Journal of Financial Intermediation 

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors briefly review the contemporary literature on relationship banking and discuss how relationship banking fits into the core economic services provided by banks and point at its costs and benefits.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors assess two broad and competing theories of government regulation: the helping hand approach, according to which governments regulate to correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach according to where government regulates to support political constituency.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that marked-to-market lever-age is strongly procyclical and that changes in aggregate balance sheets for intermediaries forecast changes in risk appetite in financial markets, as measured by the innovations in the VIX index.

TL;DR: A review of the contemporary theory of financial intermediation can be found in this paper, where the focus is on contributions in the past 15 years or so that have advanced our understanding of why financial intermediaries exist, the credit allocation and other services they provide in spot and forward credit markets, the contractual nature and allocational consequences of the claims they issue, and the optimal design of bank regulation.

TL;DR: The authors examined how the legal environment affects financial development, and then asked how this in turn is linked to long-run economic growth, finding that financial intermediaries are better developed in countries with legal and regulatory systems that give a high priority to creditors receiving the full present value of their claims on corporations, enforce contracts effectively, and promote comprehensive and accurate financial reporting by corporations.