights and the Welfare Effects of Agricultural R&D

Roundup Ready Soybeans and Welfare Effects in the Soybean Complex

Terrorism and signalling