The extent of financial disclosure and its determinants in an emerging capital market: the case of Egypt
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Citations
Determinants of narrative risk disclosures in UK interim reports
The value relevance of disclosure: Evidence from the emerging capital market of Egypt
Determinants of corporate internet reporting: evidence from Egypt
The determinants of forward‐looking information in annual reports of UAE companies
Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure in Kuwait
References
Analysis of Panel Data
Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news
Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study
The influence of company characteristics and accounting regulation on information disclosed by Spanish firms
The use of disclosure indices in accounting research: A review article
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Frequently Asked Questions (9)
Q2. What future works have the authors mentioned in the paper "The extent of financial disclosure and its determinants in an emerging capital market: the case of egypt" ?
Future research could investigate the impact of new regulations upon the level of compliance with mandatory disclosure, as compliance costs will increase. Also future research might investigate the impact of other potential explanatory variables such as ownership structure and board composition, which are proxies for corporate governance, upon the level of disclosure. 3. 14 Total assets can be derived. Disclosure information in annual reports can be divided into two broad categories, mandatory and voluntary.
Q3. What is the reason why the higher the gearing ratio, the higher the agency costs?
It is argued that the higher the gearing ratio, the higher the agency costs because larger gearing ratios allow for greater potential transfer of wealth from creditors to shareholders [14, 249].
Q4. What was the effect of the transformation on the distribution of the variables?
As almost all the variables are skewed, a logarithm transformation of the variables was23undertaken to bring the distributions of these variables closer to normality [24].
Q5. What is the potential limitation of disclosure indices?
A potential limitation of studies using disclosure indices to investigate disclosure levels is that the results are only valid to the extent of the disclosure index used and time period investigated.
Q6. What is the main argument that the larger the company, the larger the informational gap between investors?
it is argued that the larger the company (in terms of number of shareholders), the larger the informational gap (information asymmetry) among investors on one hand and between investors and the management on the other hand, so more disclosure might be used to reduce the information asymmetry problem.
Q7. How can the authors expect more from a company?
Assuming that listed companies are aware of investors’ interest, the authors can expect that more profitable companies will disclose more to increase investors’ confidence.
Q8. What rights do bondholders have to inspect the financial statements?
Bondholders’ associations have the right to inspect the financial statements and to send a representative to the annual general meeting.
Q9. What is the argument that firm size is a comprehensive variable?
It is argued that firm size is a comprehensive variable that could proxy for competitive advantages, information production costs and political costs [3, 43].