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Journal ArticleDOI

Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?

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TLDR
In this paper, the authors briefly review the contemporary literature on relationship banking and discuss how relationship banking fits into the core economic services provided by banks and point at its costs and benefits.
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This article is published in Journal of Financial Intermediation.The article was published on 2000-01-01. It has received 2302 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Retail banking & Transaction banking.

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Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure

TL;DR: In this paper, the inner workings of relationship lending, the implications for bank organisational structure, and the effects of shocks to the economic environment on the availability of relationship credit to small businesses are modeled.
Journal ArticleDOI

How Does Capital Affect Bank Performance During Financial Crises

TL;DR: The authors empirically examined how capital affects a bank's performance (survival and market share), and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the U.S over the past quarter century.
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Distance, Lending Relationships and Competition

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity, and report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price discrimination in bank lending.
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How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises

TL;DR: The authors empirically examined how capital affects a bank's performance and how this effect varies across banking crises, market crises, and normal times that occurred in the US over the past quarter century.
Journal ArticleDOI

Lending Relationships and Loan Contract Terms

TL;DR: This article found that repeated borrowing from the same lender affects loan contract terms and that such borrowing translates into a 10 to 17 bps lowering of loan spreads, and that the relationship borrowers obtain larger loans compared to non-relationship borrowers.
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Posted ContentDOI

Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information.

TL;DR: In this paper, a model is developed to provide the first theoretical justification for true credit rationing in a loan market, where the amount of the loan and amount of collateral demanded affect the behavior and distribution of borrowers, and interest rates serve as screening devices for evaluating risk.
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

TL;DR: The authors showed that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits, and showed that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
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Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors developed a theory of financial intermediation based on minimizing the cost of monitoring information which is useful for resolving incentive problems between borrowers and lenders, and presented a characterization of the costs of providing incentives for delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary.
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The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data

TL;DR: In this article, the authors empirically examined how ties between a firm and its creditors affect the availability and cost of funds to the firm and found that the primary benefit of building close ties with an institutional creditor is that the availability of financing increases.
Journal ArticleDOI

INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-length Debt

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that while informed banks make flexible financial decisions which prevent a firm's projects from going awry, the cost of this credit is that banks have bargaining power over the firm's profits, once projects have begun.