Journal ArticleDOI
Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
TLDR
In this article, the authors discuss what can go wrong with sophisticated voting systems designed to remedy problems of simpler systems, such as simple voting systems, and propose a solution to the problem.Abstract:
What can go wrong with sophisticated voting systems designed to remedy problems of simpler systems.read more
Citations
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Book
Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting
John J. Bartholdi,James B. Orlin +1 more
TL;DR: Evidence that Single Tranferable Vote (STV) is computationally resistant to manipulation is given and it is proved that it is NP-complete to recognize when an STV election violates monotonicity, suggesting that non-monotonicity in STV elections might be perceived as less threatening since it is in effect “hidden” and hard to exploit for strategic advantage.
Book
Geometry of voting
TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown how simple geometry can be used to analyze and discover new properties about pairwise and positional voting rules as well as for those rules (e.g., runoffs and approval voting) that rely on these methods.
Journal ArticleDOI
Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that every Condorcet consistent method must generate the paradox among four or more candidates, i.e., a voter is better off not voting than casting a sincere ballot.
Book ChapterDOI
Chapter 4 Voting procedures
TL;DR: This work discusses broad classes of social choice functions as well as special cases such as plurality rule, approval voting, and Borda's point-count method for voting procedures for two-candidate elections.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Paradox of Representation
TL;DR: This paper showed that sometimes less is better than more, though all else be equal, under naive, sophisticated, and cooperative voting, and that a strong version must occur in all but special cases.
References
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Book
Social Choice and Individual Values
TL;DR: Saari as mentioned in this paper introduced Arrow's Theorem and founded the field of social choice theory in economics and political science, and introduced a new foreword by Nobel laureate Eric Maskin, introducing Arrow's seminal book to a new generation of students and researchers.
Book
Collective Choice and Social Welfare
TL;DR: The second edition of Collective Choice and Social Welfare as discussed by the authors was published in 1970 and has been widely used in the social choice literature since its early 1970s, and is considered a classic work in social choice.
Journal ArticleDOI
Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that any non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation, i.e., an individual can manipulate a voting scheme if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures an outcome he prefers to the "honest" outcome.
Journal ArticleDOI
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
TL;DR: In this paper, the strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, nonnegative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions.
Book
Essai Sur L'Application de L'Analyse a la Probabilite Des Decisions Rendues a la Pluralite Des Voix
TL;DR: Condorcet's paradox (the non-transitivity of majority preferences) is seen as the direct ancestor of Arrow's paradox as discussed by the authors, and it was rediscovered as a foundational work in the theory of voting and societal preferences.