Throughout history, rich and poor countries alike have been lending, borrowing, crashing--and recovering--their way through an extraordinary range of financial crises. Each time, the experts have chimed, "this time is different"--claiming that the old rules of valuation no longer apply and that the new situation bears little similarity to past disasters. With this breakthrough study, leading economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff definitively prove them wrong. Covering sixty-six countries across five continents, This Time Is Different presents a comprehensive look at the varieties of financial crises, and guides us through eight astonishing centuries of government defaults, banking panics, and inflationary spikes--from medieval currency debasements to today's subprime catastrophe. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, leading economists whose work has been influential in the policy debate concerning the current financial crisis, provocatively argue that financial combustions are universal rites of passage for emerging and established market nations. The authors draw important lessons from history to show us how much--or how little--we have learned. Using clear, sharp analysis and comprehensive data, Reinhart and Rogoff document that financial fallouts occur in clusters and strike with surprisingly consistent frequency, duration, and ferocity. They examine the patterns of currency crashes, high and hyperinflation, and government defaults on international and domestic debts--as well as the cycles in housing and equity prices, capital flows, unemployment, and government revenues around these crises. While countries do weather their financial storms, Reinhart and Rogoff prove that short memories make it all too easy for crises to recur. An important book that will affect policy discussions for a long time to come, This Time Is Different exposes centuries of financial missteps.

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This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly

Large fluctuations in energy prices have been a distinguishing characteristic of the U.S. economy since the 1970s. Turmoil in the Middle East, rising energy prices in the U.S. and evidence of global warming recently have reignited interest in the link between energy prices and economic performance. This paper addresses a number of the key issues in this debate: What are energy price shocks and where do they come from? How responsive is energy demand to changes in energy prices? How do consumers’ expenditure patterns evolve in response to energy price shocks? How do energy price shocks affect U.S. real output, inflation and stock prices? Why do energy price increases seem to cause recessions, but energy price decreases do not seem to cause expansions? Why has there been a surge in the price of oil in recent years? Why has this new energy price shock not caused a recession so far? Have the effects of energy price shocks waned since the 1980s and, if so, why? As the paper demonstrates, it is critical to account for the endogeneity of energy prices and to differentiate between the effects of demand and supply shocks in energy markets, when answering these questions.

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The Economic Effects of Energy Price Shocks

China's emergence as a great economic power has induced an epochal shift in patterns of world trade. Simultaneously, it has challenged much of the received empirical wisdom about how labor markets adjust to trade shocks. Alongside the heralded consumer benefits of expanded trade are substantial adjustment costs and distributional consequences. These impacts are most visible in the local labor markets in which the industries exposed to foreign competition are concentrated. Adjustment in local labor markets is remarkably slow, with wages and labor-force participation rates remaining depressed and unemployment rates remaining elevated for at least a full decade after the China trade shock commences. Exposed workers experience greater job churning and reduced lifetime income. At the national level, employment has fallen in the US industries more exposed to import competition, as expected, but offsetting employment gains in other industries have yet to materialize. Better understanding when and where trade is ...

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w21906/w21906.pdf

The China Shock: Learning from Labor-Market Adjustment to Large Changes in Trade

Global banks played a significant role in transmitting the 2007-09 financial crisis to emerging-market economies. We examine adverse liquidity shocks on main developed-country banking systems and their relationships to emerging markets across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, isolating loan supply from loan demand effects. Loan supply in emerging markets across Europe, Asia, and Latin America was affected significantly through three separate channels: 1) a contraction in direct, cross-border lending by foreign banks; 2) a contraction in local lending by foreign banks' affiliates in emerging markets; and 3) a contraction in loan supply by domestic banks, resulting from the funding shock to their balance sheets induced by the decline in interbank, cross-border lending. Policy interventions, such as the Vienna Initiative introduced in Europe, influenced the lending-channel effects on emerging markets of shocks to head-office balance sheets.

Global banks and international shock transmission: evidence from the crisis

Even before the Great Recession, US employment growth was unimpressive. Between 2000 and 2007, the economy gave back the considerable employment gains achieved during the 1990s, with a historic contraction in manufacturing employment being a prime contributor to the slump. We estimate that import competition from China, which surged after 2000, was a major force behind both recent reductions in US manufacturing employment and—through input-output linkages and other general equilibrium channels—weak overall US job growth. Our central estimates suggest job losses from rising Chinese import competition over 1999–2011 in the range of 2.0–2.4 million.

https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w20395/w20395.pdf

Import competition and the great U.S. employment sag of the 2000s

One of the most striking aspects of the recent recession is the collapse in international trade. This paper uses disaggregated data on U.S. imports and exports to shed light on the anatomy of this collapse. The paper finds that the recent reduction in trade relative to overall economic activity is far larger than in previous downturns. Information on quantities and prices of both domestic absorption and imports reveals a 40 percent shortfall in imports, relative to what would be predicted by a simple import demand relationship. In a sample of imports and exports disaggregated at the 6-digit NAICS level, the paper finds that sectors used as intermediate inputs experienced significantly higher percentage reductions in both imports and exports. It also finds support for compositional effects: sectors with larger reductions in domestic output had larger drops in trade. By contrast, the paper finds no support for the hypothesis that trade credit played a role in the recent trade collapse.

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The Collapse of International Trade During the 2008-2009 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun

A common view in the literature is that systematic monetary policy responses to the inflation caused by oil price shocks have been an important source of aggregate fluctuations in the US economy. Earlier empirical evidence in support of such a link was based on inappropriate econometric models. We show that there is no credible evidence that monetary policy responses to oil price shocks caused large aggregate fluctuations in the 1970s and 1980s or more recently. Our analysis suggests that the traditional monetary policy reaction framework should be replaced by models that take account of the endogeneity of the real price of oil and that allow policy responses to depend on the underlying causes of oil price shocks.

Does the Fed Respond to Oil Price Shocks

One of the most striking aspects of the recent recession is the collapse in international trade. This paper uses disaggregated quarterly and monthly data on U.S. imports and exports to shed light on the anatomy of this collapse. We find that the recent reduction in trade relative to overall economic activity is far larger than in previous downturns. Information on quantities and prices of both domestic absorption and imports reveals a more than 50% shortfall in imports, relative to what would be predicted by a simple import demand relationship. In a sample of imports and exports disaggregated at the 6-digit NAICS level, we find that sectors used as intermediate inputs experienced significantly higher percentage reductions in both imports and exports. We also find support for compositional effects: sectors with larger reductions in domestic output had larger drops in trade. By contrast, we find no support for the hypothesis that trade credit played a role in the recent trade collapse.

As global production sharing expands, gross trade flows provide an increasingly misleading picture of the economic importance of trade.

Trade in Value-Added

This paper evaluates the hypothesis that during the 2008-2009 collapse in international trade, imports of higher quality goods experienced larger reductions compared to low-quality imports, using data on US imports disaggregated by HS-10 product category and source country. We find little, if any, robust econometric evidence in support of this hypothesis.

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Logan T. Lewis

Papers

The Collapse of International Trade During the 2008-2009 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun

Does the Fed Respond to Oil Price Shocks

The Collapse of International Trade During the 2008-2009 Crisis: In Search of the Smoking Gun

Trade in Value-Added

The "Collapse in Quality" Hypothesis