UNCORRECT
ED
PROOF
1
2
Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive
3
and Extended Mind Theories
4
Evan Thompson
Mog Stapleton
5
6
! Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008
7
Abstract This paper explores some of the differences
8
between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the
9
extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts
10
of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the
11
following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and
12
externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation
13
between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body;
14
and (4) the difference between ‘incorporation’ and mere
15
‘extension’ in the body-mind-environment relation.
16
17
Keywords Enaction ! Extended mind ! Autonomy !
18
Sense-making ! Emotion ! Embodiment ! Incorporation
19
20
According to the enactive approach in cognitive science,
21
cognition is grounded on the sense-making activity of
22
autonomous agents—beings that actively generate and
23
sustain themselves, and thereby enact or bring forth their
24
own domains of meaning and value (Thompson
2007;
25
Varela et al.
1991). According to the extended mind thesis,
26
the environment constitut es part of the mind when it is
27
coupled to the brain in the right way (Clark and Chalmers
28
1998). Although both viewpoints stress the crucial contri-
29
butions that the body and the environment make to
30
cognition, recent discussions have emphasized how these
31
views also differ in significant ways (Clark
2008; Di Paolo
32
this issue; Wheeler
in press).
33
Our aim here is to examine some of these differences,
34
particularly as seen from the enactive perspective. We do
35
not intend to offer detailed arguments supporting the
36
enactive perspective. Rather, we wish to call attention to
37
some of the distinct ive features of the enactive approach
38
compared with the extended mind thesis in order to
39
provoke future discussion and debate.
40
After first reviewing certain core ideas of the enactive
41
approach, we focus on the following issues: (1) the debate
42
between intern alism and externalism about cognitive pro-
43
cesses; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3)
44
the status of the body; and (4) the difference between
45
‘incorporation’ and mere ‘extension’ in the body-mind-
46
environment relation.
47
1 The Enactive Approach
48
The enactive approach is based on a number of mutually
49
supporting core conce pts, such as autonomy, sense-mak-
50
ing, emergence, embodiment, and experience (De Jaegher
51
and Di Paolo
2007; Thompson 2004, 2007; Varela et al.
52
1991). Here we emphasize the two crucial concepts of
53
autonomy and sense-making.
54
1.1 Autonomy
55
The enactive approach does not start from the question of
56
whether cognitive processes extend beyond one or another
57
boundary, such as the skin, skull, or central nervous sys-
58
tem, that is supposed to mark some inside/outside
59
distinction. Rather, the enactive approach starts from the
60
question of how a system must be organize d in order to
A1 E. Thompson (&)
A2 Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto,
A3 170 St. George Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M5R 2M8
A4 e-mail: evan.thompson@utoronto.ca
A5 M. Stapleton
A6 Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh,
A7 Edinburgh EH8 9AD, Scotland, UK
A8 e-mail: M.L.Stapleton@sms.ed.ac.uk
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be an autonomous system—one that generates and sustains
62
its own activity and thereby enacts or brings forth its own
63
cognitive domain.
64
The paradigm cognitive beings are living organisms.
65
According to the enactive appro ach, what makes living
66
organisms cognitive beings is that they embody or realize a
67
certain kind of autonomy—they are internally self-con-
68
structive in such a way as to regulate actively their
69
interactions with their environments (Di Paolo and Iizuka
70
2008; Thompson 2007; Varela 1979, 1997; Varela and
71
Bourgine
1991). Thus autonomy is the crucial organiza-
72
tional property we need to understand if we aim to
73
understand how a system can be cognitively related to the
74
world.
75
An autonomous system is a system composed of pro-
76
cesses that gener ate and sustain that system as a unity and
77
thereby also define an environment for the system.
78
Autonomy can be characterized abstractly in formal terms
79
or concr etely in terms of its energetic and thermodynamic
80
requirements (Thompson
2007, pp. 44–46). Considered
81
abstractly, for a system to be autonomous, its constituent
82
processes must meet the following conditions:
83
(1) recursively depend on each other for their generation
84
and their realization as a network;
85
(2) constitute the system as a unity in whatever domain
86
they exist; and
87
(3) determine a domain of possible interactions with the
88
world.
89
This definition captures what Varela (
1979, 1997) meant
90
when he proposed that the crucial property of an autono-
91
mous system is its operatio nal closure. In an autonomous
92
system, every constituent process is conditioned by some
93
other process in the system; hence, if we analyze the
94
enabling condition s for any constituent process of the
95
system, we will always be led to other processes in
96
the system.
97
Notice that operational closure does not imply that
98
conditions not belongin g to the system cannot also be
99
necessary. On the contrary, for any autonomous organiza-
100
tion to be physically reali zed, the operationally closed
101
network of processes must be thermodynamically open
.
102
This point takes us to the second way of characterizing
103
autonomy.
104
Here the main aim is to specify the energetic and ther-
105
modynamic requirements for the instantiation of ‘‘basic
106
autonomy’’ in the physical world (Ruiz-Mirazo and
107
Moreno
2004). From this perspective, basic autonomy is
108
‘‘the capacity of a system to manage the flow of matter and
109
energy through it so that it can, at the same time, regulate,
110
modify, and control: (i) internal self-constructive processes
111
and (ii) processes of exchange with the environment’’
112
(Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno
2004, p. 240).
113
Putting together the abstract and physical ways of
114
characterizing autonomy, we can state in general terms that
115
an autonomous system is a thermodynamically open system
116
with operational closure that actively generates and sus-
117
tains its identity under precarious conditions .
1
118
The paradigm case of an autonomous system is the
119
living cell. The constituent processes in this case are
120
chemical; their recursive interdependence takes the form of
121
a self-producing, metabolic network that also produces its
122
own semipermeable membrane; and this network consti-
123
tutes the system as a unity in the biochemical domain and
124
determines a domain of interactions with the world. This
125
kind of self-producing autonomy at the molecular level is
126
known as autopoiesis (Maturana and Varela
1980; Varela
127
et al.
1974).
128
Other candidate autonomous systems include the ner-
129
vous system, sensorimotor systems, the multicellular body
130
of metazoan organisms, the immune system, and animal
131
and human social groups.
2
Although these kinds of
132
autonomous systems depend on the autopoiesis of their
133
cellular constituents, they are not necessarily autopoietic.
134
Autopoiesis requires (among other things) that the opera-
135
tionally closed network produce and realize itself as a
136
spatially bounded system (see Bourgine and Stewart 2004 ;
137
Thompson
2007). This kind of closure is characteristic of
138
the single-cell, metabolic realizations of autonomy and
139
perhaps of multicellular organisms (see Maturana and
140
Varela
1987, pp. 87–89; Thompson 2007, pp. 105–106),
141
but not of distributed system s such as the nervous system,
142
the immune system, insect colonies, and so on. In any case,
143
nothing in principle rules out other ways besides autopoi-
144
esis of realizing the autonomous organization. Thus, for the
145
enactive approach, it is not autopoiesis as such that pro-
146
vides the crucial bridge to cognition (pace Wheeler,
in
147
press), but rather autonomy. To appreciate this point, we
148
need to ask what sort of autonomy is required for cognition.
149
1.2 Sense-Making
150
Consider motile bacteria swimming uphill in a food gra-
151
dient of sugar (Thompson
2007, pp. 74–75, 157–158;
152
Varela
1991). The cells tumble about until they hit upon an
153
orientation that increases their exposure to sugar, at which
154
point they swim forward, up-gradient, toward the zone of
155
greatest sugar concentration. Sugar is significant to these
1FL01
1
The notion of precarious conditions comes from Ezequiel di Paolo:
1FL02‘‘By precarious we mean the fact that in the absence of the
1FL03organization of the system as a network of processes, under otherwise
1FL04equal physical conditions, isolated component processes would tend
1FL05to run down or extinguish’’ (De Jaegher and Di Paolo
2007, p. 487).
1FL06See also Di Paolo’s paper in this special issue.
2FL01
2
For discussion of how autonomy pertains to these systems, see
2FL02Thompson (
2007) and the further references contained therein.
E. Thompson, M. Stapleton
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organisms and more of it is better than less because of the
157
way their metabolism chemically realizes their autonomous
158
organization. The significance and valence of sugar are not
159
intrinsic to the sugar molecules; they are relational fea-
160
tures, tied to the bacteria as autonomous unities. Sugar has
161
significance as food, but only in the milieu that the
162
organism itself enacts through its autonomous dynamics.
163
This example is meant to illustrate that even the simplest
164
organisms regulate their interactions with the world in such
165
a way that they transform the world into a place of salience,
166
meaning, and value—into an environment (Umwelt) in the
167
proper biological sense of the term. This transformation of
168
the world into an environment happens through the
169
organism’s sense-making activity.
170
Sense-making is the interactional and relational side of
171
autonomy. An autonomous system produces and sustains
172
its own identity in precarious conditions and thereby
173
establishes a perspective from which interactions with the
174
world acquire a normative status. Certain interactions
175
facilitate autonomy and other interactions degrade it. In
176
Merleau-Ponty’s words: ‘‘each organism, in the presence of
177
a given milieu, has its optimal conditions of activity and its
178
proper manner of realizing equilibrium,’’ and each organ-
179
ism ‘‘modifies its milieu according to the internal norms of
180
its activity’’ (Merleau-Ponty
1963, pp. 148, 154). Sense-
181
making is behaviour or conduct in relation to environ-
182
mental significance and valence, which the organism itself
183
enacts or brings forth on the basis of its autonomy.
184
Whether we choose to call the sense-making of bacteria
185
cognitive or proto-cognitive is not som ething we need to
186
dispute here (see Thompson
2007, pp 158–162). The
187
important point is that a living organism is a system
188
capable of relating cognitively to the world (however we
189
define cogni tion and wherever we place its biological
190
emergence) because it is a sense-making system, and it is a
191
sense-making system because it is an autonomous system.
192
Bacteria are the simplest kinds of living organisms and
193
they exhibit both autopoiesis and sense-making. But their
194
sense-making cannot be derived simply from their being
195
autopoietic, for mere autopoiesis is not sufficient for sense-
196
making (Bitbol and Luisi
2005; Bourgine and Stewart 2004;
197
Di Paolo
2005, this issue; Thompson 2007, pp. 122–127,
198
147–148). Rather, as Di Paolo (
2005
, this issue) has dis-
199
cussed, ‘‘adaptivity’’ needs to be added to autopoiesis in
200
order to generate sense-making.
201
Mere autopoiesis—the operationally closed self-pro-
202
duction of a chemically bounded network—provides only
203
the all-or -nothing conservation of identity through material
204
turnover and external perturbations to the system, but not
205
the active regulation of interactions with the outside world.
206
Sense-making is normat ive, but the only norm that auto-
207
poiesis can provide is the all-or-nothing norm of self-
208
continuance, not the graded norms of vitality (health,
209
sickness, stress, fatigue) implied by an organism’s regu-
210
lating its activity in ways that improve its conditions for
211
autonomy (as when a bacterium swims up a sucrose gra-
212
dient or swims away from a noxious substance). An
213
adaptive autopoietic system, however, is one that can
214
regulate its states with resp ect to its conditions of viability
215
in its environment and thereby modify its milieu according
216
to the internal norms of its activity (Di Paolo
2005).
217
Autopoiesis and adaptivity are jointly sufficient for sense-
218
making, but mere autopoiesis is insufficient.
219
We can now say what sort of autonomy is required for
220
sense-making and cognition. What is required is not
221
autopoiesis but adaptive autonomy. In single-celled
222
organisms such as bacteria, adaptive autonomy takes the
223
form of adaptive autopoiesis. Multicellular animal s with
224
nervous systems embody more complex forms of adaptive
225
sensorimotor autonomy. Thus it is adaptive autonomy that
226
grounds the deep continuity of life and mind (Thompson
227
2007) and not autopoiesis as such.
228
2 Neither Internalism nor Externalism
229
The grounding of cognition in sense-making and sense-
230
making in adaptive autonomy do not imply either inter-
231
nalism or externalism about the processes of cognition. The
232
internalist/externalist debate rests on assumptions that are
233
foreign to the enactive approach.
234
The enactive approach is not internalist because it
235
allows that the operationally closed networ ks that realize
236
an autonomous sense-making system can extend beyond
237
the brain, skull, or skin (see De Jaegher and Di Paolo
2007
238
for social cognition and Cosmelli and Thompson
2009 for
239
the brain and consciousness). Yet one can deny internal-
240
ism in this way without thereby embrac ing externalism
241
(contrary to Hurley,
in press). To see why we need to
242
consider the assumptions built into the internalist/exter-
243
nalist debate.
244
Internalists claim that explanations of what constitutes
245
cognitive processes need appeal only to internal factors
246
(relative to some usually unexamined spatial boundary
247
such as the skull). Externalists deny this claim. Yet exter-
248
nalists allow that what goes on entirely inside the head
249
(e.g., some specific neural process) sometimes counts as a
250
cognitive process; their strategy is to argue by counterex-
251
ample that not every cognitive process can be explained by
252
appealing exclusively to internal factors (see Hurley,
in
253
press). Furthermore, externalists often accept the assump-
254
tion that what goes on entirely inside the head provides a
255
paradigm of what is a cognitive process, such that if factors
256
outside the head can be shown to have a comparable or
257
equivalent status (e.g., by playing the same role in the
258
production of behaviour), then those external factors count
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as part of the cognitive process. (This is the so-called parity
260
principle introduced by Clark and Chalmers
1998).
3
261
The enactive approach does not accept these assump-
262
tions. What goes on strictly inside the head never as such
263
counts as a cognitive process. It counts only as a participant
264
in a cognitive process that exists as a relation between the
265
system and its environment. Cognition is not an event
266
happening inside the system; it is the relational process of
267
sense-making that takes place between the system and its
268
environment. In Maturana and Varela’s language (
1980,
269
1987), cognition belongs to the ‘relational domain’ in
270
which the system as a unity relates to the wider context of
271
its milieu, not to the ‘operational domain’ of the system’s
272
internal states (e.g., its brain states). Of cours e, what goes
273
on inside the system is crucial for enabling the system’s
274
cognitive or sense-making relation to its environment, but
275
to call internal processes as such cognitive is to confuse
276
levels of discourse or to make a category mistake (neurons
277
do not think and feel; people and animals do).
278
There is a clear parallel h ere between the enactive
279
approach and the phenomenological notion of intentional-
280
ity (Varela et al.
1991, pp. 205–206; Thompson 2007,
281
pp. 26–27). Intentionality is always a relation to that which
282
transcends the present state of the system (where what
283
transcends the system does not have to exist in the sense of
284
being a real entity). In saying that the mind is intentional,
285
phenomenologists imply that the mind is relational. ‘Being-
286
in-the-world’ (Heidegger ) and the ‘lived body-environ-
287
ment’ (Merleau-Ponty) are different ways of articulating
288
this kind of relation. The spatial containment language of
289
internal/external or inside/outside (which frames the in-
290
ternalist/externalist debate) is inappropriate and misleading
291
for understanding the peculiar sort of relationality
292
belonging to intentionality, the lived body, or being-in-the-
293
world. As Heidegger says, a living being is ‘in’ its world in
294
a completely different sense from that of water being in a
295
glass (Heidegger
1995, pp. 165–166).
296
Di Paolo also makes exactly this point on behalf of the
297
enactive approach in his contribution to this issue. His
298
words bear repeating here:
299
Cognition is sense-making in interaction: the regu-
300
lation of coupling with respect to norms established
301
by the self-constituted identity that gives rise to such
302
regulation in order to conserve itself. This identity
303
may be that of the living organism, but also other
304
identities based on othe r forms of organizationally
305
closed networks of processes, such as sociolinguist ic
306
selves, organ ized bundles of habits, etc. Some of
307
these identities are already constituted by processes
308
that extend beyond the skull. But in any case, cog-
309
nition is always a process that occurs in a relational
310
domain. Unlike many other processes (e.g. getting
311
wet in the rain) its cognitive character is given nor-
312
matively and asymmetrically by the self-constituted
313
identity that seeks to preserve it s mode of life in such
314
engagements. As relational in this strict sense, cog-
315
nition has no location. It simply makes no sense to
316
point to chunks of matter and space and speak of
317
containment within a cognitive system . Inspect a
318
baby all you want and you’ll never find out whether
319
she’s a twin.
320
321
3 Cognition and Emotion
322
Sense-making comprises emotion as much as cognition.
323
The enactive approach does not view cognition and emo-
324
tion as separate systems, but treats them as thoroughly
325
integrated at biological, psychological, and phenomeno-
326
logical levels (Colombetti
2005, 2007, 2009; Colombetti
327
and Thompson
2005, 2007; Thompson 2007). By contrast,
328
the extended mind thesis and the debates it has engendered
329
to-date have neglected emotion and treated cognition as if
330
it were largely affectless problem solving or inf ormation
331
processing (Adams and Aizawa
2008; Clark 2007).
332
Sense-making is viable conduct in relation to what has
333
salience and value for the system. What has salience and
334
value also has valence: it attracts or repels, elicits approach
335
or avoidance. Such action tendencies in relation to value
336
are the basis of emotion. Hence, as Walter Freeman argues,
337
‘‘emotion is essential to all intentional behaviours’’
338
(Freeman
2000).
339
To describe cognition as embodied action (Varela et al.
340
1991) implies that cognition comprises motivated action
341
tendencies and thus is also essentially emotive. Motivated
342
action, especially when it involves affect, is a mode of self-
343
regulation. Cognitio n as embodied action is more a matter
344
of adaptive self-regulation in precarious conditions than
345
abstract problem solving. The point here is not to deny that
346
we can and do engage in high-level problem solving.
347
Rather, it is that this kind of narrow cognition presupposes
348
the broader emotive cognition of sense-making.
349
Attention to the inseparability of emotion and cognition
350
is an emerging trend in cognitive science. For example,
351
Marc Lewis (
2005) argues that appraisal and emotion
352
processes are thoroughly interdependent at both psycho-
353
logical and neural levels (see also Colombetti and
354
Thompson
2005). At the p sychological level, one is not a
355
mere means to the other (as in the idea that an appraisal is a
356
means to the having of an emotion, and vice-versa); rather,
3FL01
3
See Di Paolo, this issue, for an excellent critical discussion showing
3FL02 how the parity principle ‘‘relies both on simple prejudices about inner
3FL03 and outer as well as on intuitions about cognition’’ that ‘‘are inevitably
3FL04 tied to the boundaries between inner and outer that it wishes to
3FL05 undermine.’’
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357
they form an integrated and self-organizing emotion-
358
appraisal state, an ‘emotional interpretation.’ At the neural
359
level, brain systems traditionally seen as subserving sepa-
360
rate functions of appraisal and emotion are inextricably
361
interconnected. Hence ‘appraisal’ and ‘emotion’ cannot be
362
mapped onto separate brain systems.
363
In a recent review, Pessoa (
2008) provides exte nsive
364
evidence from neuroscience that supports this view of the
365
neural underpinnings of emotion and cognition. He pre-
366
sents three converging lines of evidence: (1) brain regions
367
previously viewed as ‘affective’ are also involved in cog-
368
nition; (2) brain regions previously viewed as ‘cognitive’
369
are also involved in emotion; and (3) the neural processes
370
subserving emotion and cognition are integrated and thus
371
non-modular. In Pessoa’s view, ‘‘complex cognitive-emo-
372
tional behaviours have their basis in dynamic coalitions of
373
networks of brain areas, none of which should be con-
374
ceptualized as specifically affective or cognitive’’ (Pessoa
375
2008, p. 148).
376
If affect and action tendencies are inseparable from
377
cognition at neural, psychological, and phenomenological
378
levels, then cognition cannot be either ‘body neutral’ or
379
‘envatted,’ in Shapiro’s (
2004) terms. ‘Body neutrality’ is
380
the assumption that bo dily features play no significant role
381
in how or what an organism cognizes; ‘envattment’ is the
382
assumption that there is a clearly defined interface betwee n
383
the body and the mind (Shapiro
2004, p. 169). Both of
384
these assumptions clearly break down in the face of the
385
integration of emotion and cognition (Colombetti
2007,
386
2009; Shapiro 2004, pp. 214–219).
387
Nevertheless, disagreement remains about the body’s
388
exact status in relation to cognition (Clark
2008). This
389
issue brings us to our next contrast between the enactive
390
approach and the extended mind thesis.
391
4 The Body
392
One way (though not the only one) to motivate the special
393
importance the enactive approach gives to embodiment is
394
to appeal to the dynamic interdependency between cogni-
395
tion and emotion (or more precisely between processes
396
traditionally classified as ‘cognitive’ and ones classified as
397
‘affective’). Complex cognitive-emotional behaviours—
398
‘emotional interpretations’ or ‘appraisal-emotion amal-
399
gams’ (Lewis
2005
)—essentially involve organismic
400
processes of self-regulation aimed at sustaining and
401
enhancing adaptive autonomy in the face of perturbing
402
environment events. As Damasio (
1999) especially has
403
emphasized, emotion is the way the brain and the rest of
404
the body jointly sustain homeostasis throughout the
405
organism’s dealings with its environment .
406
Given that extended-mind theorists neglect emotion and
407
view cognition as primarily high-level problem solving, it
408
is not surprising that they also accord less importance to the
409
biological details of embodiment than do other embodied-
410
mind theorists (e.g., Shapiro
2004). Thus Andy Clark
411
concludes that ‘‘the body, insofar as it is cognitively sig-
412
nificant, turns out to be itself defined by a certain complex
413
functional role,’’ that of being ‘‘the locus of willed action,
414
the point of sensorimotor confluence, the gateway to
415
intelligent offloading [for problem-solving computations],
416
and the stable (though not permanently fixed) platform
417
whose features and relations can be relied upon in the
418
computation of certain information-processing solutions’’
419
(Clark
2008, pp. 55–56). In keeping with functionalism
420
generally, Clark advocates that we simply identify the body
421
with this functional role (and with whatever can possibly
422
realize this functional rol e). For the purposes of explaining
423
cognition, the body is simply ‘‘whatever plays these roles
424
in a unified information-processing economy’’ and it
425
is ‘‘merely a contingent (and increasingly negotiable)
426
fact about human embodiment’’ that the body is also a
427
metabolic entity (ibid., p. 56).
428
This characterization of the body’s functional role pre-
429
serves the traditional functionalist conception of cognition
430
as fundamentally distinct from emotion. Emotion nowhere
431
figures in this account of the body and its cognitive capac-
432
ities (‘‘the body insofar as it is cognitively significant’’).
433
In this way, Clark’s conception of cognition remains
434
strongly allied with traditional (disembodied) cognitive
435
science.
436
For this reason, we question Shapiro’s use of the
437
extended mind thesis to argue against the ‘envattment’
438
assumption that there is a clearly defined interface betwee n
439
the body and the mind (Shapiro
2004, p. 183). Shapiro’s
440
thought is that if the mind exte nds beyond the brain into the
441
body and the environment, then the mind and the body
442
‘‘cannot be distinguished as separate components within a
443
single system’’ and thus have no ‘‘clean interface’’ (p. 183).
444
What Shapiro overlooks, however, is that the extended
445
mind thesis winds up treating cognition and emotion as if
446
they were separate components that must interface because
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this thesis preserves the traditional functionalist conception
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of cognition.
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As Shapiro discusses, the containment of the mind with
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respect to the body does not require spatial localization:
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‘‘The mind could still count as envatted if the biological
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parts that realize it were spread across the body… If the
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parts that reali ze the mind all work toward the solution of
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similar problems, communicate with each other more than
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they do with other parts of the body, receive and send
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information from and to the body through clearly articu-
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lated channels, and so on, then the mind can be envatted
Making Sense of Sense-Making
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Journal : Large 11245 Dispatch : 24-11-2008 Pages : 8
Article No. : 9043
h LE h TYPESET
MS Code : TOPO02801-3 h CP h DISK
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Author Proof