Well-being is most commonly used in philosophy to describe what is non-instrumentally or ultimately good for a person. The question of what well-being consists in is of independent interest, but it is of great importance in moral philosophy, especially in the case of utilitarianism, according to which the only moral requirement is that well-being be maximized. Significant challenges to the very notion have been mounted, in particular by G.E. Moore and T.M. Scanlon. It has become standard to distinguish theories of well-being as either hedonist theories, desire theories, or objective list theories. According to the view known as welfarism, well-being is the only value. Also important in ethics is the question of how a person’s moral character and actions relate to their well-being. 1. The Concept 2. Moore’s Challenge 3. Scanlon’s Challenge 4. Theories of Well-being 4.1 Hedonism 4.2 Desire Theories 4.3 Objective List Theories 5. Well-being and Morality 5.1 Welfarism 5.2 Well-being and Virtue Bibliography Academic Tools Other Internet Resources Related Entries

Well‐being and time

What Is Well-Being?

Introduction 1. The Quest for the Good Life 2. Hedonism: A Preliminary Formulation 3. Classic Objections to Hedonism 4. Attitudinal Hedonism 5. Replies to Some Objections 6. The Shape of a Life Objection 7. G. E. Moore, Hedonist? 8. But is it Really 'Hedonism'? 9. Problems about Beauty and Justice 10. Themes and Puzzles

Pleasure and the good life : concerning the nature, varieties, and plausibility of hedonism

The relationship between work and leisure, with regard to various aspects of work and its meaning, was examined in two groups of people: leisure-oriented and work-oriented. Leisure-to-work spillove...

Work-Leisure Relations: Leisure Orientation and the Meaning of Work

This framing chapter has two primary purposes: to provide a frame-work for viewing and understanding the human (social) perspective on climate change, focusing on ethics and economics; and to defin ...

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Social, Economic, and Ethical Concepts and Methods

In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves - not artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And, like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Velleman finds rational grounds for morality, though not a rational guarantee. He maps a middle course between skepticism and rationalism, arguing that practical reasoning is 'pro-moral' without requiring moral action. The result is what he calls a 'Kinda Kantian metaethics'. How We Get Along is the summation of Velleman's thinking to date, incorporating and unifying previous work on agency, the self, the emotions, narrative and Kantian moral theory.

Well‐being and time

Citations

What Is Well-Being?

Pleasure and the good life : concerning the nature, varieties, and plausibility of hedonism

Work-Leisure Relations: Leisure Orientation and the Meaning of Work

Social, Economic, and Ethical Concepts and Methods

How We Get Along

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