M
Mark Bagnoli
Researcher at Purdue University
Publications - 80
Citations - 5542
Mark Bagnoli is an academic researcher from Purdue University. The author has contributed to research in topics: Earnings & Public good. The author has an hindex of 31, co-authored 80 publications receiving 5128 citations. Previous affiliations of Mark Bagnoli include Saint Petersburg State University & Indiana University.
Papers
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Book ChapterDOI
Log-concave probability and its applications
TL;DR: In this article, a series of theorems relating log-concavity and/or logconvexity of probability density functions, distribution functions, reliability functions, and their integrals are presented.
Journal ArticleDOI
Selling to Socially Responsible Consumers: Competition and The Private Provision of Public Goods
Mark Bagnoli,Susan G. Watts +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors model firms as competing for socially responsible consumers by linking the provision of a public good (environmentally friendly or socially responsible activities) to sales of their private goods.
Journal ArticleDOI
Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing the Core through Private Contributions
Mark Bagnoli,Barton L. Lipman +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that a very natural game, similar to one often used elsewhere in the literature to model private provision, in fact fully implements the core of this economy in undominated perfect equilibria.
Journal ArticleDOI
Voluntary contribution games: efficient private provision of public goods
Mark Bagnoli,Michael McKee +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors report on a series of laboratory experiments designed to evaluate a mechanism for the voluntary provision of public good, where the public good is provided if the total contributions meet or exceed a threshold and all contributions are returned if the public goods are not provided.
Journal ArticleDOI
Successful Takeovers without Exclusion
Mark Bagnoli,Barton L. Lipman +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a single-raider model with finitely many stockholders is analyzed and conditions under which exclusion is necessary and sufficient to prevent inefficient takeovers are given, and the authors show that exclusion leads to the possibility of inefficient takeover.