Yin-Hua Yeh

TL;DR: In this article, the determinants of board composition and firm valuation as a function of the board composition in Taiwan were examined and the results suggest that there is poor governance when the board is dominated by members who are affiliated with the controlling family but good governance if the board are dominated by shareholders who are not affiliated with a controlling family.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyzed family control and corporate governance using a sample of Taiwanese firms and found that family control is even more prevalent than previously suggested and that a non-linear relation exists between family controlling and relative firm performance.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors adopt three variables to proxy for corporate governance risk, namely, the percentage of directors occupied by the controlling shareholders, the shareholding pledged for bank loans (pledge ratio), and the deviation in control away from the cash flow rights.

TL;DR: In this article, the effect of ownership and control of controlling shareholders on corporate valuation was investigated in Taiwan listed companies, where the ownership concentration structure is similar to that in East Asian countries.

TL;DR: Zhang et al. as discussed by the authors explored whether the performance is higher for financial institutions with more independent directors on different committees during the 2007-08 financial crisis, and they also examined the moderating effect of a country-level civil law dummy and firm level excessive risk-taking behaviors on the independence-performance relationships.