Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.

The Evolution of Cooperation

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

The morality of transformational leadership has been sharply questioned, particularly by libertarians, “grass roots” theorists, and organizational development consultants. This paper argues that to be truly transformational, leadership must be grounded in moral foundations. The four components of authentic transformational leadership (idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration) are contrasted with their counterfeits in dissembling pseudo -transformational leadership on the basis of (1) the moral character of the leaders and their concerns for self and others; (2) the ethical values embedded in the leaders' vision, articulation, and program, which followers can embrace or reject; and (3) the morality of the processes of social ethical choices and action in which the leaders and followers engage and collectively pursue. The literature on transformational leadership is linked to the long-standing literature on virtue and moral character, as exemplified by Socratic and Confucian typologies. It is related as well to the major themes of the modern Western ethical agenda: liberty, utility, and distributive justice Deception, sophistry, and pretense are examined alongside issues of transcendence, agency, trust, striving for congruence in values, cooperative action, power, persuasion, and corporate governance to establish the strategic and moral foundations of authentic transformational leadership.

/pdf/ethics-character-and-authentic-transformational-leadership-1jcc07fyjv.pdf

Ethics, character, and authentic transformational leadership behavior

conceptions of bounded rationality Recently, behavioral studies of choice have examined the second guess, the way preferences are processed in choice behavior These studies suggest possible modifications in standard assumptions about tastes and their role in choice This paper examines some of those modifications, some possible approaches to working on them, and some complications 1 The engineering of choice and ordinary choice behavior * Recently I gave a lecture on elementary decision theory, an introduction to rational theories of choice After the lecture, a student asked whether it was conceivable that the practical procedures for decisionmaking implicit in theories of choice might make actual human decisions worse rather than better What is the empirical evidence, he asked, that human choice is improved by knowledge of decision theory or by application of the various engineering forms of rational choice? I answered, I think correctly, that the case for the usefulness of decision engineering rested primarily not on the kind of direct empirical confirmation that he sought, but on two other things: on a set of theorems proving the superiority of particular procedures in particular situations if the situations are correctly specified and the procedures correctly applied, and on the willingness of clients to purchase the services of experts with skills in decision sciences The answer may not have been reasonable, but the question clearly was It articulated a classical challenge to the practice of rational choice, the possibility that processes of rationality might combine with properties of human beings to

Bounded rationality, ambiguity, and the engineering of choice

Identifying, developing, and testing implementation strategies are important goals of implementation science. However, these efforts have been complicated by the use of inconsistent language and inadequate descriptions of implementation strategies in the literature. The Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) study aimed to refine a published compilation of implementation strategy terms and definitions by systematically gathering input from a wide range of stakeholders with expertise in implementation science and clinical practice. Purposive sampling was used to recruit a panel of experts in implementation and clinical practice who engaged in three rounds of a modified Delphi process to generate consensus on implementation strategies and definitions. The first and second rounds involved Web-based surveys soliciting comments on implementation strategy terms and definitions. After each round, iterative refinements were made based upon participant feedback. The third round involved a live polling and consensus process via a Web-based platform and conference call. Participants identified substantial concerns with 31% of the terms and/or definitions and suggested five additional strategies. Seventy-five percent of definitions from the originally published compilation of strategies were retained after voting. Ultimately, the expert panel reached consensus on a final compilation of 73 implementation strategies. This research advances the field by improving the conceptual clarity, relevance, and comprehensiveness of implementation strategies that can be used in isolation or combination in implementation research and practice. Future phases of ERIC will focus on developing conceptually distinct categories of strategies as well as ratings for each strategy’s importance and feasibility. Next, the expert panel will recommend multifaceted strategies for hypothetical yet real-world scenarios that vary by sites’ endorsement of evidence-based programs and practices and the strength of contextual supports that surround the effort.

/pdf/a-refined-compilation-of-implementation-strategies-results-5ehy7cp7mn.pdf

A refined compilation of implementation strategies: results from the Expert Recommendations for Implementing Change (ERIC) project.

Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or 'bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, 'I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide 'envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.

Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution

This course is designed with two aims in mind: First, to introduce students to the basic concepts and tools of game theory. Second, to demonstrate how formal models can be used in social science. Emphasis is placed on understanding the intuition and logic of game theory and its application in the social sciences. Students finishing this course should be in a position to read and evaluate the current game theoretic literature in political science.

Game Theory and Politics

1. Rules of play: the starting point matters 2. The anticipation problem: there may be no resolution 3. Magnanimity: it sometimes pays 4. Moving power: breaking the cycle 5. Order and threat power: eliminating indeterminacy and communicating intentions 6. Information in games: misperceptions, deception, and omniscience 7. Incomplete information in larger games: a model of negotiations 8. Summary and conclusions.

Theory of moves

(1995). An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol. The American Mathematical Monthly: Vol. 102, No. 1, pp. 9-18.

An envy-free cake division protocol

What can go wrong with sophisticated voting systems designed to remedy problems of simpler systems.

Steven J. Brams

Papers

Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution

Game Theory and Politics

Theory of moves

An envy-free cake division protocol

Paradoxes of Preferential Voting