Background on genetic algorithms, LISP, and genetic programming hierarchical problem-solving introduction to automatically-defined functions - the two-boxes problem problems that straddle the breakeven point for computational effort Boolean parity functions determining the architecture of the program the lawnmower problem the bumblebee problem the increasing benefits of ADFs as problems are scaled up finding an impulse response function artificial ant on the San Mateo trail obstacle-avoiding robot the minesweeper problem automatic discovery of detectors for letter recognition flushes and four-of-a-kinds in a pinochle deck introduction to biochemistry and molecular biology prediction of transmembrane domains in proteins prediction of omega loops in proteins lookahead version of the transmembrane problem evolutionary selection of the architecture of the program evolution of primitives and sufficiency evolutionary selection of terminals evolution of closure simultaneous evolution of architecture, primitive functions, terminals, sufficiency, and closure the role of representation and the lens effect Appendices: list of special symbols list of special functions list of type fonts default parameters computer implementation annotated bibliography of genetic programming electronic mailing list and public repository

Genetic Programming: On the Programming of Computers by Means of Natural Selection

When people make donations to privately provided public goods, such as charity, there may be many factors influencing their decision other than altruism. Social pressure, guilt, sympathy, or simply a desire for a "warm glow" may all be important. This paper considers such impure altruism formally and develops a wide set of implications. In particular, this paper discusses the invariance proposition of public goods, solves for the sufficient conditions for neutrality to hold, examines the optimal tax treatment of charitable giving, and calibrates the model based on econometric studies in order to consider policy experiments. Impure altruism is shown to be more consistent with observed patterns of giving than the conventional pure altruism approach, and to have policy implications that may differ widely from those of the conventional models. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.

https://creationetfinancement.files.wordpress.com/2012/12/impure-altruism-and-donations-to-public-goods.pdf

Impure altruism and donations to public goods: a theory of warm-glow giving*

A Treatise on the Family. G. S. Becker. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1981. Gary Becker is one of the most famous and influential economists of the second half of the 20th century, a fervent contributor to and expounder of the University of Chicago free-market philosophy, and winner of the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics. Although any book with the word "treatise" in its title is clearly intended to have an impact, one coming from someone as brilliant and controversial as Becker certainly had such a lofty goal. It has received many article-length reviews in several disciplines (Ben-Porath, 1982; Bergmann, 1995; Foster, 1993; Hannan, 1982), which is one measure of its scholarly importance, and yet its impact is, I think, less than it may have initially appeared, especially for scholars with substantive interests in the family. This book is, its title notwithstanding, more about economics and the economic approach to behavior than about the family. In the first sentence of the preface, Becker writes "In this book, I develop an economic or rational choice approach to the family." Lest anyone accuse him of focusing on traditional (i.e., material) economics topics, such as family income, poverty, and labor supply, he immediately emphasizes that those topics are not his focus. "My intent is more ambitious: to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, and other non-material behavior with the tools and framework developed for material behavior." Indeed, the book includes chapters on many of these issues. One chapter examines the principles of the efficient division of labor in households, three analyze marriage and divorce, three analyze various child-related issues (fertility and intergenerational mobility), and others focus on broader family issues, such as intrafamily resource allocation. His analysis is not, he believes, constrained by time or place. His intention is "to present a comprehensive analysis that is applicable, at least in part, to families in the past as well as the present, in primitive as well as modern societies, and in Eastern as well as Western cultures." His tone is profoundly conservative and utterly skeptical of any constructive role for government programs. There is a clear sense of how much better things were in the old days of a genderbased division of labor and low market-work rates for married women. Indeed, Becker is ready and able to show in Chapter 2 that such a state of affairs was efficient and induced not by market or societal discrimination (although he allows that it might exist) but by small underlying household productivity differences that arise primarily from what he refers to as "complementarities" between caring for young children while carrying another to term. Most family scholars would probably find that an unconvincingly simple explanation for a profound and complex phenomenon. What, then, is the salient contribution of Treatise on the Family? It is not literally the idea that economics could be applied to the nonmarket sector and to family life because Becker had already established that with considerable success and influence. At its core, microeconomics is simple, characterized by a belief in the importance of prices and markets, the role of self-interested or rational behavior, and, somewhat less centrally, the stability of preferences. It was Becker's singular and invaluable contribution to appreciate that the behaviors potentially amenable to the economic approach were not limited to phenomenon with explicit monetary prices and formal markets. Indeed, during the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, he did undeniably important and pioneering work extending the domain of economics to such topics as labor market discrimination, fertility, crime, human capital, household production, and the allocation of time. Nor is Becker's contribution the detailed analyses themselves. Many of them are, frankly, odd, idiosyncratic, and off-putting. …

A Treatise on the Family

Models of giving have often been based on altruism. Examples include charity and intergenerational transfers. The literatures on both subjects have centered around neutrality hypotheses: charity is subject to complete crowding out, while intergenerational transfers are subject to Ricardian equivalence. This paper formally develops a model of giving in which altruism is not "pure." In particular, people are assumed to get a "warm glow" from giving. Contrary to the previous literature, this model generates identifiable comparative statics results that show that crowding out of charity is incomplete and that government debt will have Keynesian effects.

Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence

We present a model that links heterogeneity of preferences across ethnic groups in a city to the amount and type of public good the city supplies. We test the implications of the model with three related datasets: US cities, US metropolitan areas, and US urban counties. Results show that productive public goods -- education, roads, libraries, sewers and trash pickup -- in US cities (metro areas/urban counties) are inversely related to the city's (metro area's/county's) ethnic fragmentation, even after controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic determinants. Ethnic fragmentation is negatively related to the share of local spending on welfare. The results are mainly driven by observations in which majority whites are reacting to varying sizes of minority groups. We conclude that ethnic conflict is an important determinant of local public finances.

Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions

https://escholarship.org/content/qt2z16222r/qt2z16222r.pdf?t=lnpv94

On the private provision of public goods

In many applications, assumptions about the log-concavity of a probability distribution allow just enough special structure to yield a workable theory. This paper catalogs a series of theorems relating log-concavity and/or log-convexity of probability density functions, distribution functions, reliability functions, and their integrals. We list a large number of commonly-used probability distributions and report the log-concavity or log-convexity of their density functions and their integrals. We also discuss a variety of applications of log-concavity that have appeared in the literature.

/pdf/log-concave-probability-and-its-applications-thyp7rquw9.pdf

Log-concave probability and its applications

Author(s): Bergstrom, Ted; Goodman, Robert P. | Abstract: This paper develops a method for using data for a large cross-section of municipalities relating expenditures on specific local public goods, median income, median house value, total assessed valuation, and population to estimate demand functions for local public goods. The key idea is to make the assumption that the quantity chosen in any municipality is the median of the preferred quantities of its citizens. The method is applied to cities with population exceeding 10,000 in several states. Seemingly plausible estimates of income and price elasticity are found. The estimated crowding parameter suggests that most local public goods are congestible in the sense that utility functions depend on the per capita quantity of public goods.

/pdf/private-demands-for-public-goods-2gyyceigju.pdf

Private Demands for Public Goods

Gary Becker's "Rotten Kid theorem" asserts that if all family members receive gifts of money income from a benevolent household member, then even if the household head does not precommit to an incentive plan for family members, it will be in the interest of selfish family members to maximize total family income. I show by examples that the Rotten Kid theorem is not true without assuming transferable utility. I find a simple condition on utility functions that is necessary and sufficient for there to be the kind of transferable utility needed for a Rotten Kid theorem. While restrictive, these conditions still allow one to apply the strong conclusions of the Rotten Kid theorem in an interesting class of examples.

/pdf/a-fresh-look-at-the-rotten-kid-theorem-and-other-household-4nwc178c6c.pdf

Theodore C. Bergstrom

Papers

On the private provision of public goods

Log-concave probability and its applications

Private Demands for Public Goods

A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries

Lectures on Public Economics