Michael R. Baye

TL;DR: In this paper, the first price all-pay auction is used to model rent seeking, where asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium, and the high bidder receives the item.

TL;DR: In this paper, the first price all-pay auction is used to model rent seeking, where asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium, and the high bidder receives the item.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined an interesting principle arising in all-pay auctions, which states that a politician wishing to maximize political rents may find it in his best interest to exclude certain lobbyists from participating in the lobbying process, particularly lobbyists valuing most the political prize.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined four million daily price observations for more than 1,000 consumer electronics products on the price comparison site http://shopper.com and found little support for the notion that prices on the Internet are converging to the law of one price.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the equilibrium interaction between a market for price information (controlled by a gatekeeper) and the homogenous product market it serves, and show that gatekeeper profits are maximized in an equilibrium where the product market exhibits price dispersion, access fees are sufficiently low that all consumers subscribe, advertising fees exceed socially optimal levels, thus inducing partial firm participation, and advertised prices are below unadvertised prices.