Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Knowledge and the Flow of Information.

Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive Extension.

In this book Professor Holmes discusses some of the evidence relating to one of the most baffling problems yet recognized by biologists-the factors involved in the regulation of growth and form. A wide range of possible influences, from enzymes to cellular competition, is considered. Numerous experiments and theories are described, with or without bibliographic citation. There is a list of references for each chapter and an index. The subject from a scientific standpoint is an exceedingly difficult one, for the reason that very little indeed is understood regarding such phenomena as differentiation. It follows that the problem offers fine opportunities for intellectual jousting by mechanists and vitalists, that hypotheses and theories must often be the weapons of choice, and philosophy the armor. Professor Holmes gives us a good seat from which to watch the combats, explains clearly what is going on, and occasionally slips away to enter the lists himself. This stereoscopic atlas of anatomy was designed as an aid in teaching neuro-anatomy for beginning medical students and as a review for physicians taking Board examinations in Psychiatry and Neurology. Each plate consists of a pair of stereoscopic photographs and a labelled diagram of the important parts seen in the photograph. Perhaps in this day of scarcity of materials, particularly of human brains hardened for dissection, photographs of this kind conceivably can be used as a substitute. Successive stages of dissection are presented in such a fashion that, used in conjunction with the dissecting manual, a student should be able to identify most of the important components of the nervous system without much outside help. The area covered is limited to the gross features of the brain and brain stem and perhaps necessarily does not deal with any of the microscopic structure. So much more can be learned from the dissection of the actual brain that it is doubtful if this atlas would be useful except where brains are not available. A good deal of effort has been spent on the preparation of this atlas, with moderately successful results.

The Integrative Action of the Nervous System.

Models of Network Growth All networks, whether they are social, technological, or biological, are the result of a growth process. Many of these networks continue to grow for prolonged periods of time, continually modifying their connectivity structure throughout their entire existence. For example, the World Wide Web has grown from a small number of cross-linked documents in the early 1 990s to an estimated 30 billion indexed web pages in 2009.3 The extraordinary growth of the Web continues unabated and has occurred without any top-down design, yet the topology of its hyperlink structure exhibits characteristic statistical patterns (Pastor-Satorras and Vespig­ nani, 2004). Other technological networks such as the power grid, global transportation networks, or mobile communication networks continue to grow and evolve, each displaying characteristic patterns of expansion and elaboration. Growth and change in social and organizational

Networks of the Brain

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.

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Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories

The debate about the use of robots in the care of older adults has often been dominated by either overly optimistic visions (coming particularly from Japan), in which robots are seamlessly incorporated into society thereby enhancing quality of life for everyone; or by extremely pessimistic scenarios that paint such a future as horrifying. We reject this dichotomy and argue for a more differentiated ethical evaluation of the possibilities and risks involved with the use of social robots. In a critical discussion surrounding the capabilities approach to the ethical evaluation of quality of life, we develop an ethical framework that is more appropriate to the situation of the oldest old. We urge employment of a context-dependent approach to the ethical evaluation of new technologies in the care and therapy of older adults, and using the example of the robotic seal Paro, we show how this can be accomplished in a sensible and practical way.

Ethical Considerations Regarding the Use of Social Robots in the Fourth Age

https://philpapers.org/archive/STASTA-2.pdf

Steps to a Properly Embodied cognitive science

Following the philosophy of embodiment of Merleau-Ponty, Jonas and others, enactivism is a pivot point from which various areas of science can be brought into a fruitful dialogue about the nature of subjectivity. In this chapter we present the enactive conception of agency, which, in contrast to current mainstream theories of agency, is deeply and strongly embodied. In line with this thinking we argue that anything that ought to be considered a genuine agent is a biologically embodied (even if distributed) agent, and that this embodiment must be affectively lived. However, we also consider that such an affective agent is not necessarily also an agent imbued with an explicit sense of subjectivity. To support this contention we outline the interoceptive foundation of basic agency and argue that there is a qualitative difference in the phenomenology of agency when it is instantiated in organisms which, due to their complexity and size, require a nervous system to underpin their physiological and sensorimotor processes. We argue that this interoceptively grounded agency not only entails affectivity but also forms the necessary basis for subjectivity.

/pdf/the-enactive-philosophy-of-embodiment-from-biological-gy5918j42i.pdf

The Enactive Philosophy of Embodiment: From Biological Foundations of Agency to the Phenomenology of Subjectivity

We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended Keywords: enactivism; embodied cognition; situated cognition; affective cognition

Mog Stapleton

Papers

Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories

Ethical Considerations Regarding the Use of Social Robots in the Fourth Age

Steps to a Properly Embodied cognitive science

The Enactive Philosophy of Embodiment: From Biological Foundations of Agency to the Phenomenology of Subjectivity

Es are good